{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00013070","kind":"vulnerability","title":"brace-expansion: DoS via uncontrolled recursion in parseCommaParts causing stack exhaustion","revision":3,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-6j4f-fj2g-mc7p","CVE-2026-102276"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for brace-expansion, brace-expansion, brace-expansion, brace-expansion. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-0a01f80409f4fb2fa416897c7bd1fd11"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-09-29T23:44:59.000Z","value":"7.5 high","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-51fe081b86f7d758d7e40aba5181912d"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-11-04T12:03:12.000Z","value":"0.455%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.39624. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-0a01f80409f4fb2fa416897c7bd1fd11"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-51fe081b86f7d758d7e40aba5181912d","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-6j4f-fj2g-mc7p","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-6j4f-fj2g-mc7p","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T07:24:25.558Z"},{"id":"sr-0a01f80409f4fb2fa416897c7bd1fd11","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-102276","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-11-04T17:58:50.308Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-51fe081b86f7d758d7e40aba5181912d"],"technology":"brace-expansion","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\n`parseCommaParts()` can exhaust the native stack and crash the process. There are two distinct ways to trigger it, both reachable from a single untrusted pattern string.\n\nThis is the parsing-side counterpart to CVE-2026-14257 / GHSA-mh99-v99m-4gvg. That fix made `expand_()` iterative and documented a constant-stack-depth guarantee, but `parseCommaParts()` was left recursive, so the guarantee only held for one of the two parsing paths.\n\n### Vector 1 - unbounded recursion on `post`\n\n`parseCommaParts()` recursed on the remainder of the string once per brace group:\n\n```js\nconst postParts = parseCommaParts(post)   // unbounded\n```\n\nA brace group containing many comma-separated groups drives one recursion level per group:\n\n```js\nexpand('{' + '{a},'.repeat(7000) + 'b}')\n// RangeError: Maximum call stack size exceeded\n```\n\nAbout 7,300 repetitions - roughly 29 KB of input - is enough on Node 24; roughly 6,300 (25 KB) on Node 18. The threshold is identical on every affected release line.\n\n### Vector 2 - `push.apply` with an unbounded array\n\nEven with the recursion removed, `parseCommaParts()` spread whole arrays into an argument list:\n\n```js\np.push.apply(p, postParts)\nparts.push","public_affected_ranges":[">= 4.0.0, < 5.0.10"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-51fe081b86f7d758d7e40aba5181912d"],"technology":"brace-expansion","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\n`parseCommaParts()` can exhaust the native stack and crash the process. There are two distinct ways to trigger it, both reachable from a single untrusted pattern string.\n\nThis is the parsing-side counterpart to CVE-2026-14257 / GHSA-mh99-v99m-4gvg. That fix made `expand_()` iterative and documented a constant-stack-depth guarantee, but `parseCommaParts()` was left recursive, so the guarantee only held for one of the two parsing paths.\n\n### Vector 1 - unbounded recursion on `post`\n\n`parseCommaParts()` recursed on the remainder of the string once per brace group:\n\n```js\nconst postParts = parseCommaParts(post)   // unbounded\n```\n\nA brace group containing many comma-separated groups drives one recursion level per group:\n\n```js\nexpand('{' + '{a},'.repeat(7000) + 'b}')\n// RangeError: Maximum call stack size exceeded\n```\n\nAbout 7,300 repetitions - roughly 29 KB of input - is enough on Node 24; roughly 6,300 (25 KB) on Node 18. The threshold is identical on every affected release line.\n\n### Vector 2 - `push.apply` with an unbounded array\n\nEven with the recursion removed, `parseCommaParts()` spread whole arrays into an argument list:\n\n```js\np.push.apply(p, postParts)\nparts.push","public_affected_ranges":[">= 3.0.0, < 3.0.7"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-51fe081b86f7d758d7e40aba5181912d"],"technology":"brace-expansion","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\n`parseCommaParts()` can exhaust the native stack and crash the process. There are two distinct ways to trigger it, both reachable from a single untrusted pattern string.