{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00013126","kind":"vulnerability","title":"ixo Blockchain x/bonds DID-resolved payer drain + x/entity ICA authorization bypass","revision":2,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.","NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-w3rp-4cm2-4wgc","CVE-2026-61604"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for github.com/ixofoundation/ixo-blockchain/v8, github.com/ixofoundation/ixo-blockchain/v7, github.com/ixofoundation/ixo-blockchain/v6, github.com/ixofoundation/ixo-blockchain/v5, github.com/ixofoundation/ixo-blockchain/v4. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-14d5cf977736702548865ce5f9c054c0"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-09-30T17:32:07.107Z","value":"9.3 CRITICAL (4.0)","meaning":"security-advisories@github.com severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-14d5cf977736702548865ce5f9c054c0"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-6b28607d6d8542d8634ad5bfeb439bcd","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-w3rp-4cm2-4wgc","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-w3rp-4cm2-4wgc","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T07:24:52.155Z"},{"id":"sr-14d5cf977736702548865ce5f9c054c0","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-61604","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.","title":"CVE-2026-61604","publisher":"NIST National Vulnerability Database","observed_at":"2026-11-04T02:47:38.696Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-6b28607d6d8542d8634ad5bfeb439bcd"],"technology":"github.com/ixofoundation/ixo-blockchain/v8","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"Impact\n\n  Type: Improper authorization leading to unauthorized movement of user funds.\n\n  The x/bonds module moved funds from an address that was resolved from a DID verification method, without verifying that the resolved address belonged to the transaction signer. Affected handlers included MsgMakeOutcomePayment, MsgBuy, MsgSell, MsgSwap, and MsgWithdrawShare, as well as the batch order processor.\n\n  Because any account may list an arbitrary blockchainAccountID as a verification method on a DID it controls (without the consent of that address's owner), an attacker could register victims' addresses as verification methods on their own DID and then move the victims' balances into a bond the attacker controlled — later withdrawing and bridging the proceeds off-chain.\n\n  This was exploited on ixo mainnet (ixo-5) on 2026-06-20. The attack required no victim keys, signatures, or system compromise — any account holding a balance in a token a bond could use was at risk.\n\n  Patches\n\n  Fixed in v8.0.0, delivered via the on-chain v8 software-upgrade. The x/bonds module is disabled: every bonds message is rejected on all routes (top-level, authz, CosmWasm, and ICA), and the bonds batch EndBl","public_affected_ranges":["< 8.0.0"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-6b28607d6d8542d8634ad5bfeb439bcd"],"technology":"github.com/ixofoundation/ixo-blockchain/v7","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"Impact\n\n  Type: Improper authorization leading to unauthorized movement of user funds.\n\n  The x/bonds module moved funds from an address that was resolved from a DID verification method, without verifying that the resolved address belonged to the transaction signer. Affected handlers included MsgMakeOutcomePayment, MsgBuy, MsgSell, MsgSwap, and MsgWithdrawShare, as well as the batch order processor.\n\n  Because any account may list an arbitrary blockchainAccountID as a verification method on a DID it controls (without the consent of that address's owner), an attacker could register victims' addresses as verification methods on their own DID and then move the victims' balances into a bond the attacker controlled — later withdrawing and bridging the proceeds off-chain.\n\n  This was exploited on ixo mainnet (ixo-5) on 2026-06-20. The attack required no victim keys, signatures, or system compromise — any account holding a balance in a token a bond could use was at risk.\n\n  Patches\n\n  Fixed in v8.0.0, delivered via the on-chain v8 software-upgrade. The x/bonds module is disabled: every bonds message is rejected on all routes (top-level, authz, CosmWasm, and ICA), and the bonds batch EndBl","public_affected_ranges":["<= 7.0.0"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-6b28607d6d8542d8634ad5bfeb439bcd"],"technology":"github.com/ixofoundation/ixo-blockchain/v6","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"Impact\n\n  Type: Improper authorization leading to unauthorized movement of user funds.