{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00013048","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Trigger.dev: Cross-tenant SQL injection in the TSQL query compiler (POST /api/v1/query) via unsanitized window-function name","revision":2,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-9q4r-4842-93vw","CVE-2026-114081"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for trigger.dev. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-48c395ce983b1f5ac346916c62c82d61"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null},{"summary":"The original advisory lists fixed boundaries 4.5.6 for trigger.dev. Confirm the publisher’s latest guidance.","source_ids":["sr-20011d7d655d3737d83a2b4a14767858"],"action_type":"vendor_patch","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-02T22:42:23.000Z","value":"7.7 high","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-48c395ce983b1f5ac346916c62c82d61"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-48c395ce983b1f5ac346916c62c82d61","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-9q4r-4842-93vw","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-9q4r-4842-93vw","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T01:40:00.567Z"},{"id":"sr-20011d7d655d3737d83a2b4a14767858","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-9q4r-4842-93vw","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub-origin advisory, CC-BY-4.0; OSV is an aggregate copy, not independent corroboration.","title":"GHSA-9q4r-4842-93vw","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database via OSV","observed_at":"2026-11-08T01:48:04.563Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-48c395ce983b1f5ac346916c62c82d61"],"technology":"trigger.dev","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\nA cross-tenant SQL injection in the TSQL query compiler lets **any authenticated trigger.dev customer read every other tenant's analytics data**. The customer-facing query endpoint `POST /api/v1/query` accepts a TSQL/TRQL query that is compiled to ClickHouse SQL by `internal-packages/tsql`. The compiler parameterizes or escapes all user input and injects a per-tenant `WHERE` guard — **except the window-function name**, which is concatenated into the SQL string with no allowlist and no escaping. By smuggling a backtick-quoted identifier into that position, an attacker injects a raw subquery (e.g. `(SELECT ... FROM task_runs_v2 WHERE organization_id = 'org_VICTIM')`) that sits **outside** the tenant guard, exfiltrating another organization's rows. Verified end-to-end against the real compiler and a live ClickHouse.\n\n### Details\n\n**Vulnerable sink** — `internal-packages/tsql/src/query/printer.ts:3073-3075`, `ClickHousePrinter.visitWindowFunction`:\n\n```ts\nprivate visitWindowFunction(node: WindowFunction): string {\n  const args = node.args ? node.args.map((a) => this.visit(a)) : [];\n  const funcCall = `${node.name}(${args.join(\", \")})`;   // <-- node.name concatenated RAW\n ","public_affected_ranges":["<= 4.5.5"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-20011d7d655d3737d83a2b4a14767858"],"technology":"trigger.dev","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\nA cross-tenant SQL injection in the TSQL query compiler lets **any authenticated trigger.dev customer read every other tenant's analytics data**. The customer-facing query endpoint `POST /api/v1/query` accepts a TSQL/TRQL query that is compiled to ClickHouse SQL by `internal-packages/tsql`. The compiler parameterizes or escapes all user input and injects a per-tenant `WHERE` guard — **except the window-function name**, which is concatenated into the SQL string with no allowlist and no escaping. By smuggling a backtick-quoted identifier into that position, an attacker injects a raw subquery (e.g. `(SELECT ... FROM task_runs_v2 WHERE organization_id = 'org_VICTIM')`) that sits **outside** the tenant guard, exfiltrating another organization's rows. Verified end-to-end against the real compiler and a live ClickHouse.\n\n### Details\n\n**Vulnerable sink** — `internal-packages/tsql/src/query/printer.ts:3073-3075`, `ClickHousePrinter.visitWindowFunction`:\n\n```ts\nprivate visitWindowFunction(node: WindowFunction): string {\n  const args = node.args ? node.args.map((a) => this.visit(a)) : [];\n  const funcCall = `${node.name}(${args.join(\", \")})`;   // <-- node.name concatenated RAW\n ","public_affected_ranges":["SEMVER: introduced 0; fixed 4.5.6"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-08T08:10:35.856Z","source_updated_at":"2026-10-02T22:42:23.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-10-02T22:42:20.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-01T01:40:00.567Z"},{"id":"NVI-00013048","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Trigger.dev: Cross-tenant SQL injection in the TSQL query compiler (POST /api/v1/query) via unsanitized window-function name","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-9q4r-4842-93vw"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for trigger.dev. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-48c395ce983b1f5ac346916c62c82d61"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-02T22:42:23.000Z","value":"7.7 high","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-48c395ce983b1f5ac346916c62c82d61"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-48c395ce983b1f5ac346916c62c82d61","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-9q4r-4842-93vw","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-9q4r-4842-93vw","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T01:40:00.567Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-48c395ce983b1f5ac346916c62c82d61"],"technology":"trigger.dev","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\nA cross-tenant SQL injection in the TSQL query compiler lets **any authenticated trigger.dev customer read every other tenant's analytics data**. The customer-facing query endpoint `POST /api/v1/query` accepts a TSQL/TRQL query that is compiled to ClickHouse SQL by `internal-packages/tsql`. The compiler parameterizes or escapes all user input and injects a per-tenant `WHERE` guard — **except the window-function name**, which is concatenated into the SQL string with no allowlist and no escaping. By smuggling a backtick-quoted identifier into that position, an attacker injects a raw subquery (e.g. `(SELECT ... FROM task_runs_v2 WHERE organization_id = 'org_VICTIM')`) that sits **outside** the tenant guard, exfiltrating another organization's rows. Verified end-to-end against the real compiler and a live ClickHouse.\n\n### Details\n\n**Vulnerable sink** — `internal-packages/tsql/src/query/printer.ts:3073-3075`, `ClickHousePrinter.visitWindowFunction`:\n\n```ts\nprivate visitWindowFunction(node: WindowFunction): string {\n  const args = node.args ? node.args.map((a) => this.visit(a)) : [];\n  const funcCall = `${node.name}(${args.join(\", \")})`;   // <-- node.name concatenated RAW\n ","public_affected_ranges":["<= 4.5.5"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-01T07:29:12.912Z","source_updated_at":"2026-10-02T22:42:23.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-10-02T22:42:20.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-01T01:40:00.567Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}