\n\nThis is the parsing-side counterpart to CVE-2026-14257 / GHSA-mh99-v99m-4gvg. That fix made `expand_()` iterative and documented a constant-stack-depth guarantee, but `parseCommaParts()` was left recursive, so the guarantee only held for one of the two parsing paths.\n\n### Vector 1 - unbounded recursion on `post`\n\n`parseCommaParts()` recursed on the remainder of the string once per brace group:\n\n```js\nconst postParts = parseCommaParts(post)   // unbounded\n```\n\nA brace group containing many comma-separated groups drives one recursion level per group:\n\n```js\nexpand('{' + '{a},'.repeat(7000) + 'b}')\n// RangeError: Maximum call stack size exceeded\n```\n\nAbout 7,300 repetitions - roughly 29 KB of input - is enough on Node 24; roughly 6,300 (25 KB) on Node 18. The threshold is identical on every affected release line.\n\n### Vector 2 - `push.apply` with an unbounded array\n\nEven with the recursion removed, `parseCommaParts()` spread whole arrays into an argument list:\n\n```js\np.push.apply(p, postParts)\nparts.push","public_affected_ranges":[">= 2.0.0, < 2.1.5"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-51fe081b86f7d758d7e40aba5181912d"],"technology":"brace-expansion","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\n`parseCommaParts()` can exhaust the native stack and crash the process. There are two distinct ways to trigger it, both reachable from a single untrusted pattern string.\n\nThis is the parsing-side counterpart to CVE-2026-14257 / GHSA-mh99-v99m-4gvg. That fix made `expand_()` iterative and documented a constant-stack-depth guarantee, but `parseCommaParts()` was left recursive, so the guarantee only held for one of the two parsing paths.\n\n### Vector 1 - unbounded recursion on `post`\n\n`parseCommaParts()` recursed on the remainder of the string once per brace group:\n\n```js\nconst postParts = parseCommaParts(post)   // unbounded\n```\n\nA brace group containing many comma-separated groups drives one recursion level per group:\n\n```js\nexpand('{' + '{a},'.repeat(7000) + 'b}')\n// RangeError: Maximum call stack size exceeded\n```\n\nAbout 7,300 repetitions - roughly 29 KB of input - is enough on Node 24; roughly 6,300 (25 KB) on Node 18. The threshold is identical on every affected release line.\n\n### Vector 2 - `push.apply` with an unbounded array\n\nEven with the recursion removed, `parseCommaParts()` spread whole arrays into an argument list:\n\n```js\np.push.apply(p, postParts)\nparts.push","public_affected_ranges":["< 1.1.19"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-06T07:24:11.296Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-29T23:44:59.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-09-29T23:44:58.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-01T07:24:25.558Z"},{"id":"NVI-00013070","kind":"vulnerability","title":"brace-expansion: DoS via uncontrolled recursion in parseCommaParts causing stack exhaustion","revision":2,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-6j4f-fj2g-mc7p","CVE-2026-102276"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for brace-expansion, brace-expansion, brace-expansion, brace-expansion. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-0a1e2f43eb142c409cf4dbee547571ea"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-09-29T23:44:59.000Z","value":"7.5 high","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-51fe081b86f7d758d7e40aba5181912d"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-11-02T12:00:30.000Z","value":"0.455%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.39497. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-0a1e2f43eb142c409cf4dbee547571ea"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-51fe081b86f7d758d7e40aba5181912d","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-6j4f-fj2g-mc7p","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-6j4f-fj2g-mc7p","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T07:24:25.558Z"},{"id":"sr-0a1e2f43eb142c409cf4dbee547571ea","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-102276","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-11-02T20:15:58.837Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-51fe081b86f7d758d7e40aba5181912d"],"technology":"brace-expansion","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\n`parseCommaParts()` can exhaust the native stack and crash the process. There are two distinct ways to trigger it, both reachable from a single untrusted pattern string.