{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00013096","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Angular SSR: Path Traversal to Sibling Directories in CommonEngine on Windows","revision":3,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.","NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-7g7c-h8rr-7p6q","CVE-2026-104871"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for @angular/ssr, @angular/ssr, @angular/ssr, @angular/ssr. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-0426d5286485a2f1eade7af46e59e20d"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-06T16:00:36.547Z","value":"6.3 MEDIUM (4.0)","meaning":"security-advisories@github.com severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-32c859677efcb62d44b74d269e686ee1"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-11-05T12:03:04.000Z","value":"0.421%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.36637. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-0426d5286485a2f1eade7af46e59e20d"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-5cf2574e5f26a99e4db0df32596bcee0","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-7g7c-h8rr-7p6q","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-7g7c-h8rr-7p6q","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T01:39:10.636Z"},{"id":"sr-32c859677efcb62d44b74d269e686ee1","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-104871","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.","title":"CVE-2026-104871","publisher":"NIST National Vulnerability Database","observed_at":"2026-11-03T09:58:14.367Z"},{"id":"sr-0426d5286485a2f1eade7af46e59e20d","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-104871","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-11-06T00:24:57.624Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-5cf2574e5f26a99e4db0df32596bcee0"],"technology":"@angular/ssr","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"A Path Traversal vulnerability exists in the prerendered (SSG) page retrieval logic of `CommonEngine` in `@angular/ssr/node` (and `@angular/ssr` in earlier versions). When deployed on Windows, an attacker can craft a request path with backslash directory traversal sequences that causes `CommonEngine` to serve prerendered pages from sibling output directories.\n\nThe vulnerability occurs due to how relative URLs and Windows file paths are resolved and validated:\n\n1. A request URL containing a backslash parent traversal segment (e.g., `/..\\app-admin`) is passed to `CommonEngine.render({ url })`.\n2. The engine parses the URL using `new URL(url, 'resolve://')`. Because `resolve://` is a non-special scheme under the WHATWG URL standard, backslashes are not normalized to forward slashes, leaving the `pathname` unnormalized as `/..\\app-admin`.\n3. The engine constructs the candidate file path using `join(publicPath, pathname, 'index.html')`. On Windows, `path.join` treats `\\` as a path delimiter, resolving the parent segment (`..\\`) out of `publicPath` (e.g., `dist\\app`) into a sibling directory (e.g., `dist\\app-admin\\index.html`).\n4. The containment check (`pagePath.startsWith(normalize(pub","public_affected_ranges":[">= 22.0.0, < 22.1.7"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-5cf2574e5f26a99e4db0df32596bcee0"],"technology":"@angular/ssr","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"A Path Traversal vulnerability exists in the prerendered (SSG) page retrieval logic of `CommonEngine` in `@angular/ssr/node` (and `@angular/ssr` in earlier versions). When deployed on Windows, an attacker can craft a request path with backslash directory traversal sequences that causes `CommonEngine` to serve prerendered pages from sibling output directories.\n\nThe vulnerability occurs due to how relative URLs and Windows file paths are resolved and validated:\n\n1. A request URL containing a backslash parent traversal segment (e.g., `/..\\app-admin`) is passed to `CommonEngine.render({ url })`.\n2. The engine parses the URL using `new URL(url, 'resolve://')`. Because `resolve://` is a non-special scheme under the WHATWG URL standard, backslashes are not normalized to forward slashes, leaving the `pathname` unnormalized as `/..\\app-admin`.\n3. The engine constructs the candidate file path using `join(publicPath, pathname, 'index.html')`. On Windows, `path.join` treats `\\` as a path delimiter, resolving the parent segment (`..