{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00012935","kind":"vulnerability","title":" Plug: quadratic-time decoding of nested query/body parameters enables denial of service","revision":2,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.","NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-j43x-5hjq-rgxf","CVE-2026-54892"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for plug, plug, plug, plug, plug. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-24b5d3ce0b34fbb57aea32dc70765f70"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-25T23:10:00.167Z","value":"8.7 HIGH (4.0)","meaning":"6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-24b5d3ce0b34fbb57aea32dc70765f70"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-1370efc154c604622f8b8ba87d56239f","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-j43x-5hjq-rgxf","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-j43x-5hjq-rgxf","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T07:25:10.521Z"},{"id":"sr-24b5d3ce0b34fbb57aea32dc70765f70","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-54892","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.","title":"CVE-2026-54892","publisher":"NIST National Vulnerability Database","observed_at":"2026-11-03T22:35:50.402Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-1370efc154c604622f8b8ba87d56239f"],"technology":"plug","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\nPlug's nested-parameter decoder (`Plug.Conn.Query`) parses URL-encoded keys in time quadratic in their bracket-nesting depth. Any unauthenticated remote attacker that can reach a Plug-based HTTP endpoint can pin a BEAM scheduler for minutes with a single small request.\n\n### Details\n\nFor a key like `a[a][a]...=1`, `Plug.Conn.Query.split_keys/6` (in `lib/plug/conn/query.ex`) builds an accumulator of `:binary.part` prefixes (`a`, `a[a]`, `a[a][a]`, …) that grow ~3 bytes per level. `Plug.Conn.Query.insert_keys/3` then does one `Map.put` per level keyed on that growing prefix, hashing the full byte range each time, and `Plug.Conn.Query.finalize_pointer/2` repeats the prefix-keyed walk to materialize the structure. Total cost is `O(N²)` in nesting depth.\n\nThe same code path handles query strings, `application/x-www-form-urlencoded` bodies, and multipart field names via `Plug.Conn.Query.decode/4` and `decode_each/2`. The default `Plug.Parsers.URLENCODED` cap is 1 MB (~333,000 nesting levels), but `Plug.Parsers` accepts urlencoded payloads up to its overall body limit (20 MB by default), so an attacker can scale the per-request work well beyond the urlencoded-specific cap. The","public_affected_ranges":[">= 1.15.0, < 1.15.5"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-1370efc154c604622f8b8ba87d56239f"],"technology":"plug","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\nPlug's nested-parameter decoder (`Plug.Conn.Query`) parses URL-encoded keys in time quadratic in their bracket-nesting depth. Any unauthenticated remote attacker that can reach a Plug-based HTTP endpoint can pin a BEAM scheduler for minutes with a single small request.\n\n### Details\n\nFor a key like `a[a][a]...=1`, `Plug.Conn.Query.split_keys/6` (in `lib/plug/conn/query.ex`) builds an accumulator of `:binary.part` prefixes (`a`, `a[a]`, `a[a][a]`, …) that grow ~3 bytes per level. `Plug.Conn.Query.insert_keys/3` then does one `Map.put` per level keyed on that growing prefix, hashing the full byte range each time, and `Plug.Conn.Query.finalize_pointer/2` repeats the prefix-keyed walk to materialize the structure. Total cost is `O(N²)` in nesting depth.\n\nThe same code path handles query strings, `application/x-www-form-urlencoded` bodies, and multipart field names via `Plug.Conn.Query.decode/4` and `decode_each/2`. The default `Plug.Parsers.URLENCODED` cap is 1 MB (~333,000 nesting levels), but `Plug.Parsers` accepts urlencoded payloads up to its overall body limit (20 MB by default), so an attacker can scale the per-request work well beyond the urlencoded-specific cap. The","public_affected_ranges":[">= 1.16.0, < 1.16.4"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-1370efc154c604622f8b8ba87d56239f"],"technology":"plug","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\nPlug's nested-parameter decoder (`Plug.Conn.Query`) parses URL-encoded keys in time quadratic in their bracket-nesting depth. Any unauthenticated remote attacker that can reach a Plug-based HTTP endpoint can pin a BEAM scheduler for minutes with a single small request.