\n\nThis is the parsing-side counterpart to CVE-2026-14257 / GHSA-mh99-v99m-4gvg. That fix made `expand_()` iterative and documented a constant-stack-depth guarantee, but `parseCommaParts()` was left recursive, so the guarantee only held for one of the two parsing paths.\n\n### Vector 1 - unbounded recursion on `post`\n\n`parseCommaParts()` recursed on the remainder of the string once per brace group:\n\n```js\nconst postParts = parseCommaParts(post)   // unbounded\n```\n\nA brace group containing many comma-separated groups drives one recursion level per group:\n\n```js\nexpand('{' + '{a},'.repeat(7000) + 'b}')\n// RangeError: Maximum call stack size exceeded\n```\n\nAbout 7,300 repetitions - roughly 29 KB of input - is enough on Node 24; roughly 6,300 (25 KB) on Node 18. The threshold is identical on every affected release line.\n\n### Vector 2 - `push.apply` with an unbounded array\n\nEven with the recursion removed, `parseCommaParts()` spread whole arrays into an argument list:\n\n```js\np.push.apply(p, postParts)\nparts.push","public_affected_ranges":[">= 4.0.0, < 5.0.10"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-51fe081b86f7d758d7e40aba5181912d"],"technology":"brace-expansion","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\n`parseCommaParts()` can exhaust the native stack and crash the process. There are two distinct ways to trigger it, both reachable from a single untrusted pattern string.\n\nThis is the parsing-side counterpart to CVE-2026-14257 / GHSA-mh99-v99m-4gvg. That fix made `expand_()` iterative and documented a constant-stack-depth guarantee, but `parseCommaParts()` was left recursive, so the guarantee only held for one of the two parsing paths.\n\n### Vector 1 - unbounded recursion on `post`\n\n`parseCommaParts()` recursed on the remainder of the string once per brace group:\n\n```js\nconst postParts = parseCommaParts(post)   // unbounded\n```\n\nA brace group containing many comma-separated groups drives one recursion level per group:\n\n```js\nexpand('{' + '{a},'.repeat(7000) + 'b}')\n// RangeError: Maximum call stack size exceeded\n```\n\nAbout 7,300 repetitions - roughly 29 KB of input - is enough on Node 24; roughly 6,300 (25 KB) on Node 18. The threshold is identical on every affected release line.\n\n### Vector 2 - `push.apply` with an unbounded array\n\nEven with the recursion removed, `parseCommaParts()` spread whole arrays into an argument list:\n\n```js\np.push.apply(p, postParts)\nparts.push","public_affected_ranges":[">= 3.0.0, < 3.0.7"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-51fe081b86f7d758d7e40aba5181912d"],"technology":"brace-expansion","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\n`parseCommaParts()` can exhaust the native stack and crash the process. There are two distinct ways to trigger it, both reachable from a single untrusted pattern string.\n\nThis is the parsing-side counterpart to CVE-2026-14257 / GHSA-mh99-v99m-4gvg. That fix made `expand_()` iterative and documented a constant-stack-depth guarantee, but `parseCommaParts()` was left recursive, so the guarantee only held for one of the two parsing paths.\n\n### Vector 1 - unbounded recursion on `post`\n\n`parseCommaParts()` recursed on the remainder of the string once per brace group:\n\n```js\nconst postParts = parseCommaParts(post)   // unbounded\n```\n\nA brace group containing many comma-separated groups drives one recursion level per group:\n\n```js\nexpand('{' + '{a},'.repeat(7000) + 'b}')\n// RangeError: Maximum call stack size exceeded\n```\n\nAbout 7,300 repetitions - roughly 29 KB of input - is enough on Node 24; roughly 6,300 (25 KB) on Node 18. The threshold is identical on every affected release line.