\n\n  The x/bonds module moved funds from an address that was resolved from a DID verification method, without verifying that the resolved address belonged to the transaction signer. Affected handlers included MsgMakeOutcomePayment, MsgBuy, MsgSell, MsgSwap, and MsgWithdrawShare, as well as the batch order processor.\n\n  Because any account may list an arbitrary blockchainAccountID as a verification method on a DID it controls (without the consent of that address's owner), an attacker could register victims' addresses as verification methods on their own DID and then move the victims' balances into a bond the attacker controlled — later withdrawing and bridging the proceeds off-chain.\n\n  This was exploited on ixo mainnet (ixo-5) on 2026-06-20. The attack required no victim keys, signatures, or system compromise — any account holding a balance in a token a bond could use was at risk.\n\n  Patches\n\n  Fixed in v8.0.0, delivered via the on-chain v8 software-upgrade. The x/bonds module is disabled: every bonds message is rejected on all routes (top-level, authz, CosmWasm, and ICA), and the bonds batch EndBl","public_affected_ranges":["<= 6.0.1"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-6b28607d6d8542d8634ad5bfeb439bcd"],"technology":"github.com/ixofoundation/ixo-blockchain/v5","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"Impact\n\n  Type: Improper authorization leading to unauthorized movement of user funds.\n\n  The x/bonds module moved funds from an address that was resolved from a DID verification method, without verifying that the resolved address belonged to the transaction signer. Affected handlers included MsgMakeOutcomePayment, MsgBuy, MsgSell, MsgSwap, and MsgWithdrawShare, as well as the batch order processor.\n\n  Because any account may list an arbitrary blockchainAccountID as a verification method on a DID it controls (without the consent of that address's owner), an attacker could register victims' addresses as verification methods on their own DID and then move the victims' balances into a bond the attacker controlled — later withdrawing and bridging the proceeds off-chain.\n\n  This was exploited on ixo mainnet (ixo-5) on 2026-06-20. The attack required no victim keys, signatures, or system compromise — any account holding a balance in a token a bond could use was at risk.\n\n  Patches\n\n  Fixed in v8.0.0, delivered via the on-chain v8 software-upgrade. The x/bonds module is disabled: every bonds message is rejected on all routes (top-level, authz, CosmWasm, and ICA), and the bonds batch EndBl","public_affected_ranges":["<= 5.0.0"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-6b28607d6d8542d8634ad5bfeb439bcd"],"technology":"github.com/ixofoundation/ixo-blockchain/v4","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"Impact\n\n  Type: Improper authorization leading to unauthorized movement of user funds.\n\n  The x/bonds module moved funds from an address that was resolved from a DID verification method, without verifying that the resolved address belonged to the transaction signer. Affected handlers included MsgMakeOutcomePayment, MsgBuy, MsgSell, MsgSwap, and MsgWithdrawShare, as well as the batch order processor.\n\n  Because any account may list an arbitrary blockchainAccountID as a verification method on a DID it controls (without the consent of that address's owner), an attacker could register victims' addresses as verification methods on their own DID and then move the victims' balances into a bond the attacker controlled — later withdrawing and bridging the proceeds off-chain.\n\n  This was exploited on ixo mainnet (ixo-5) on 2026-06-20. The attack required no victim keys, signatures, or system compromise — any account holding a balance in a token a bond could use was at risk.\n\n  Patches\n\n  Fixed in v8.0.0, delivered via the on-chain v8 software-upgrade. The x/bonds module is disabled: every bonds message is rejected on all routes (top-level, authz, CosmWasm, and ICA), and the bonds batch EndBl","public_affected_ranges":["<= 4.0.0"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-6b28607d6d8542d8634ad5bfeb439bcd"],"technology":"github.com/ixofoundation/ixo-blockchain/v3","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"Impact\n\n  Type: Improper authorization leading to unauthorized movement of user funds.\n\n  The x/bonds module moved funds from an address that was resolved from a DID verification method, without verifying that the resolved address belonged to the transaction signer. Affected handlers included MsgMakeOutcomePayment, MsgBuy, MsgSell, MsgSwap, and MsgWithdrawShare, as well as the batch order processor.