\\`) out of `publicPath` (e.g., `dist\\app`) into a sibling directory (e.g., `dist\\app-admin\\index.html`).\n4. The containment check (`pagePath.startsWith(normalize(pub","public_affected_ranges":[">= 21.0.0, < 21.2.23"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-5cf2574e5f26a99e4db0df32596bcee0"],"technology":"@angular/ssr","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"A Path Traversal vulnerability exists in the prerendered (SSG) page retrieval logic of `CommonEngine` in `@angular/ssr/node` (and `@angular/ssr` in earlier versions). When deployed on Windows, an attacker can craft a request path with backslash directory traversal sequences that causes `CommonEngine` to serve prerendered pages from sibling output directories.\n\nThe vulnerability occurs due to how relative URLs and Windows file paths are resolved and validated:\n\n1. A request URL containing a backslash parent traversal segment (e.g., `/..\\app-admin`) is passed to `CommonEngine.render({ url })`.\n2. The engine parses the URL using `new URL(url, 'resolve://')`. Because `resolve://` is a non-special scheme under the WHATWG URL standard, backslashes are not normalized to forward slashes, leaving the `pathname` unnormalized as `/..\\app-admin`.\n3. The engine constructs the candidate file path using `join(publicPath, pathname, 'index.html')`. On Windows, `path.join` treats `\\` as a path delimiter, resolving the parent segment (`..\\`) out of `publicPath` (e.g., `dist\\app`) into a sibling directory (e.g., `dist\\app-admin\\index.html`).\n4. The containment check (`pagePath.startsWith(normalize(pub","public_affected_ranges":[">= 20.0.0, < 20.3.36"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-5cf2574e5f26a99e4db0df32596bcee0"],"technology":"@angular/ssr","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"A Path Traversal vulnerability exists in the prerendered (SSG) page retrieval logic of `CommonEngine` in `@angular/ssr/node` (and `@angular/ssr` in earlier versions). When deployed on Windows, an attacker can craft a request path with backslash directory traversal sequences that causes `CommonEngine` to serve prerendered pages from sibling output directories.\n\nThe vulnerability occurs due to how relative URLs and Windows file paths are resolved and validated:\n\n1. A request URL containing a backslash parent traversal segment (e.g., `/..\\app-admin`) is passed to `CommonEngine.render({ url })`.\n2. The engine parses the URL using `new URL(url, 'resolve://')`. Because `resolve://` is a non-special scheme under the WHATWG URL standard, backslashes are not normalized to forward slashes, leaving the `pathname` unnormalized as `/..\\app-admin`.\n3. The engine constructs the candidate file path using `join(publicPath, pathname, 'index.html')`. On Windows, `path.join` treats `\\` as a path delimiter, resolving the parent segment (`..\\`) out of `publicPath` (e.g., `dist\\app`) into a sibling directory (e.g., `dist\\app-admin\\index.html`).\n4. The containment check (`pagePath.startsWith(normalize(pub","public_affected_ranges":["<= 19.2.27"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-07T07:07:42.547Z","source_updated_at":"2026-10-05T22:53:46.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-10-05T22:53:45.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-01T01:39:10.636Z"},{"id":"NVI-00013096","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Angular SSR: Path Traversal to Sibling Directories in CommonEngine on Windows","revision":2,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.","NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-7g7c-h8rr-7p6q","CVE-2026-104871"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for @angular/ssr, @angular/ssr, @angular/ssr, @angular/ssr. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-32c859677efcb62d44b74d269e686ee1"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-06T16:00:36.547Z","value":"6.3 MEDIUM (4.0)","meaning":"security-advisories@github.com severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-32c859677efcb62d44b74d269e686ee1"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-5cf2574e5f26a99e4db0df32596bcee0","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-7g7c-h8rr-7p6q","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-7g7c-h8rr-7p6q","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T01:39:10.636Z"},{"id":"sr-32c859677efcb62d44b74d269e686ee1","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-104871","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.","title":"CVE-2026-104871","publisher":"NIST National Vulnerability Database","observed_at":"2026-11-03T09:58:14.367Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-5cf2574e5f26a99e4db0df32596bcee0"],"technology":"@angular/ssr","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"A Path Traversal vulnerability exists in the prerendered (SSG) page retrieval logic of `CommonEngine` in `@angular/ssr/node` (and `@angular/ssr` in earlier versions). When deployed on Windows, an attacker can craft a request path with backslash directory traversal sequences that causes `CommonEngine` to serve prerendered pages from sibling output directories.\n\nThe vulnerability occurs due to how relative URLs and Windows file paths are resolved and validated:\n\n1. A request URL containing a backslash parent traversal segment (e.g., `/..\\app-admin`) is passed to `CommonEngine.render({ url })`.\n2. The engine parses the URL using `new URL(url, 'resolve://')`. Because `resolve://` is a non-special scheme under the WHATWG URL standard, backslashes are not normalized to forward slashes, leaving the `pathname` unnormalized as `/..\\app-admin`.\n3. The engine constructs the candidate file path using `join(publicPath, pathname, 'index.html')`. On Windows, `path.join` treats `\\` as a path delimiter, resolving the parent segment (`..\\`) out of `publicPath` (e.g., `dist\\app`) into a sibling directory (e.g., `dist\\app-admin\\index.html`).\n4. The containment check (`pagePath.startsWith(normalize(pub","public_affected_ranges":[">= 22.0.0, < 22.1.7"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-5cf2574e5f26a99e4db0df32596bcee0"],"technology":"@angular/ssr","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"A Path Traversal vulnerability exists in the prerendered (SSG) page retrieval logic of `CommonEngine` in `@angular/ssr/node` (and `@angular/ssr` in earlier versions). When deployed on Windows, an attacker can craft a request path with backslash directory traversal sequences that causes `CommonEngine` to serve prerendered pages from sibling output directories.\n\nThe vulnerability occurs due to how relative URLs and Windows file paths are resolved and validated:\n\n1. A request URL containing a backslash parent traversal segment (e.g., `/..\\app-admin`) is passed to `CommonEngine.render({ url })`.\n2. The engine parses the URL using `new URL(url, 'resolve://')`. Because `resolve://` is a non-special scheme under the WHATWG URL standard, backslashes are not normalized to forward slashes, leaving the `pathname` unnormalized as `/..\\app-admin`.\n3. The engine constructs the candidate file path using `join(publicPath, pathname, 'index.html')`. On Windows, `path.join` treats `\\` as a path delimiter, resolving the parent segment (`..\\`) out of `publicPath` (e.g., `dist\\app`) into a sibling directory (e.g., `dist\\app-admin\\index.html`).\n4. The containment check (`pagePath.startsWith(normalize(pub","public_affected_ranges":[">= 21.0.0, < 21.2.23"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-5cf2574e5f26a99e4db0df32596bcee0"],"technology":"@angular/ssr","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"A Path Traversal vulnerability exists in the prerendered (SSG) page retrieval logic of `CommonEngine` in `@angular/ssr/node` (and `@angular/ssr` in earlier versions). When deployed on Windows, an attacker can craft a request path with backslash directory traversal sequences that causes `CommonEngine` to serve prerendered pages from sibling output directories.\n\nThe vulnerability occurs due to how relative URLs and Windows file paths are resolved and validated:\n\n1. A request URL containing a backslash parent traversal segment (e.g., `/..\\app-admin`) is passed to `CommonEngine.render({ url })`.\n2. The engine parses the URL using `new URL(url, 'resolve://')`. Because `resolve://` is a non-special scheme under the WHATWG URL standard, backslashes are not normalized to forward slashes, leaving the `pathname` unnormalized as `/..\\app-admin`.\n3. The engine constructs the candidate file path using `join(publicPath, pathname, 'index.html')`. On Windows, `path.join` treats `\\` as a path delimiter, resolving the parent segment (`..