{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00013084","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Klever-Go: Zombie-order theft: `Buy` missing `IsClaimed` guard in native marketplace","revision":2,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-26r5-4mm2-px5c","CVE-2026-82406"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for github.com/klever-io/klever-go. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-2451937ada797b16b6937ef579ceecff"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-11-01T12:00:16.000Z","value":"0.434%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.37664. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-2451937ada797b16b6937ef579ceecff"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-58ca6f069131daa9897fcd1e68d054a5","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-26r5-4mm2-px5c","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-26r5-4mm2-px5c","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T07:25:10.521Z"},{"id":"sr-2451937ada797b16b6937ef579ceecff","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-82406","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-11-01T14:28:32.287Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-58ca6f069131daa9897fcd1e68d054a5"],"technology":"github.com/klever-io/klever-go","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"**Location:** `core/kapp/market/market.go` — `Buy()` (approx. L281–436)\\\n**Severity:** High\n\nThe native marketplace enforces an `IsClaimed` guard in `Claim` (`market.go:752`), `CancelOrder` (`market.go:1125`), and `orderEscrowAmount` (`market.go:251`), but **not in `Buy`**.\n\nMarketplace escrow is *virtual*: the market KApp account never custodies currency. A bid burns funds from the bidder (`bidderAcc.SubFromBalance`, ~L378), and refunds/payouts mint to the recipient (`AddToBalance`, e.g. the prior-bidder refund at ~L349). Soundness depends on each order's `CurrentBid` being paid out exactly once.\n\nA seller can settle a resting-bid auction **early** via the seller-accept branch of `Claim` (~L776) → `executeBuyMarket` (~L656). That path sets `IsClaimed=true`, delivers the NFT, pays the seller, and re-saves the order (`SetMarketOrder`, ~L726) — but, unlike every other settle path, it does **not** reset `EndTime` (contrast immediate-buy `Buy` ~L416 and `CancelOrder` ~L1206), and no code path deletes the order. The result is a \"zombie\" order: already settled, yet still loadable with `EndTime` in the future and a stale `CurrentBidder`.\n\nBecause `Buy` has no `IsClaimed` guard, a new bidd","public_affected_ranges":["<= 1.7.19"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-04T18:04:03.187Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-23T21:24:04.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-09-23T21:24:03.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-01T07:25:10.521Z"},{"id":"NVI-00013084","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Klever-Go: Zombie-order theft: `Buy` missing `IsClaimed` guard in native marketplace","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-26r5-4mm2-px5c","CVE-2026-82406"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for github.com/klever-io/klever-go. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-58ca6f069131daa9897fcd1e68d054a5"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-58ca6f069131daa9897fcd1e68d054a5","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-26r5-4mm2-px5c","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-26r5-4mm2-px5c","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T07:25:10.521Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-58ca6f069131daa9897fcd1e68d054a5"],"technology":"github.com/klever-io/klever-go","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"**Location:** `core/kapp/market/market.go` — `Buy()` (approx. L281–436)\\\n**Severity:** High\n\nThe native marketplace enforces an `IsClaimed` guard in `Claim` (`market.go:752`), `CancelOrder` (`market.go:1125`), and `orderEscrowAmount` (`market.go:251`), but **not in `Buy`**.\n\nMarketplace escrow is *virtual*: the market KApp account never custodies currency. A bid burns funds from the bidder (`bidderAcc.SubFromBalance`, ~L378), and refunds/payouts mint to the recipient (`AddToBalance`, e.g. the prior-bidder refund at ~L349). Soundness depends on each order's `CurrentBid` being paid out exactly once.\n\nA seller can settle a resting-bid auction **early** via the seller-accept branch of `Claim` (~L776) → `executeBuyMarket` (~L656). That path sets `IsClaimed=true`, delivers the NFT, pays the seller, and re-saves the order (`SetMarketOrder`, ~L726) — but, unlike every other settle path, it does **not** reset `EndTime` (contrast immediate-buy `Buy` ~L416 and `CancelOrder` ~L1206), and no code path deletes the order. The result is a \"zombie\" order: already settled, yet still loadable with `EndTime` in the future and a stale `CurrentBidder`.\n\nBecause `Buy` has no `IsClaimed` guard, a new bidd","public_affected_ranges":["<= 1.7.19"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-01T07:29:12.917Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-23T21:24:04.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-09-23T21:24:03.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-01T07:25:10.521Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}