\n\n  Because any account may list an arbitrary blockchainAccountID as a verification method on a DID it controls (without the consent of that address's owner), an attacker could register victims' addresses as verification methods on their own DID and then move the victims' balances into a bond the attacker controlled — later withdrawing and bridging the proceeds off-chain.\n\n  This was exploited on ixo mainnet (ixo-5) on 2026-06-20. The attack required no victim keys, signatures, or system compromise — any account holding a balance in a token a bond could use was at risk.\n\n  Patches\n\n  Fixed in v8.0.0, delivered via the on-chain v8 software-upgrade. The x/bonds module is disabled: every bonds message is rejected on all routes (top-level, authz, CosmWasm, and ICA), and the bonds batch EndBl","public_affected_ranges":["<= 3.0.0"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-6b28607d6d8542d8634ad5bfeb439bcd"],"technology":"github.com/ixofoundation/ixo-blockchain","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"Impact\n\n  Type: Improper authorization leading to unauthorized movement of user funds.\n\n  The x/bonds module moved funds from an address that was resolved from a DID verification method, without verifying that the resolved address belonged to the transaction signer. Affected handlers included MsgMakeOutcomePayment, MsgBuy, MsgSell, MsgSwap, and MsgWithdrawShare, as well as the batch order processor.\n\n  Because any account may list an arbitrary blockchainAccountID as a verification method on a DID it controls (without the consent of that address's owner), an attacker could register victims' addresses as verification methods on their own DID and then move the victims' balances into a bond the attacker controlled — later withdrawing and bridging the proceeds off-chain.\n\n  This was exploited on ixo mainnet (ixo-5) on 2026-06-20. The attack required no victim keys, signatures, or system compromise — any account holding a balance in a token a bond could use was at risk.\n\n  Patches\n\n  Fixed in v8.0.0, delivered via the on-chain v8 software-upgrade. The x/bonds module is disabled: every bonds message is rejected on all routes (top-level, authz, CosmWasm, and ICA), and the bonds batch EndBl","public_affected_ranges":["<= 1.6.0"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-04T10:04:35.912Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-24T19:22:55.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-09-24T19:22:53.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-01T07:24:52.155Z"},{"id":"NVI-00013126","kind":"vulnerability","title":"ixo Blockchain x/bonds DID-resolved payer drain + x/entity ICA authorization bypass","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-w3rp-4cm2-4wgc","CVE-2026-61604"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for github.com/ixofoundation/ixo-blockchain/v8, github.com/ixofoundation/ixo-blockchain/v7, github.com/ixofoundation/ixo-blockchain/v6, github.com/ixofoundation/ixo-blockchain/v5, github.com/ixofoundation/ixo-blockchain/v4. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-6b28607d6d8542d8634ad5bfeb439bcd"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-6b28607d6d8542d8634ad5bfeb439bcd","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-w3rp-4cm2-4wgc","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-w3rp-4cm2-4wgc","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T07:24:52.155Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-6b28607d6d8542d8634ad5bfeb439bcd"],"technology":"github.com/ixofoundation/ixo-blockchain/v8","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"Impact\n\n  Type: Improper authorization leading to unauthorized movement of user funds.\n\n  The x/bonds module moved funds from an address that was resolved from a DID verification method, without verifying that the resolved address belonged to the transaction signer. Affected handlers included MsgMakeOutcomePayment, MsgBuy, MsgSell, MsgSwap, and MsgWithdrawShare, as well as the batch order processor.\n\n  Because any account may list an arbitrary blockchainAccountID as a verification method on a DID it controls (without the consent of that address's owner), an attacker could register victims' addresses as verification methods on their own DID and then move the victims' balances into a bond the attacker controlled — later withdrawing and bridging the proceeds off-chain.\n\n  This was exploited on ixo mainnet (ixo-5) on 2026-06-20. The attack required no victim keys, signatures, or system compromise — any account holding a balance in a token a bond could use was at risk.