{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00013008","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Nautobot: Authorization bypass in approval workflow REST API allows self-approval and unauthorized activation of scheduled jobs","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-q4c5-2j6f-r476","CVE-2026-83805"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for nautobot. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-377618a8998d7a64804606d9fa13905d"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-09-22T20:37:37.000Z","value":"6.4 medium","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-377618a8998d7a64804606d9fa13905d"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-377618a8998d7a64804606d9fa13905d","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-q4c5-2j6f-r476","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-q4c5-2j6f-r476","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T07:25:10.521Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-377618a8998d7a64804606d9fa13905d"],"technology":"nautobot","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\nThis is an authorization bypass that escalates into unauthorized server-side job execution.\n\n1. Primary impact - self-approval: The approver checks (approver-group membership, `change` permission on the object under review, one-response-per-user) are enforced only in the `approve`/`deny` actions on `ApprovalWorkflowStage`. The generic `ApprovalWorkflowStageResponse` create endpoint enforces none of them, so a user holding only `extras.add_approvalworkflowstageresponse` can `POST` approved responses directly and drive a stage past its `min_approvers` threshold with no legitimate approver involved. The serializer also exposes `user` and `state` as writable, letting the attacker attribute responses to arbitrary users.\n\n2. Escalated impact  job activation: Because the approval workflow gates a `ScheduledJob`, self-approval does not stop at the approval record. Stage approval cascades through `ApprovalWorkflow.save()` to `on_workflow_approved()`, which sets the target job to enabled/active.\n\n### Patches\n\nFixed in Nautobot v3.1.8\n\n### Workarounds\nRestrict the `extras.add_approvalworkflowstageresponse` permission so that no untrusted user holds it; approval responses should onl","public_affected_ranges":[">= 3.0.0, < 3.1.8"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-01T07:29:12.908Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-22T20:37:37.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-09-22T20:37:33.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-01T07:25:10.521Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}