\\`) out of `publicPath` (e.g., `dist\\app`) into a sibling directory (e.g., `dist\\app-admin\\index.html`).\n4. The containment check (`pagePath.startsWith(normalize(pub","public_affected_ranges":[">= 20.0.0, < 20.3.36"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-5cf2574e5f26a99e4db0df32596bcee0"],"technology":"@angular/ssr","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"A Path Traversal vulnerability exists in the prerendered (SSG) page retrieval logic of `CommonEngine` in `@angular/ssr/node` (and `@angular/ssr` in earlier versions). When deployed on Windows, an attacker can craft a request path with backslash directory traversal sequences that causes `CommonEngine` to serve prerendered pages from sibling output directories.\n\nThe vulnerability occurs due to how relative URLs and Windows file paths are resolved and validated:\n\n1. A request URL containing a backslash parent traversal segment (e.g., `/..\\app-admin`) is passed to `CommonEngine.render({ url })`.\n2. The engine parses the URL using `new URL(url, 'resolve://')`. Because `resolve://` is a non-special scheme under the WHATWG URL standard, backslashes are not normalized to forward slashes, leaving the `pathname` unnormalized as `/..\\app-admin`.\n3. The engine constructs the candidate file path using `join(publicPath, pathname, 'index.html')`. On Windows, `path.join` treats `\\` as a path delimiter, resolving the parent segment (`..\\`) out of `publicPath` (e.g., `dist\\app`) into a sibling directory (e.g., `dist\\app-admin\\index.html`).\n4. The containment check (`pagePath.startsWith(normalize(pub","public_affected_ranges":["<= 19.2.27"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-03T10:03:31.392Z","source_updated_at":"2026-10-05T22:53:46.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-10-05T22:53:45.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-01T01:39:10.636Z"},{"id":"NVI-00013096","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Angular SSR: Path Traversal to Sibling Directories in CommonEngine on Windows","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-7g7c-h8rr-7p6q","CVE-2026-104871"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for @angular/ssr, @angular/ssr, @angular/ssr, @angular/ssr. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-5cf2574e5f26a99e4db0df32596bcee0"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-5cf2574e5f26a99e4db0df32596bcee0","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-7g7c-h8rr-7p6q","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-7g7c-h8rr-7p6q","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T01:39:10.636Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-5cf2574e5f26a99e4db0df32596bcee0"],"technology":"@angular/ssr","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"A Path Traversal vulnerability exists in the prerendered (SSG) page retrieval logic of `CommonEngine` in `@angular/ssr/node` (and `@angular/ssr` in earlier versions). When deployed on Windows, an attacker can craft a request path with backslash directory traversal sequences that causes `CommonEngine` to serve prerendered pages from sibling output directories.\n\nThe vulnerability occurs due to how relative URLs and Windows file paths are resolved and validated:\n\n1. A request URL containing a backslash parent traversal segment (e.g., `/..\\app-admin`) is passed to `CommonEngine.render({ url })`.\n2. The engine parses the URL using `new URL(url, 'resolve://')`. Because `resolve://` is a non-special scheme under the WHATWG URL standard, backslashes are not normalized to forward slashes, leaving the `pathname` unnormalized as `/..\\app-admin`.\n3. The engine constructs the candidate file path using `join(publicPath, pathname, 'index.html')`. On Windows, `path.join` treats `\\` as a path delimiter, resolving the parent segment (`..\\`) out of `publicPath` (e.g., `dist\\app`) into a sibling directory (e.g., `dist\\app-admin\\index.html`).\n4. The containment check (`pagePath.startsWith(normalize(pub","public_affected_ranges":[">= 22.0.0, < 22.1.7"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-5cf2574e5f26a99e4db0df32596bcee0"],"technology":"@angular/ssr","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"A Path Traversal vulnerability exists in the prerendered (SSG) page retrieval logic of `CommonEngine` in `@angular/ssr/node` (and `@angular/ssr` in earlier versions). When deployed on Windows, an attacker can craft a request path with backslash directory traversal sequences that causes `CommonEngine` to serve prerendered pages from sibling output directories.