{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00012022","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Distribution: Client `manifests.Get()` does not verify returned content against requested digest","revision":4,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.","NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-685w-q87j-wqw3","CVE-2026-85747"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for github.com/docker/distribution, github.com/distribution/distribution/v3. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-0abbc38435f839d88567cb5a988beb5d"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-15T20:22:03.000Z","value":"6.8 medium","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-8b23d303fbf71e073d645aff440e642d"},{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-18T14:16:56.910Z","value":"6.8 MEDIUM (3.1)","meaning":"security-advisories@github.com severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-434345473690ff1b3d25e3ad52dfec0f"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-11-04T12:03:12.000Z","value":"0.218%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.12359. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-0abbc38435f839d88567cb5a988beb5d"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-8b23d303fbf71e073d645aff440e642d","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-685w-q87j-wqw3","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-685w-q87j-wqw3","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-10-31T23:14:14.588Z"},{"id":"sr-434345473690ff1b3d25e3ad52dfec0f","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-85747","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.","title":"CVE-2026-85747","publisher":"NIST National Vulnerability Database","observed_at":"2026-11-04T09:59:21.684Z"},{"id":"sr-0abbc38435f839d88567cb5a988beb5d","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-85747","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-11-04T23:33:33.073Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-8b23d303fbf71e073d645aff440e642d"],"technology":"github.com/docker/distribution","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\n`registry/client.(*manifests).Get(ctx, dgst, …)` fetches a manifest by digest but never hashes the returned body and compares it against the requested digest. A malicious or compromised registry, or any MITM on the registry connection, can serve arbitrary manifest bytes in response to a digest-pinned request and the client returns the substituted content transparently to the caller. Any application relying on digest pinning for supply-chain integrity — image policy controllers, mirrors, pull-through caches — is silently undermined. The bundled pull-through proxy (`registry/proxy/proxymanifeststore.go`) is itself an unguarded consumer and is directly exploitable.\n\n### Details\n\n**Root cause:** `registry/client/repository.go:488-505` reads the response body and passes it directly to `distribution.UnmarshalManifest` without ever computing `digest.FromBytes(body)` and comparing against the caller-supplied `dgst`. The `Docker-Content-Digest` response header is parsed (lines 251-292 in `descriptorFromResponse`) only to populate an out-parameter (`ReturnContentDigest`) and is itself server-supplied — it is never recomputed from the body, so a lying server can set it to whateve","public_affected_ranges":["<= 2.8.3"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-8b23d303fbf71e073d645aff440e642d"],"technology":"github.com/distribution/distribution/v3","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\n`registry/client.(*manifests).Get(ctx, dgst, …)` fetches a manifest by digest but never hashes the returned body and compares it against the requested digest. A malicious or compromised registry, or any MITM on the registry connection, can serve arbitrary manifest bytes in response to a digest-pinned request and the client returns the substituted content transparently to the caller. Any application relying on digest pinning for supply-chain integrity — image policy controllers, mirrors, pull-through caches — is silently undermined. The bundled pull-through proxy (`registry/proxy/proxymanifeststore.go`) is itself an unguarded consumer and is directly exploitable.\n\n### Details\n\n**Root cause:** `registry/client/repository.go:488-505` reads the response body and passes it directly to `distribution.UnmarshalManifest` without ever computing `digest.FromBytes(body)` and comparing against the caller-supplied `dgst`. The `Docker-Content-Digest` response header is parsed (lines 251-292 in `descriptorFromResponse`) only to populate an out-parameter (`ReturnContentDigest`) and is itself server-supplied — it is never recomputed from the body, so a lying server can set it to whateve","public_affected_ranges":["< 3.1.2"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-07T14:01:58.748Z","source_updated_at":"2026-10-15T20:22:03.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-10-15T20:22:02.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T23:14:14.588Z"},{"id":"NVI-00012022","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Distribution: Client `manifests.Get()` does not verify returned content against requested digest","revision":3,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.","NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-685w-q87j-wqw3","CVE-2026-85747"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for github.com/docker/distribution, github.com/distribution/distribution/v3. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-426d6a152703087cd82fa491288ebf85"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-15T20:22:03.000Z","value":"6.8 medium","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-8b23d303fbf71e073d645aff440e642d"},{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-18T14:16:56.910Z","value":"6.8 MEDIUM (3.1)","meaning":"security-advisories@github.com severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-434345473690ff1b3d25e3ad52dfec0f"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-10-31T12:00:27.000Z","value":"0.218%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.12279. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-426d6a152703087cd82fa491288ebf85"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-8b23d303fbf71e073d645aff440e642d","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-685w-q87j-wqw3","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-685w-q87j-wqw3","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-10-31T23:14:14.588Z"},{"id":"sr-434345473690ff1b3d25e3ad52dfec0f","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-85747","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.","title":"CVE-2026-85747","publisher":"NIST National Vulnerability Database","observed_at":"2026-11-04T09:59:21.684Z"},{"id":"sr-426d6a152703087cd82fa491288ebf85","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-85747","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-11-01T01:39:43.087Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-8b23d303fbf71e073d645aff440e642d"],"technology":"github.com/docker/distribution","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\n`registry/client.(*manifests).Get(ctx, dgst, …)` fetches a manifest by digest but never hashes the returned body and compares it against the requested digest. A malicious or compromised registry, or any MITM on the registry connection, can serve arbitrary manifest bytes in response to a digest-pinned request and the client returns the substituted content transparently to the caller. Any application relying on digest pinning for supply-chain integrity — image policy controllers, mirrors, pull-through caches — is silently undermined. The bundled pull-through proxy (`registry/proxy/proxymanifeststore.go`) is itself an unguarded consumer and is directly exploitable.\n\n### Details\n\n**Root cause:** `registry/client/repository.go:488-505` reads the response body and passes it directly to `distribution.UnmarshalManifest` without ever computing `digest.FromBytes(body)` and comparing against the caller-supplied `dgst`. The `Docker-Content-Digest` response header is parsed (lines 251-292 in `descriptorFromResponse`) only to populate an out-parameter (`ReturnContentDigest`) and is itself server-supplied — it is never recomputed from the body, so a lying server can set it to whateve","public_affected_ranges":["<= 2.8.3"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-8b23d303fbf71e073d645aff440e642d"],"technology":"github.com/distribution/distribution/v3","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\n`registry/client.(*manifests).Get(ctx, dgst, …)` fetches a manifest by digest but never hashes the returned body and compares it against the requested digest. A malicious or compromised registry, or any MITM on the registry connection, can serve arbitrary manifest bytes in response to a digest-pinned request and the client returns the substituted content transparently to the caller. Any application relying on digest pinning for supply-chain integrity — image policy controllers, mirrors, pull-through caches — is silently undermined. The bundled pull-through proxy (`registry/proxy/proxymanifeststore.go`) is itself an unguarded consumer and is directly exploitable.\n\n### Details\n\n**Root cause:** `registry/client/repository.go:488-505` reads the response body and passes it directly to `distribution.UnmarshalManifest` without ever computing `digest.FromBytes(body)` and comparing against the caller-supplied `dgst`. The `Docker-Content-Digest` response header is parsed (lines 251-292 in `descriptorFromResponse`) only to populate an out-parameter (`ReturnContentDigest`) and is itself server-supplied — it is never recomputed from the body, so a lying server can set it to whateve","public_affected_ranges":["< 3.1.2"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-04T10:04:35.944Z","source_updated_at":"2026-10-15T20:22:03.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-10-15T20:22:02.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T23:14:14.588Z"},{"id":"NVI-00012022","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Distribution: Client `manifests.Get()` does not verify returned content against requested digest","revision":2,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-685w-q87j-wqw3","CVE-2026-85747"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for github.com/docker/distribution, github.com/distribution/distribution/v3. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-426d6a152703087cd82fa491288ebf85"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-15T20:22:03.000Z","value":"6.8 medium","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-8b23d303fbf71e073d645aff440e642d"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-10-31T12:00:27.000Z","value":"0.218%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.12279. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-426d6a152703087cd82fa491288ebf85"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-8b23d303fbf71e073d645aff440e642d","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-685w-q87j-wqw3","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-685w-q87j-wqw3","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-10-31T23:14:14.588Z"},{"id":"sr-426d6a152703087cd82fa491288ebf85","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-85747","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-11-01T01:39:43.087Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-8b23d303fbf71e073d645aff440e642d"],"technology":"github.com/docker/distribution","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\n`registry/client.(*manifests).Get(ctx, dgst, …)` fetches a manifest by digest but never hashes the returned body and compares it against the requested digest. A malicious or compromised registry, or any MITM on the registry connection, can serve arbitrary manifest bytes in response to a digest-pinned request and the client returns the substituted content transparently to the caller. Any application relying on digest pinning for supply-chain integrity — image policy controllers, mirrors, pull-through caches — is silently undermined. The bundled pull-through proxy (`registry/proxy/proxymanifeststore.go`) is itself an unguarded consumer and is directly exploitable.