\n\n### Vector 2 - `push.apply` with an unbounded array\n\nEven with the recursion removed, `parseCommaParts()` spread whole arrays into an argument list:\n\n```js\np.push.apply(p, postParts)\nparts.push","public_affected_ranges":[">= 2.0.0, < 2.1.5"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-51fe081b86f7d758d7e40aba5181912d"],"technology":"brace-expansion","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\n`parseCommaParts()` can exhaust the native stack and crash the process. There are two distinct ways to trigger it, both reachable from a single untrusted pattern string.\n\nThis is the parsing-side counterpart to CVE-2026-14257 / GHSA-mh99-v99m-4gvg. That fix made `expand_()` iterative and documented a constant-stack-depth guarantee, but `parseCommaParts()` was left recursive, so the guarantee only held for one of the two parsing paths.\n\n### Vector 1 - unbounded recursion on `post`\n\n`parseCommaParts()` recursed on the remainder of the string once per brace group:\n\n```js\nconst postParts = parseCommaParts(post)   // unbounded\n```\n\nA brace group containing many comma-separated groups drives one recursion level per group:\n\n```js\nexpand('{' + '{a},'.repeat(7000) + 'b}')\n// RangeError: Maximum call stack size exceeded\n```\n\nAbout 7,300 repetitions - roughly 29 KB of input - is enough on Node 24; roughly 6,300 (25 KB) on Node 18. The threshold is identical on every affected release line.\n\n### Vector 2 - `push.apply` with an unbounded array\n\nEven with the recursion removed, `parseCommaParts()` spread whole arrays into an argument list:\n\n```js\np.push.apply(p, postParts)\nparts.push","public_affected_ranges":["< 1.1.19"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-03T17:49:15.034Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-29T23:44:59.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-09-29T23:44:58.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-01T07:24:25.558Z"},{"id":"NVI-00013070","kind":"vulnerability","title":"brace-expansion: DoS via uncontrolled recursion in parseCommaParts causing stack exhaustion","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-6j4f-fj2g-mc7p","CVE-2026-102276"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for brace-expansion, brace-expansion, brace-expansion, brace-expansion. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-51fe081b86f7d758d7e40aba5181912d"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-09-29T23:44:59.000Z","value":"7.5 high","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-51fe081b86f7d758d7e40aba5181912d"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-51fe081b86f7d758d7e40aba5181912d","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-6j4f-fj2g-mc7p","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-6j4f-fj2g-mc7p","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T07:24:25.558Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-51fe081b86f7d758d7e40aba5181912d"],"technology":"brace-expansion","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\n`parseCommaParts()` can exhaust the native stack and crash the process. There are two distinct ways to trigger it, both reachable from a single untrusted pattern string.\n\nThis is the parsing-side counterpart to CVE-2026-14257 / GHSA-mh99-v99m-4gvg. That fix made `expand_()` iterative and documented a constant-stack-depth guarantee, but `parseCommaParts()` was left recursive, so the guarantee only held for one of the two parsing paths.\n\n### Vector 1 - unbounded recursion on `post`\n\n`parseCommaParts()` recursed on the remainder of the string once per brace group:\n\n```js\nconst postParts = parseCommaParts(post)   // unbounded\n```\n\nA brace group containing many comma-separated groups drives one recursion level per group:\n\n```js\nexpand('{' + '{a},'.repeat(7000) + 'b}')\n// RangeError: Maximum call stack size exceeded\n```\n\nAbout 7,300 repetitions - roughly 29 KB of input - is enough on Node 24; roughly 6,300 (25 KB) on Node 18. The threshold is identical on every affected release line.\n\n### Vector 2 - `push.apply` with an unbounded array\n\nEven with the recursion removed, `parseCommaParts()` spread whole arrays into an argument list:\n\n```js\np.push.apply(p, postParts)\nparts.push","public_affected_ranges":[">= 4.0.0, < 5.0.10"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-51fe081b86f7d758d7e40aba5181912d"],"technology":"brace-expansion","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\n`parseCommaParts()` can exhaust the native stack and crash the process. There are two distinct ways to trigger it, both reachable from a single untrusted pattern string.