\n\n### Details\n\nFor a key like `a[a][a]...=1`, `Plug.Conn.Query.split_keys/6` (in `lib/plug/conn/query.ex`) builds an accumulator of `:binary.part` prefixes (`a`, `a[a]`, `a[a][a]`, …) that grow ~3 bytes per level. `Plug.Conn.Query.insert_keys/3` then does one `Map.put` per level keyed on that growing prefix, hashing the full byte range each time, and `Plug.Conn.Query.finalize_pointer/2` repeats the prefix-keyed walk to materialize the structure. Total cost is `O(N²)` in nesting depth.\n\nThe same code path handles query strings, `application/x-www-form-urlencoded` bodies, and multipart field names via `Plug.Conn.Query.decode/4` and `decode_each/2`. The default `Plug.Parsers.URLENCODED` cap is 1 MB (~333,000 nesting levels), but `Plug.Parsers` accepts urlencoded payloads up to its overall body limit (20 MB by default), so an attacker can scale the per-request work well beyond the urlencoded-specific cap. The","public_affected_ranges":[">= 1.17.0, < 1.17.2"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-1370efc154c604622f8b8ba87d56239f"],"technology":"plug","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\nPlug's nested-parameter decoder (`Plug.Conn.Query`) parses URL-encoded keys in time quadratic in their bracket-nesting depth. Any unauthenticated remote attacker that can reach a Plug-based HTTP endpoint can pin a BEAM scheduler for minutes with a single small request.\n\n### Details\n\nFor a key like `a[a][a]...=1`, `Plug.Conn.Query.split_keys/6` (in `lib/plug/conn/query.ex`) builds an accumulator of `:binary.part` prefixes (`a`, `a[a]`, `a[a][a]`, …) that grow ~3 bytes per level. `Plug.Conn.Query.insert_keys/3` then does one `Map.put` per level keyed on that growing prefix, hashing the full byte range each time, and `Plug.Conn.Query.finalize_pointer/2` repeats the prefix-keyed walk to materialize the structure. Total cost is `O(N²)` in nesting depth.\n\nThe same code path handles query strings, `application/x-www-form-urlencoded` bodies, and multipart field names via `Plug.Conn.Query.decode/4` and `decode_each/2`. The default `Plug.Parsers.URLENCODED` cap is 1 MB (~333,000 nesting levels), but `Plug.Parsers` accepts urlencoded payloads up to its overall body limit (20 MB by default), so an attacker can scale the per-request work well beyond the urlencoded-specific cap. The","public_affected_ranges":[">= 1.18.0, < 1.18.3"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-1370efc154c604622f8b8ba87d56239f"],"technology":"plug","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\nPlug's nested-parameter decoder (`Plug.Conn.Query`) parses URL-encoded keys in time quadratic in their bracket-nesting depth. Any unauthenticated remote attacker that can reach a Plug-based HTTP endpoint can pin a BEAM scheduler for minutes with a single small request.\n\n### Details\n\nFor a key like `a[a][a]...=1`, `Plug.Conn.Query.split_keys/6` (in `lib/plug/conn/query.ex`) builds an accumulator of `:binary.part` prefixes (`a`, `a[a]`, `a[a][a]`, …) that grow ~3 bytes per level. `Plug.Conn.Query.insert_keys/3` then does one `Map.put` per level keyed on that growing prefix, hashing the full byte range each time, and `Plug.Conn.Query.finalize_pointer/2` repeats the prefix-keyed walk to materialize the structure. Total cost is `O(N²)` in nesting depth.\n\nThe same code path handles query strings, `application/x-www-form-urlencoded` bodies, and multipart field names via `Plug.Conn.Query.decode/4` and `decode_each/2`. The default `Plug.Parsers.URLENCODED` cap is 1 MB (~333,000 nesting levels), but `Plug.Parsers` accepts urlencoded payloads up to its overall body limit (20 MB by default), so an attacker can scale the per-request work well beyond the urlencoded-specific cap. The","public_affected_ranges":[">= 1.19.0, < 1.19.3"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-04T10:04:35.921Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-23T14:00:23.