{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00012337","kind":"supply_chain_event","title":"Malicious code in @tvg-mar/promos-gtm (npm)","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-4mmr-x347-r6gv"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this malware advisory for @tvg-mar/promos-gtm. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-25d243c742e34dc3dcb4c671dc7acbfc"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-25d243c742e34dc3dcb4c671dc7acbfc","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-4mmr-x347-r6gv","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-4mmr-x347-r6gv","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T00:59:24.535Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-25d243c742e34dc3dcb4c671dc7acbfc"],"technology":"@tvg-mar/promos-gtm","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Source: amazon-inspector (0c4ce7a8a15cabec2c11f60085a7b3bac2cc905ef037e5ce28d6dd3dd847ef28)\n@tvg-mar/promos-gtm@9.9.10 executes an out-of-band DNS exfiltration routine both at install time (via a scripts.install hook running node index.js) and on require() (top-level module load chain reaching runtime/support/telemetry/probe/impl.js). The probe reads os.userInfo().username, os.hostname(), and process.cwd(), concatenates them with a timestamp and a prefix tag, and issues dns.resolve4 against a subdomain of a hardcoded attacker-controlled domain. The destination suffix (oob.algamil7x.xyz), prefix tag (tvggtm), Node built-in names (os, dns, process, userInfo, hostname, cwd, resolve4), and the internal _load API are stored as hex character-code arrays and reassembled at runtime via String.fromCharCode; the os and dns modules are loaded indirectly through module.constructor._load to further hide the behavior. The DNS channel bypasses typical HTTP egress controls and delivers installer host identifiers to attacker infrastructure with no relation to the package's advertised purpose.\n\n---\n\nCredit: OpenSSF ([source](https://github.com/ossf/ma","public_affected_ranges":["= 9.9.10"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-01T01:45:40.756Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-23T00:31:21.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-09-23T00:31:21.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-01T00:59:24.535Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}