{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00012908","kind":"vulnerability","title":"mpp vulnerable to Gas Draining with access list","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-qpxh-ff8m-c62v"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for mpp. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-0421563916f482a1b36f12871df31bab"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-0421563916f482a1b36f12871df31bab","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-qpxh-ff8m-c62v","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-qpxh-ff8m-c62v","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T07:24:25.558Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-0421563916f482a1b36f12871df31bab"],"technology":"mpp","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Details\nWhen the server acts as the fee_payer, `mpp` Elixir 0.4.0 copies the client-supplied EIP-2930 access list verbatim into the cosigned fee-payer transaction. In `cosign_fee_payer`, the server re-signs the raw `base_fields` (index 5 of the 0x76 AASigned envelope) without inspecting the access list field, which is part of the signed payload.\n\nAccess list gas is charged **intrinsically** — before any opcode executes — regardless of whether the listed addresses are ever touched.\n\nAn attacker submits a valid `transferWithMemo` alongside fabricated address-only access list entries. The server validates calldata and amount but never inspects `access_list` length. It cosigns and broadcasts a transaction that costs the fee-payer wallet `N × 2,400` extra gas per request with no corresponding work performed on-chain.\n\nAt the default of 137 entries and 100 Gwei `max_fee_per_gas`, this inflates the fee-payer cost from the normal ~51,287 gas to ~380,087 gas — a **7.4× multiplier** — while staying within Bandit's default 10,000-byte per-header-field limit (verified empirically).\n\n### PoC\nThe PoC is provided below. It is configured to reproduce the attack on Tempo Moderate testnet within","public_affected_ranges":[">= 0.2.0, < 0.6.0"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-01T07:29:12.901Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-25T21:45:26.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-09-25T21:45:16.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-01T07:24:25.558Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}