{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00013162","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Trigger.dev: Cross-environment deployment cancel","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-4672-hwv6-gq62"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for trigger.dev. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-7d4abfa57cd48817ec03a0ed8ed95e39"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-02T22:42:43.000Z","value":"5.4 medium","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-7d4abfa57cd48817ec03a0ed8ed95e39"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-7d4abfa57cd48817ec03a0ed8ed95e39","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-4672-hwv6-gq62","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-4672-hwv6-gq62","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T01:40:00.567Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-7d4abfa57cd48817ec03a0ed8ed95e39"],"technology":"trigger.dev","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\nTrigger.dev isolates each project into multiple **environments** (`dev`, `staging`, `prod`, and per-PR `preview` branches), each with its **own secret API key** — the environment is a trust boundary (a `dev`/preview/CI key is lower-trust than a `prod` key). Most API routes enforce this by scoping resource lookups to the authenticated key's environment (`where: { friendlyId, runtimeEnvironmentId: auth.environment.id }`).\n\nThe deployment **cancel** path does not. `DeploymentService.getDeployment()` scopes the lookup by **`projectId` only** — never `environmentId` — so a secret key for *any* environment in a project can cancel a deployment belonging to *any other* environment of the same project, including **production**. The deployment **GET** route, by contrast, *is* env-scoped — so the same key that is **404'd when trying to read** a prod deployment can nonetheless **cancel** it. That asymmetry is the bug.\n\n### Affected\n\n`apps/webapp`, HEAD `5d99457` (current `main`). Affects self-hosted and cloud.\n\n### Root cause\n\n`apps/webapp/app/routes/api.v1.deployments.$deploymentId.cancel.ts` authenticates to an environment and calls `deploymentService.cancelDeployment(authentica","public_affected_ranges":["<= 4.5.5"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-01T07:29:12.927Z","source_updated_at":"2026-10-02T22:42:43.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-10-02T22:42:40.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-01T01:40:00.567Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}