{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00012114","kind":"vulnerability","title":"KEDA: Privilege escalation from namespace admin to cluster admin via KEDA TriggerAuthentication","revision":3,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.","NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-637c-6jxx-4rwm","CVE-2026-77524"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for github.com/kedacore/keda, github.com/kedacore/keda/v2. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-152ed042a29f28d3d7204dfc37caa3ba"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-15T20:19:44.000Z","value":"9.9 critical","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-ab46694d8d3c3cecd0dd976b5be69d2c"},{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-20T02:17:11.973Z","value":"9.9 CRITICAL (3.1)","meaning":"security-advisories@github.com severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-749c4e047f3e759ffa5461eecd447601"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-11-02T12:00:30.000Z","value":"0.602%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.48784. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-152ed042a29f28d3d7204dfc37caa3ba"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-ab46694d8d3c3cecd0dd976b5be69d2c","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-637c-6jxx-4rwm","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-637c-6jxx-4rwm","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-10-31T23:14:14.588Z"},{"id":"sr-749c4e047f3e759ffa5461eecd447601","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-77524","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.","title":"CVE-2026-77524","publisher":"NIST National Vulnerability Database","observed_at":"2026-11-04T09:59:04.406Z"},{"id":"sr-152ed042a29f28d3d7204dfc37caa3ba","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-77524","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-11-02T20:15:58.863Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-ab46694d8d3c3cecd0dd976b5be69d2c"],"technology":"github.com/kedacore/keda","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nA namespace admin who creates a `TriggerAuthentication` and a `ScaledObject` in their own namespace can make the KEDA operator send its own ServiceAccount token to a tenant-controlled URL. That token holds `[\"*\"]/[\"*\"] get` cluster-wide, so it reads every Secret in every namespace, plus `batch/jobs` and `horizontalpodautoscalers` create/delete cluster-wide, `*/scale` update on any workload, `validatingwebhookconfigurations` update (rewrite or disable cluster admission), and `apiservices` update (hijack aggregated API routing). This is effectively privilege escalation from namespace admin to cluster admin in real environments: a cluster-wide Secret read alone is enough to find a token for a more privileged ServiceAccount, and the cluster-wide `batch/jobs` create lets the attacker run a workload in any namespace whose Pod Security Admission level permits it (or that is PSA-exempt, such as `kube-system` , `kyverno`) to reach the node filesystem and a control-plane kubeconfig.\n\nThis is an incomplete fix of CVE-2025-68476: its content filter only requires the loaded file to be a JWT whose subject begins with `system:serviceaccount:`, which the operator's own projected token ","public_affected_ranges":["<= 1.5.0"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-ab46694d8d3c3cecd0dd976b5be69d2c"],"technology":"github.com/kedacore/keda/v2","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nA namespace admin who creates a `TriggerAuthentication` and a `ScaledObject` in their own namespace can make the KEDA operator send its own ServiceAccount token to a tenant-controlled URL. That token holds `[\"*\"]/[\"*\"] get` cluster-wide, so it reads every Secret in every namespace, plus `batch/jobs` and `horizontalpodautoscalers` create/delete cluster-wide, `*/scale` update on any workload, `validatingwebhookconfigurations` update (rewrite or disable cluster admission), and `apiservices` update (hijack aggregated API routing). This is effectively privilege escalation from namespace admin to cluster admin in real environments: a cluster-wide Secret read alone is enough to find a token for a more privileged ServiceAccount, and the cluster-wide `batch/jobs` create lets the attacker run a workload in any namespace whose Pod Security Admission level permits it (or that is PSA-exempt, such as `kube-system` , `kyverno`) to reach the node filesystem and a control-plane kubeconfig.\n\nThis is an incomplete fix of CVE-2025-68476: its content filter only requires the loaded file to be a JWT whose subject begins with `system:serviceaccount:`, which the operator's own projected token ","public_affected_ranges":["< 2.21.0"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-08T15:11:49.353Z","source_updated_at":"2026-10-15T20:19:44.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-10-15T20:19:42.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T23:14:14.588Z"},{"id":"NVI-00012114","kind":"vulnerability","title":"KEDA: Privilege escalation from namespace admin to cluster admin via KEDA TriggerAuthentication","revision":2,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-637c-6jxx-4rwm","CVE-2026-77524"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for github.com/kedacore/keda, github.com/kedacore/keda/v2. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-152ed042a29f28d3d7204dfc37caa3ba"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-15T20:19:44.000Z","value":"9.9 critical","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-ab46694d8d3c3cecd0dd976b5be69d2c"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-11-02T12:00:30.000Z","value":"0.602%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.48784. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-152ed042a29f28d3d7204dfc37caa3ba"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-ab46694d8d3c3cecd0dd976b5be69d2c","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-637c-6jxx-4rwm","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-637c-6jxx-4rwm","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-10-31T23:14:14.588Z"},{"id":"sr-152ed042a29f28d3d7204dfc37caa3ba","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-77524","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-11-02T20:15:58.863Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-ab46694d8d3c3cecd0dd976b5be69d2c"],"technology":"github.com/kedacore/keda","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nA namespace admin who creates a `TriggerAuthentication` and a `ScaledObject` in their own namespace can make the KEDA operator send its own ServiceAccount token to a tenant-controlled URL. That token holds `[\"*\"]/[\"*\"] get` cluster-wide, so it reads every Secret in every namespace, plus `batch/jobs` and `horizontalpodautoscalers` create/delete cluster-wide, `*/scale` update on any workload, `validatingwebhookconfigurations` update (rewrite or disable cluster admission), and `apiservices` update (hijack aggregated API routing). This is effectively privilege escalation from namespace admin to cluster admin in real environments: a cluster-wide Secret read alone is enough to find a token for a more privileged ServiceAccount, and the cluster-wide `batch/jobs` create lets the attacker run a workload in any namespace whose Pod Security Admission level permits it (or that is PSA-exempt, such as `kube-system` , `kyverno`) to reach the node filesystem and a control-plane kubeconfig.