\n\nThis is the parsing-side counterpart to CVE-2026-14257 / GHSA-mh99-v99m-4gvg. That fix made `expand_()` iterative and documented a constant-stack-depth guarantee, but `parseCommaParts()` was left recursive, so the guarantee only held for one of the two parsing paths.\n\n### Vector 1 - unbounded recursion on `post`\n\n`parseCommaParts()` recursed on the remainder of the string once per brace group:\n\n```js\nconst postParts = parseCommaParts(post)   // unbounded\n```\n\nA brace group containing many comma-separated groups drives one recursion level per group:\n\n```js\nexpand('{' + '{a},'.repeat(7000) + 'b}')\n// RangeError: Maximum call stack size exceeded\n```\n\nAbout 7,300 repetitions - roughly 29 KB of input - is enough on Node 24; roughly 6,300 (25 KB) on Node 18. The threshold is identical on every affected release line.\n\n### Vector 2 - `push.apply` with an unbounded array\n\nEven with the recursion removed, `parseCommaParts()` spread whole arrays into an argument list:\n\n```js\np.push.apply(p, postParts)\nparts.push","public_affected_ranges":[">= 3.0.0, < 3.0.7"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-51fe081b86f7d758d7e40aba5181912d"],"technology":"brace-expansion","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\n`parseCommaParts()` can exhaust the native stack and crash the process. There are two distinct ways to trigger it, both reachable from a single untrusted pattern string.\n\nThis is the parsing-side counterpart to CVE-2026-14257 / GHSA-mh99-v99m-4gvg. That fix made `expand_()` iterative and documented a constant-stack-depth guarantee, but `parseCommaParts()` was left recursive, so the guarantee only held for one of the two parsing paths.\n\n### Vector 1 - unbounded recursion on `post`\n\n`parseCommaParts()` recursed on the remainder of the string once per brace group:\n\n```js\nconst postParts = parseCommaParts(post)   // unbounded\n```\n\nA brace group containing many comma-separated groups drives one recursion level per group:\n\n```js\nexpand('{' + '{a},'.repeat(7000) + 'b}')\n// RangeError: Maximum call stack size exceeded\n```\n\nAbout 7,300 repetitions - roughly 29 KB of input - is enough on Node 24; roughly 6,300 (25 KB) on Node 18. The threshold is identical on every affected release line.\n\n### Vector 2 - `push.apply` with an unbounded array\n\nEven with the recursion removed, `parseCommaParts()` spread whole arrays into an argument list:\n\n```js\np.push.apply(p, postParts)\nparts.push","public_affected_ranges":[">= 2.0.0, < 2.1.5"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-51fe081b86f7d758d7e40aba5181912d"],"technology":"brace-expansion","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\n`parseCommaParts()` can exhaust the native stack and crash the process. There are two distinct ways to trigger it, both reachable from a single untrusted pattern string.\n\nThis is the parsing-side counterpart to CVE-2026-14257 / GHSA-mh99-v99m-4gvg. That fix made `expand_()` iterative and documented a constant-stack-depth guarantee, but `parseCommaParts()` was left recursive, so the guarantee only held for one of the two parsing paths.\n\n### Vector 1 - unbounded recursion on `post`\n\n`parseCommaParts()` recursed on the remainder of the string once per brace group:\n\n```js\nconst postParts = parseCommaParts(post)   // unbounded\n```\n\nA brace group containing many comma-separated groups drives one recursion level per group:\n\n```js\nexpand('{' + '{a},'.repeat(7000) + 'b}')\n// RangeError: Maximum call stack size exceeded\n```\n\nAbout 7,300 repetitions - roughly 29 KB of input - is enough on Node 24; roughly 6,300 (25 KB) on Node 18. The threshold is identical on every affected release line.\n\n### Vector 2 - `push.apply` with an unbounded array\n\nEven with the recursion removed, `parseCommaParts()` spread whole arrays into an argument list:\n\n```js\np.push.apply(p, postParts)\nparts.push","public_affected_ranges":["< 1.1.19"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-01T07:29:12.914Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-29T23:44:59.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-09-29T23:44:58.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-01T07:24:25.558Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}