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-09-23T14:00:22.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-01T07:25:10.521Z"},{"id":"NVI-00012935","kind":"vulnerability","title":" Plug: quadratic-time decoding of nested query/body parameters enables denial of service","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-j43x-5hjq-rgxf","CVE-2026-54892"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for plug, plug, plug, plug, plug. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-1370efc154c604622f8b8ba87d56239f"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-1370efc154c604622f8b8ba87d56239f","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-j43x-5hjq-rgxf","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-j43x-5hjq-rgxf","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T07:25:10.521Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-1370efc154c604622f8b8ba87d56239f"],"technology":"plug","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\nPlug's nested-parameter decoder (`Plug.Conn.Query`) parses URL-encoded keys in time quadratic in their bracket-nesting depth. Any unauthenticated remote attacker that can reach a Plug-based HTTP endpoint can pin a BEAM scheduler for minutes with a single small request.\n\n### Details\n\nFor a key like `a[a][a]...=1`, `Plug.Conn.Query.split_keys/6` (in `lib/plug/conn/query.ex`) builds an accumulator of `:binary.part` prefixes (`a`, `a[a]`, `a[a][a]`, …) that grow ~3 bytes per level. `Plug.Conn.Query.insert_keys/3` then does one `Map.put` per level keyed on that growing prefix, hashing the full byte range each time, and `Plug.Conn.Query.finalize_pointer/2` repeats the prefix-keyed walk to materialize the structure. Total cost is `O(N²)` in nesting depth.\n\nThe same code path handles query strings, `application/x-www-form-urlencoded` bodies, and multipart field names via `Plug.Conn.Query.decode/4` and `decode_each/2`. The default `Plug.Parsers.URLENCODED` cap is 1 MB (~333,000 nesting levels), but `Plug.Parsers` accepts urlencoded payloads up to its overall body limit (20 MB by default), so an attacker can scale the per-request work well beyond the urlencoded-specific cap. The","public_affected_ranges":[">= 1.15.0, < 1.15.5"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-1370efc154c604622f8b8ba87d56239f"],"technology":"plug","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\nPlug's nested-parameter decoder (`Plug.Conn.Query`) parses URL-encoded keys in time quadratic in their bracket-nesting depth. Any unauthenticated remote attacker that can reach a Plug-based HTTP endpoint can pin a BEAM scheduler for minutes with a single small request.\n\n### Details\n\nFor a key like `a[a][a]...=1`, `Plug.Conn.Query.split_keys/6` (in `lib/plug/conn/query.ex`) builds an accumulator of `:binary.part` prefixes (`a`, `a[a]`, `a[a][a]`, …) that grow ~3 bytes per level. `Plug.Conn.Query.insert_keys/3` then does one `Map.put` per level keyed on that growing prefix, hashing the full byte range each time, and `Plug.Conn.Query.finalize_pointer/2` repeats the prefix-keyed walk to materialize the structure. Total cost is `O(N²)` in nesting depth.\n\nThe same code path handles query strings, `application/x-www-form-urlencoded` bodies, and multipart field names via `Plug.Conn.Query.decode/4` and `decode_each/2`. The default `Plug.Parsers.URLENCODED` cap is 1 MB (~333,000 nesting levels), but `Plug.Parsers` accepts urlencoded payloads up to its overall body limit (20 MB by default), so an attacker can scale the per-request work well beyond the urlencoded-specific cap. The","public_affected_ranges":[">= 1.16.0, < 1.16.4"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-1370efc154c604622f8b8ba87d56239f"],"technology":"plug","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\nPlug's nested-parameter decoder (`Plug.Conn.Query`) parses URL-encoded keys in time quadratic in their bracket-nesting depth. Any unauthenticated remote attacker that can reach a Plug-based HTTP endpoint can pin a BEAM scheduler for minutes with a single small request.