{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00013103","kind":"vulnerability","title":"vm2 sandbox escape via WebAssembly.compileStreaming Promise species bypass","revision":2,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-wjwh-qqvp-g4p4","CVE-2026-92956"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for vm2. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-1a68eb70d0c95b69fae0508da78050f0"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-05T22:34:24.000Z","value":"10 critical","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-60bf4c8f24e3989f6bfc57d3f45bf35b"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-11-03T12:00:27.000Z","value":"0.509%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.43522. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-1a68eb70d0c95b69fae0508da78050f0"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-60bf4c8f24e3989f6bfc57d3f45bf35b","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-wjwh-qqvp-g4p4","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-wjwh-qqvp-g4p4","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T01:39:10.636Z"},{"id":"sr-1a68eb70d0c95b69fae0508da78050f0","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-92956","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-11-03T17:45:16.087Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-60bf4c8f24e3989f6bfc57d3f45bf35b"],"technology":"vm2","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nThere is a sandbox escape in vm2 `3.11.5` / current HEAD when it is used on Node.js 26. The issue is reachable from a default `new VM()` sandbox. No `NodeVM`, `require` permission, host object injection, or intentionally unsafe configuration is required.\n\nThe escape is a patch-bypass of the same security invariant addressed by GHSA-6j2x-vhqr-qr7q. The earlier fix removed the JSPI entry points `WebAssembly.promising` and `WebAssembly.Suspending`, because those APIs exposed a Promise path whose host-realm `Promise.prototype` was not intercepted by vm2's Promise hardening or bridge layer.\n\nThe same unsafe class remains reachable through `WebAssembly.compileStreaming` and `WebAssembly.instantiateStreaming`. On Node 26, these streaming APIs can produce a raw host-realm Promise path that rejects with a host-realm error. By controlling `Symbol.species` through `Promise.prototype.finally`, sandbox code can receive that raw host error object, walk from the host error constructor to the host `Function` constructor, and recover the real host `process` object.\n\nThe proof of concept demonstrates this by first showing that direct access to `process`, `require`, and constructor-based ","public_affected_ranges":[">= 3.10.1, <= 3.11.6"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-07T14:01:55.392Z","source_updated_at":"2026-10-05T22:34:24.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-10-05T22:34:22.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-01T01:39:10.636Z"},{"id":"NVI-00013103","kind":"vulnerability","title":"vm2 sandbox escape via WebAssembly.compileStreaming Promise species bypass","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-wjwh-qqvp-g4p4","CVE-2026-92956"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for vm2. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-60bf4c8f24e3989f6bfc57d3f45bf35b"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-05T22:34:24.000Z","value":"10 critical","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-60bf4c8f24e3989f6bfc57d3f45bf35b"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-60bf4c8f24e3989f6bfc57d3f45bf35b","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-wjwh-qqvp-g4p4","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-wjwh-qqvp-g4p4","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T01:39:10.636Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-60bf4c8f24e3989f6bfc57d3f45bf35b"],"technology":"vm2","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nThere is a sandbox escape in vm2 `3.11.5` / current HEAD when it is used on Node.js 26. The issue is reachable from a default `new VM()` sandbox. No `NodeVM`, `require` permission, host object injection, or intentionally unsafe configuration is required.\n\nThe escape is a patch-bypass of the same security invariant addressed by GHSA-6j2x-vhqr-qr7q. The earlier fix removed the JSPI entry points `WebAssembly.promising` and `WebAssembly.Suspending`, because those APIs exposed a Promise path whose host-realm `Promise.prototype` was not intercepted by vm2's Promise hardening or bridge layer.\n\nThe same unsafe class remains reachable through `WebAssembly.compileStreaming` and `WebAssembly.instantiateStreaming`. On Node 26, these streaming APIs can produce a raw host-realm Promise path that rejects with a host-realm error. By controlling `Symbol.species` through `Promise.prototype.finally`, sandbox code can receive that raw host error object, walk from the host error constructor to the host `Function` constructor, and recover the real host `process` object.\n\nThe proof of concept demonstrates this by first showing that direct access to `process`, `require`, and constructor-based ","public_affected_ranges":[">= 3.10.1, <= 3.11.6"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-01T07:29:12.921Z","source_updated_at":"2026-10-05T22:34:24.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-10-05T22:34:22.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-01T01:39:10.636Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}