\n\n  Patches\n\n  Fixed in v8.0.0, delivered via the on-chain v8 software-upgrade. The x/bonds module is disabled: every bonds message is rejected on all routes (top-level, authz, CosmWasm, and ICA), and the bonds batch EndBl","public_affected_ranges":["< 8.0.0"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-6b28607d6d8542d8634ad5bfeb439bcd"],"technology":"github.com/ixofoundation/ixo-blockchain/v7","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"Impact\n\n  Type: Improper authorization leading to unauthorized movement of user funds.\n\n  The x/bonds module moved funds from an address that was resolved from a DID verification method, without verifying that the resolved address belonged to the transaction signer. Affected handlers included MsgMakeOutcomePayment, MsgBuy, MsgSell, MsgSwap, and MsgWithdrawShare, as well as the batch order processor.\n\n  Because any account may list an arbitrary blockchainAccountID as a verification method on a DID it controls (without the consent of that address's owner), an attacker could register victims' addresses as verification methods on their own DID and then move the victims' balances into a bond the attacker controlled — later withdrawing and bridging the proceeds off-chain.\n\n  This was exploited on ixo mainnet (ixo-5) on 2026-06-20. The attack required no victim keys, signatures, or system compromise — any account holding a balance in a token a bond could use was at risk.\n\n  Patches\n\n  Fixed in v8.0.0, delivered via the on-chain v8 software-upgrade. The x/bonds module is disabled: every bonds message is rejected on all routes (top-level, authz, CosmWasm, and ICA), and the bonds batch EndBl","public_affected_ranges":["<= 7.0.0"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-6b28607d6d8542d8634ad5bfeb439bcd"],"technology":"github.com/ixofoundation/ixo-blockchain/v6","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"Impact\n\n  Type: Improper authorization leading to unauthorized movement of user funds.\n\n  The x/bonds module moved funds from an address that was resolved from a DID verification method, without verifying that the resolved address belonged to the transaction signer. Affected handlers included MsgMakeOutcomePayment, MsgBuy, MsgSell, MsgSwap, and MsgWithdrawShare, as well as the batch order processor.\n\n  Because any account may list an arbitrary blockchainAccountID as a verification method on a DID it controls (without the consent of that address's owner), an attacker could register victims' addresses as verification methods on their own DID and then move the victims' balances into a bond the attacker controlled — later withdrawing and bridging the proceeds off-chain.\n\n  This was exploited on ixo mainnet (ixo-5) on 2026-06-20. The attack required no victim keys, signatures, or system compromise — any account holding a balance in a token a bond could use was at risk.\n\n  Patches\n\n  Fixed in v8.0.0, delivered via the on-chain v8 software-upgrade. The x/bonds module is disabled: every bonds message is rejected on all routes (top-level, authz, CosmWasm, and ICA), and the bonds batch EndBl","public_affected_ranges":["<= 6.0.1"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-6b28607d6d8542d8634ad5bfeb439bcd"],"technology":"github.com/ixofoundation/ixo-blockchain/v5","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"Impact\n\n  Type: Improper authorization leading to unauthorized movement of user funds.\n\n  The x/bonds module moved funds from an address that was resolved from a DID verification method, without verifying that the resolved address belonged to the transaction signer. Affected handlers included MsgMakeOutcomePayment, MsgBuy, MsgSell, MsgSwap, and MsgWithdrawShare, as well as the batch order processor.\n\n  Because any account may list an arbitrary blockchainAccountID as a verification method on a DID it controls (without the consent of that address's owner), an attacker could register victims' addresses as verification methods on their own DID and then move the victims' balances into a bond the attacker controlled — later withdrawing and bridging the proceeds off-chain.\n\n  This was exploited on ixo mainnet (ixo-5) on 2026-06-20. The attack required no victim keys, signatures, or system compromise — any account holding a balance in a token a bond could use was at risk.\n\n  Patches\n\n  Fixed in v8.0.0, delivered via the on-chain v8 software-upgrade. The x/bonds module is disabled: every bonds message is rejected on all routes (top-level, authz, CosmWasm, and ICA), and the bonds batch EndBl","public_affected_ranges":["<= 5.0.0"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-6b28607d6d8542d8634ad5bfeb439bcd"],"technology":"github.com/ixofoundation/ixo-blockchain/v4","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"Impact\n\n  Type: Improper authorization leading to unauthorized movement of user funds.