{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00012032","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Nx: Path traversal in nx migrate package-migrations extraction","revision":2,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-hrvq-x7jp-36xv","CVE-2026-104853"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for nx, nx. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-16ba36e9a4de4529fc4fadeaf3af7a82"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-11-04T12:03:12.000Z","value":"0.172%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.06624. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-16ba36e9a4de4529fc4fadeaf3af7a82"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-8f21f79114d7a7f8c6c5c80f3a8af9fc","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-hrvq-x7jp-36xv","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-hrvq-x7jp-36xv","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T00:59:16.959Z"},{"id":"sr-16ba36e9a4de4529fc4fadeaf3af7a82","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-104853","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-11-04T17:58:50.308Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-8f21f79114d7a7f8c6c5c80f3a8af9fc"],"technology":"nx","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`nx migrate` reads each target package's `nx-migrations.migrations` value from its manifest and extracts the referenced file to a path built by joining that value onto a temporary directory. The value is never validated, so a package whose `migrations` field contains `..` segments (or an absolute path) steers the extraction to write outside the temporary directory. A hostile package — or any package pulled in transitively through a trusted package's `packageGroup` — can write attacker-controlled content, or truncate an existing file, anywhere the running user can write. This happens during migration *planning*, before the user reviews the migration list and before `--run-migrations`, so it does not require the user to approve or execute anything.\n\n**Most workspaces need no action.** By default `nx migrate` does not run the nx installed in your workspace — it installs `nx@latest` into a temporary directory and performs the upgrade planning, including this extraction, with that copy. Now that a patched nx is the latest release, a default `nx migrate` run is unaffected whatever version the workspace has installed. The installed version only runs, and is only then exposed, ","public_affected_ranges":[">= 13.10.0, < 22.7.10"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-8f21f79114d7a7f8c6c5c80f3a8af9fc"],"technology":"nx","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`nx migrate` reads each target package's `nx-migrations.migrations` value from its manifest and extracts the referenced file to a path built by joining that value onto a temporary directory. The value is never validated, so a package whose `migrations` field contains `..` segments (or an absolute path) steers the extraction to write outside the temporary directory. A hostile package — or any package pulled in transitively through a trusted package's `packageGroup` — can write attacker-controlled content, or truncate an existing file, anywhere the running user can write. This happens during migration *planning*, before the user reviews the migration list and before `--run-migrations`, so it does not require the user to approve or execute anything.\n\n**Most workspaces need no action.** By default `nx migrate` does not run the nx installed in your workspace — it installs `nx@latest` into a temporary directory and performs the upgrade planning, including this extraction, with that copy. Now that a patched nx is the latest release, a default `nx migrate` run is unaffected whatever version the workspace has installed. The installed version only runs, and is only then exposed, ","public_affected_ranges":[">= 23.0.0, < 23.2.1"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-08T19:53:38.934Z","source_updated_at":"2026-10-05T23:28:36.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-10-05T23:28:35.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-01T00:59:16.959Z"},{"id":"NVI-00012032","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Nx: Path traversal in nx migrate package-migrations extraction","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-hrvq-x7jp-36xv","CVE-2026-104853"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for nx, nx. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-8f21f79114d7a7f8c6c5c80f3a8af9fc"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-8f21f79114d7a7f8c6c5c80f3a8af9fc","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-hrvq-x7jp-36xv","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-hrvq-x7jp-36xv","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T00:59:16.959Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-8f21f79114d7a7f8c6c5c80f3a8af9fc"],"technology":"nx","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`nx migrate` reads each target package's `nx-migrations.migrations` value from its manifest and extracts the referenced file to a path built by joining that value onto a temporary directory. The value is never validated, so a package whose `migrations` field contains `..` segments (or an absolute path) steers the extraction to write outside the temporary directory. A hostile package — or any package pulled in transitively through a trusted package's `packageGroup` — can write attacker-controlled content, or truncate an existing file, anywhere the running user can write. This happens during migration *planning*, before the user reviews the migration list and before `--run-migrations`, so it does not require the user to approve or execute anything.\n\n**Most workspaces need no action.** By default `nx migrate` does not run the nx installed in your workspace — it installs `nx@latest` into a temporary directory and performs the upgrade planning, including this extraction, with that copy. Now that a patched nx is the latest release, a default `nx migrate` run is unaffected whatever version the workspace has installed. The installed version only runs, and is only then exposed, ","public_affected_ranges":[">= 13.10.0, < 22.7.10"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-8f21f79114d7a7f8c6c5c80f3a8af9fc"],"technology":"nx","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`nx migrate` reads each target package's `nx-migrations.migrations` value from its manifest and extracts the referenced file to a path built by joining that value onto a temporary directory. The value is never validated, so a package whose `migrations` field contains `..` segments (or an absolute path) steers the extraction to write outside the temporary directory. A hostile package — or any package pulled in transitively through a trusted package's `packageGroup` — can write attacker-controlled content, or truncate an existing file, anywhere the running user can write. This happens during migration *planning*, before the user reviews the migration list and before `--run-migrations`, so it does not require the user to approve or execute anything.\n\n**Most workspaces need no action.** By default `nx migrate` does not run the nx installed in your workspace — it installs `nx@latest` into a temporary directory and performs the upgrade planning, including this extraction, with that copy. Now that a patched nx is the latest release, a default `nx migrate` run is unaffected whatever version the workspace has installed. The installed version only runs, and is only then exposed, ","public_affected_ranges":[">= 23.0.0, < 23.2.1"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-01T01:03:56.623Z","source_updated_at":"2026-10-05T23:28:36.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-10-05T23:28:35.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-01T00:59:16.959Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}