\n\nThe vulnerability occurs due to how relative URLs and Windows file paths are resolved and validated:\n\n1. A request URL containing a backslash parent traversal segment (e.g., `/..\\app-admin`) is passed to `CommonEngine.render({ url })`.\n2. The engine parses the URL using `new URL(url, 'resolve://')`. Because `resolve://` is a non-special scheme under the WHATWG URL standard, backslashes are not normalized to forward slashes, leaving the `pathname` unnormalized as `/..\\app-admin`.\n3. The engine constructs the candidate file path using `join(publicPath, pathname, 'index.html')`. On Windows, `path.join` treats `\\` as a path delimiter, resolving the parent segment (`..\\`) out of `publicPath` (e.g., `dist\\app`) into a sibling directory (e.g., `dist\\app-admin\\index.html`).\n4. The containment check (`pagePath.startsWith(normalize(pub","public_affected_ranges":[">= 21.0.0, < 21.2.23"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-5cf2574e5f26a99e4db0df32596bcee0"],"technology":"@angular/ssr","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"A Path Traversal vulnerability exists in the prerendered (SSG) page retrieval logic of `CommonEngine` in `@angular/ssr/node` (and `@angular/ssr` in earlier versions). When deployed on Windows, an attacker can craft a request path with backslash directory traversal sequences that causes `CommonEngine` to serve prerendered pages from sibling output directories.\n\nThe vulnerability occurs due to how relative URLs and Windows file paths are resolved and validated:\n\n1. A request URL containing a backslash parent traversal segment (e.g., `/..\\app-admin`) is passed to `CommonEngine.render({ url })`.\n2. The engine parses the URL using `new URL(url, 'resolve://')`. Because `resolve://` is a non-special scheme under the WHATWG URL standard, backslashes are not normalized to forward slashes, leaving the `pathname` unnormalized as `/..\\app-admin`.\n3. The engine constructs the candidate file path using `join(publicPath, pathname, 'index.html')`. On Windows, `path.join` treats `\\` as a path delimiter, resolving the parent segment (`..\\`) out of `publicPath` (e.g., `dist\\app`) into a sibling directory (e.g., `dist\\app-admin\\index.html`).\n4. The containment check (`pagePath.startsWith(normalize(pub","public_affected_ranges":[">= 20.0.0, < 20.3.36"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-5cf2574e5f26a99e4db0df32596bcee0"],"technology":"@angular/ssr","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"A Path Traversal vulnerability exists in the prerendered (SSG) page retrieval logic of `CommonEngine` in `@angular/ssr/node` (and `@angular/ssr` in earlier versions). When deployed on Windows, an attacker can craft a request path with backslash directory traversal sequences that causes `CommonEngine` to serve prerendered pages from sibling output directories.\n\nThe vulnerability occurs due to how relative URLs and Windows file paths are resolved and validated:\n\n1. A request URL containing a backslash parent traversal segment (e.g., `/..\\app-admin`) is passed to `CommonEngine.render({ url })`.\n2. The engine parses the URL using `new URL(url, 'resolve://')`. Because `resolve://` is a non-special scheme under the WHATWG URL standard, backslashes are not normalized to forward slashes, leaving the `pathname` unnormalized as `/..\\app-admin`.\n3. The engine constructs the candidate file path using `join(publicPath, pathname, 'index.html')`. On Windows, `path.join` treats `\\` as a path delimiter, resolving the parent segment (`..\\`) out of `publicPath` (e.g., `dist\\app`) into a sibling directory (e.g., `dist\\app-admin\\index.html`).\n4. The containment check (`pagePath.startsWith(normalize(pub","public_affected_ranges":["<= 19.2.27"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-01T07:29:12.919Z","source_updated_at":"2026-10-05T22:53:46.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-10-05T22:53:45.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-01T01:39:10.636Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}