\n\n### Details\n\nFor a key like `a[a][a]...=1`, `Plug.Conn.Query.split_keys/6` (in `lib/plug/conn/query.ex`) builds an accumulator of `:binary.part` prefixes (`a`, `a[a]`, `a[a][a]`, …) that grow ~3 bytes per level. `Plug.Conn.Query.insert_keys/3` then does one `Map.put` per level keyed on that growing prefix, hashing the full byte range each time, and `Plug.Conn.Query.finalize_pointer/2` repeats the prefix-keyed walk to materialize the structure. Total cost is `O(N²)` in nesting depth.\n\nThe same code path handles query strings, `application/x-www-form-urlencoded` bodies, and multipart field names via `Plug.Conn.Query.decode/4` and `decode_each/2`. The default `Plug.Parsers.URLENCODED` cap is 1 MB (~333,000 nesting levels), but `Plug.Parsers` accepts urlencoded payloads up to its overall body limit (20 MB by default), so an attacker can scale the per-request work well beyond the urlencoded-specific cap. The","public_affected_ranges":[">= 1.17.0, < 1.17.2"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-1370efc154c604622f8b8ba87d56239f"],"technology":"plug","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\nPlug's nested-parameter decoder (`Plug.Conn.Query`) parses URL-encoded keys in time quadratic in their bracket-nesting depth. Any unauthenticated remote attacker that can reach a Plug-based HTTP endpoint can pin a BEAM scheduler for minutes with a single small request.\n\n### Details\n\nFor a key like `a[a][a]...=1`, `Plug.Conn.Query.split_keys/6` (in `lib/plug/conn/query.ex`) builds an accumulator of `:binary.part` prefixes (`a`, `a[a]`, `a[a][a]`, …) that grow ~3 bytes per level. `Plug.Conn.Query.insert_keys/3` then does one `Map.put` per level keyed on that growing prefix, hashing the full byte range each time, and `Plug.Conn.Query.finalize_pointer/2` repeats the prefix-keyed walk to materialize the structure. Total cost is `O(N²)` in nesting depth.\n\nThe same code path handles query strings, `application/x-www-form-urlencoded` bodies, and multipart field names via `Plug.Conn.Query.decode/4` and `decode_each/2`. The default `Plug.Parsers.URLENCODED` cap is 1 MB (~333,000 nesting levels), but `Plug.Parsers` accepts urlencoded payloads up to its overall body limit (20 MB by default), so an attacker can scale the per-request work well beyond the urlencoded-specific cap. The","public_affected_ranges":[">= 1.18.0, < 1.18.3"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-1370efc154c604622f8b8ba87d56239f"],"technology":"plug","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\nPlug's nested-parameter decoder (`Plug.Conn.Query`) parses URL-encoded keys in time quadratic in their bracket-nesting depth. Any unauthenticated remote attacker that can reach a Plug-based HTTP endpoint can pin a BEAM scheduler for minutes with a single small request.\n\n### Details\n\nFor a key like `a[a][a]...=1`, `Plug.Conn.Query.split_keys/6` (in `lib/plug/conn/query.ex`) builds an accumulator of `:binary.part` prefixes (`a`, `a[a]`, `a[a][a]`, …) that grow ~3 bytes per level. `Plug.Conn.Query.insert_keys/3` then does one `Map.put` per level keyed on that growing prefix, hashing the full byte range each time, and `Plug.Conn.Query.finalize_pointer/2` repeats the prefix-keyed walk to materialize the structure. Total cost is `O(N²)` in nesting depth.\n\nThe same code path handles query strings, `application/x-www-form-urlencoded` bodies, and multipart field names via `Plug.Conn.Query.decode/4` and `decode_each/2`. The default `Plug.Parsers.URLENCODED` cap is 1 MB (~333,000 nesting levels), but `Plug.Parsers` accepts urlencoded payloads up to its overall body limit (20 MB by default), so an attacker can scale the per-request work well beyond the urlencoded-specific cap. The","public_affected_ranges":[">= 1.19.0, < 1.19.3"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-01T07:29:12.903Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-23T14:00:23.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-09-23T14:00:22.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-01T07:25:10.521Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}