\n\n  The x/bonds module moved funds from an address that was resolved from a DID verification method, without verifying that the resolved address belonged to the transaction signer. Affected handlers included MsgMakeOutcomePayment, MsgBuy, MsgSell, MsgSwap, and MsgWithdrawShare, as well as the batch order processor.\n\n  Because any account may list an arbitrary blockchainAccountID as a verification method on a DID it controls (without the consent of that address's owner), an attacker could register victims' addresses as verification methods on their own DID and then move the victims' balances into a bond the attacker controlled — later withdrawing and bridging the proceeds off-chain.\n\n  This was exploited on ixo mainnet (ixo-5) on 2026-06-20. The attack required no victim keys, signatures, or system compromise — any account holding a balance in a token a bond could use was at risk.\n\n  Patches\n\n  Fixed in v8.0.0, delivered via the on-chain v8 software-upgrade. The x/bonds module is disabled: every bonds message is rejected on all routes (top-level, authz, CosmWasm, and ICA), and the bonds batch EndBl","public_affected_ranges":["<= 4.0.0"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-6b28607d6d8542d8634ad5bfeb439bcd"],"technology":"github.com/ixofoundation/ixo-blockchain/v3","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"Impact\n\n  Type: Improper authorization leading to unauthorized movement of user funds.\n\n  The x/bonds module moved funds from an address that was resolved from a DID verification method, without verifying that the resolved address belonged to the transaction signer. Affected handlers included MsgMakeOutcomePayment, MsgBuy, MsgSell, MsgSwap, and MsgWithdrawShare, as well as the batch order processor.\n\n  Because any account may list an arbitrary blockchainAccountID as a verification method on a DID it controls (without the consent of that address's owner), an attacker could register victims' addresses as verification methods on their own DID and then move the victims' balances into a bond the attacker controlled — later withdrawing and bridging the proceeds off-chain.\n\n  This was exploited on ixo mainnet (ixo-5) on 2026-06-20. The attack required no victim keys, signatures, or system compromise — any account holding a balance in a token a bond could use was at risk.\n\n  Patches\n\n  Fixed in v8.0.0, delivered via the on-chain v8 software-upgrade. The x/bonds module is disabled: every bonds message is rejected on all routes (top-level, authz, CosmWasm, and ICA), and the bonds batch EndBl","public_affected_ranges":["<= 3.0.0"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-6b28607d6d8542d8634ad5bfeb439bcd"],"technology":"github.com/ixofoundation/ixo-blockchain","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"Impact\n\n  Type: Improper authorization leading to unauthorized movement of user funds.\n\n  The x/bonds module moved funds from an address that was resolved from a DID verification method, without verifying that the resolved address belonged to the transaction signer. Affected handlers included MsgMakeOutcomePayment, MsgBuy, MsgSell, MsgSwap, and MsgWithdrawShare, as well as the batch order processor.\n\n  Because any account may list an arbitrary blockchainAccountID as a verification method on a DID it controls (without the consent of that address's owner), an attacker could register victims' addresses as verification methods on their own DID and then move the victims' balances into a bond the attacker controlled — later withdrawing and bridging the proceeds off-chain.\n\n  This was exploited on ixo mainnet (ixo-5) on 2026-06-20. The attack required no victim keys, signatures, or system compromise — any account holding a balance in a token a bond could use was at risk.\n\n  Patches\n\n  Fixed in v8.0.0, delivered via the on-chain v8 software-upgrade. The x/bonds module is disabled: every bonds message is rejected on all routes (top-level, authz, CosmWasm, and ICA), and the bonds batch EndBl","public_affected_ranges":["<= 1.6.0"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-01T07:29:12.924Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-24T19:22:55.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-09-24T19:22:53.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-01T07:24:52.155Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}