\n\nThis is an incomplete fix of CVE-2025-68476: its content filter only requires the loaded file to be a JWT whose subject begins with `system:serviceaccount:`, which the operator's own projected token ","public_affected_ranges":["<= 1.5.0"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-ab46694d8d3c3cecd0dd976b5be69d2c"],"technology":"github.com/kedacore/keda/v2","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nA namespace admin who creates a `TriggerAuthentication` and a `ScaledObject` in their own namespace can make the KEDA operator send its own ServiceAccount token to a tenant-controlled URL. That token holds `[\"*\"]/[\"*\"] get` cluster-wide, so it reads every Secret in every namespace, plus `batch/jobs` and `horizontalpodautoscalers` create/delete cluster-wide, `*/scale` update on any workload, `validatingwebhookconfigurations` update (rewrite or disable cluster admission), and `apiservices` update (hijack aggregated API routing). This is effectively privilege escalation from namespace admin to cluster admin in real environments: a cluster-wide Secret read alone is enough to find a token for a more privileged ServiceAccount, and the cluster-wide `batch/jobs` create lets the attacker run a workload in any namespace whose Pod Security Admission level permits it (or that is PSA-exempt, such as `kube-system` , `kyverno`) to reach the node filesystem and a control-plane kubeconfig.\n\nThis is an incomplete fix of CVE-2025-68476: its content filter only requires the loaded file to be a JWT whose subject begins with `system:serviceaccount:`, which the operator's own projected token ","public_affected_ranges":["< 2.21.0"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-04T10:04:47.620Z","source_updated_at":"2026-10-15T20:19:44.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-10-15T20:19:42.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T23:14:14.588Z"},{"id":"NVI-00012114","kind":"vulnerability","title":"KEDA: Privilege escalation from namespace admin to cluster admin via KEDA TriggerAuthentication","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-637c-6jxx-4rwm","CVE-2026-77524"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for github.com/kedacore/keda, github.com/kedacore/keda/v2. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-ab46694d8d3c3cecd0dd976b5be69d2c"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-15T20:19:44.000Z","value":"9.9 critical","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-ab46694d8d3c3cecd0dd976b5be69d2c"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-ab46694d8d3c3cecd0dd976b5be69d2c","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-637c-6jxx-4rwm","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-637c-6jxx-4rwm","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-10-31T23:14:14.588Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-ab46694d8d3c3cecd0dd976b5be69d2c"],"technology":"github.com/kedacore/keda","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nA namespace admin who creates a `TriggerAuthentication` and a `ScaledObject` in their own namespace can make the KEDA operator send its own ServiceAccount token to a tenant-controlled URL. That token holds `[\"*\"]/[\"*\"] get` cluster-wide, so it reads every Secret in every namespace, plus `batch/jobs` and `horizontalpodautoscalers` create/delete cluster-wide, `*/scale` update on any workload, `validatingwebhookconfigurations` update (rewrite or disable cluster admission), and `apiservices` update (hijack aggregated API routing). This is effectively privilege escalation from namespace admin to cluster admin in real environments: a cluster-wide Secret read alone is enough to find a token for a more privileged ServiceAccount, and the cluster-wide `batch/jobs` create lets the attacker run a workload in any namespace whose Pod Security Admission level permits it (or that is PSA-exempt, such as `kube-system` , `kyverno`) to reach the node filesystem and a control-plane kubeconfig.\n\nThis is an incomplete fix of CVE-2025-68476: its content filter only requires the loaded file to be a JWT whose subject begins with `system:serviceaccount:`, which the operator's own projected token ","public_affected_ranges":["<= 1.5.0"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-ab46694d8d3c3cecd0dd976b5be69d2c"],"technology":"github.com/kedacore/keda/v2","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nA namespace admin who creates a `TriggerAuthentication` and a `ScaledObject` in their own namespace can make the KEDA operator send its own ServiceAccount token to a tenant-controlled URL. That token holds `[\"*\"]/[\"*\"] get` cluster-wide, so it reads every Secret in every namespace, plus `batch/jobs` and `horizontalpodautoscalers` create/delete cluster-wide, `*/scale` update on any workload, `validatingwebhookconfigurations` update (rewrite or disable cluster admission), and `apiservices` update (hijack aggregated API routing). This is effectively privilege escalation from namespace admin to cluster admin in real environments: a cluster-wide Secret read alone is enough to find a token for a more privileged ServiceAccount, and the cluster-wide `batch/jobs` create lets the attacker run a workload in any namespace whose Pod Security Admission level permits it (or that is PSA-exempt, such as `kube-system` , `kyverno`) to reach the node filesystem and a control-plane kubeconfig.\n\nThis is an incomplete fix of CVE-2025-68476: its content filter only requires the loaded file to be a JWT whose subject begins with `system:serviceaccount:`, which the operator's own projected token ","public_affected_ranges":["< 2.21.0"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-01T01:03:56.631Z","source_updated_at":"2026-10-15T20:19:44.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-10-15T20:19:42.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-10-31T23:14:14.588Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}