\n\n### Details\n\n**Root cause:** `registry/client/repository.go:488-505` reads the response body and passes it directly to `distribution.UnmarshalManifest` without ever computing `digest.FromBytes(body)` and comparing against the caller-supplied `dgst`. The `Docker-Content-Digest` response header is parsed (lines 251-292 in `descriptorFromResponse`) only to populate an out-parameter (`ReturnContentDigest`) and is itself server-supplied — it is never recomputed from the body, so a lying server can set it to whateve","public_affected_ranges":["<= 2.8.3"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-8b23d303fbf71e073d645aff440e642d"],"technology":"github.com/distribution/distribution/v3","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\n`registry/client.(*manifests).Get(ctx, dgst, …)` fetches a manifest by digest but never hashes the returned body and compares it against the requested digest. A malicious or compromised registry, or any MITM on the registry connection, can serve arbitrary manifest bytes in response to a digest-pinned request and the client returns the substituted content transparently to the caller. Any application relying on digest pinning for supply-chain integrity — image policy controllers, mirrors, pull-through caches — is silently undermined. The bundled pull-through proxy (`registry/proxy/proxymanifeststore.go`) is itself an unguarded consumer and is directly exploitable.\n\n### Details\n\n**Root cause:** `registry/client/repository.go:488-505` reads the response body and passes it directly to `distribution.UnmarshalManifest` without ever computing `digest.FromBytes(body)` and comparing against the caller-supplied `dgst`. The `Docker-Content-Digest` response header is parsed (lines 251-292 in `descriptorFromResponse`) only to populate an out-parameter (`ReturnContentDigest`) and is itself server-supplied — it is never recomputed from the body, so a lying server can set it to whateve","public_affected_ranges":["< 3.1.2"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-01T14:34:14.123Z","source_updated_at":"2026-10-15T20:22:03.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-10-15T20:22:02.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T23:14:14.588Z"},{"id":"NVI-00012022","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Distribution: Client `manifests.Get()` does not verify returned content against requested digest","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-685w-q87j-wqw3","CVE-2026-85747"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for github.com/docker/distribution, github.com/distribution/distribution/v3. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-8b23d303fbf71e073d645aff440e642d"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-15T20:22:03.000Z","value":"6.8 medium","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-8b23d303fbf71e073d645aff440e642d"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-8b23d303fbf71e073d645aff440e642d","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-685w-q87j-wqw3","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-685w-q87j-wqw3","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-10-31T23:14:14.588Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-8b23d303fbf71e073d645aff440e642d"],"technology":"github.com/docker/distribution","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\n`registry/client.(*manifests).Get(ctx, dgst, …)` fetches a manifest by digest but never hashes the returned body and compares it against the requested digest. A malicious or compromised registry, or any MITM on the registry connection, can serve arbitrary manifest bytes in response to a digest-pinned request and the client returns the substituted content transparently to the caller. Any application relying on digest pinning for supply-chain integrity — image policy controllers, mirrors, pull-through caches — is silently undermined. The bundled pull-through proxy (`registry/proxy/proxymanifeststore.go`) is itself an unguarded consumer and is directly exploitable.\n\n### Details\n\n**Root cause:** `registry/client/repository.go:488-505` reads the response body and passes it directly to `distribution.UnmarshalManifest` without ever computing `digest.FromBytes(body)` and comparing against the caller-supplied `dgst`. The `Docker-Content-Digest` response header is parsed (lines 251-292 in `descriptorFromResponse`) only to populate an out-parameter (`ReturnContentDigest`) and is itself server-supplied — it is never recomputed from the body, so a lying server can set it to whateve","public_affected_ranges":["<= 2.8.3"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-8b23d303fbf71e073d645aff440e642d"],"technology":"github.com/distribution/distribution/v3","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\n`registry/client.(*manifests).Get(ctx, dgst, …)` fetches a manifest by digest but never hashes the returned body and compares it against the requested digest. A malicious or compromised registry, or any MITM on the registry connection, can serve arbitrary manifest bytes in response to a digest-pinned request and the client returns the substituted content transparently to the caller. Any application relying on digest pinning for supply-chain integrity — image policy controllers, mirrors, pull-through caches — is silently undermined. The bundled pull-through proxy (`registry/proxy/proxymanifeststore.go`) is itself an unguarded consumer and is directly exploitable.\n\n### Details\n\n**Root cause:** `registry/client/repository.go:488-505` reads the response body and passes it directly to `distribution.UnmarshalManifest` without ever computing `digest.FromBytes(body)` and comparing against the caller-supplied `dgst`. The `Docker-Content-Digest` response header is parsed (lines 251-292 in `descriptorFromResponse`) only to populate an out-parameter (`ReturnContentDigest`) and is itself server-supplied — it is never recomputed from the body, so a lying server can set it to whateve","public_affected_ranges":["< 3.1.2"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-01T01:03:56.623Z","source_updated_at":"2026-10-15T20:22:03.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-10-15T20:22:02.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T23:14:14.588Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}