{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00013130","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Vibe-Trading LLM-callable tools permit command execution, code injection, and SSRF","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-jqmf-mx4f-hfr6"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for vibe-trading-ai. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-6d61c06e24e3f3a311c1459174a2d675"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-02T22:44:03.000Z","value":"10 critical","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-6d61c06e24e3f3a311c1459174a2d675"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-6d61c06e24e3f3a311c1459174a2d675","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-jqmf-mx4f-hfr6","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-jqmf-mx4f-hfr6","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T01:40:00.567Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-6d61c06e24e3f3a311c1459174a2d675"],"technology":"vibe-trading-ai","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary: \n5 findings — `BashTool` shell-injection sink (F6, the canonical RCE primitive), `BackgroundRunTool` async shell-injection sink (F7), backtest `exec_module()` runs top-level statements before the `SignalEngine` class check (F8 — independent RCE path that does not match BashTool signatures), `read_url` outbound HTTP forwarding without schema/host validation (F-B4 SSRF), and Jinja2 codegen with autoescape disabled for `.py.j2` templates (F-B5, defense-in-depth code-injection sink).\n\n---\n\n### Shared baseline (applies to all 5 findings)\n\nAll five tools are members of the **auto-discovered tool registry** the LLM agent gets at startup; the LLM is free to call any of them based on the user prompt. The tool registration is unconditional in default config — no operator opt-in flag gates them. Combined with GHSA-1 / F1 (unauthenticated POST /sessions/{id}/messages), every primitive in this advisory is reachable from any anonymous TCP client to port 8899. The container has no `USER` directive, so successful execution runs as `uid=0(root)`. See GHSA-1 for the shared reproducer environment block — the same `docker compose up -d` setup applies here.\n\nThe five primitives also share ","public_affected_ranges":[">= 0.1.0, < 0.1.7"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-01T07:29:12.924Z","source_updated_at":"2026-10-02T22:44:03.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-10-02T22:44:03.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-01T01:40:00.567Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}