{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00013173","kind":"vulnerability","title":"plone.app.portlets Vulnerable to Remote Code Execution via TALES Injection","revision":2,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-rr49-f9g6-c9r5","CVE-2026-57149"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for plone.app.portlets, plone.app.portlets, plone.app.portlets. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-01632f528f4f692705fd2f51d55af719"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-09-23T13:55:49.000Z","value":"9.9 critical","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-8509524a8aa2ec73f236a5ef7f934b86"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-11-05T12:03:04.000Z","value":"0.638%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.50737. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-01632f528f4f692705fd2f51d55af719"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-8509524a8aa2ec73f236a5ef7f934b86","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-rr49-f9g6-c9r5","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-rr49-f9g6-c9r5","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T07:25:10.521Z"},{"id":"sr-01632f528f4f692705fd2f51d55af719","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-57149","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-11-06T07:17:46.389Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-8509524a8aa2ec73f236a5ef7f934b86"],"technology":"plone.app.portlets","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\nThe Classic portlet (plone.app.portlets.portlets.classic) used its user-supplied template/macro fields to build a TALES path expression that was then evaluated by the TAL path() helper. Because the value was interpreted as a full TALES expression, a user able to add or edit a Classic portlet could supply a crafted value that escapes simple path traversal and is evaluated as arbitrary code.\n\nThis is exploitable by any authenticated user who can configure a Classic portlet - which, with the default role map, includes regular users on their personal dashboard. The result is code execution in the context of the Plone process, i.e. a privilege escalation across the trust boundary between an authenticated web user and the server-side process.\n\n### Patches\nThe problem has been patched in `plone.app.portlets`\n\n* For Plone 6.2, upgrade to `plone.app.portlets` 7.0.2.\n* For Plone 6.1, upgrade to `plone.app.portlets` 6.0.4.\n* For Plone 6.0, upgrade to `plone.app.portlets` 5.0.8.\n\n### Workarounds\nIf upgrading is not immediately possible:\n\n- Restrict who can manage portlets: remove the `plone.app.portlets.ManageOwnPortlets` permission from untrusted roles, and limit Manage portlets to","public_affected_ranges":[">= 7.0.0, <= 7.0.1"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-8509524a8aa2ec73f236a5ef7f934b86"],"technology":"plone.app.portlets","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\nThe Classic portlet (plone.app.portlets.portlets.classic) used its user-supplied template/macro fields to build a TALES path expression that was then evaluated by the TAL path() helper. Because the value was interpreted as a full TALES expression, a user able to add or edit a Classic portlet could supply a crafted value that escapes simple path traversal and is evaluated as arbitrary code.\n\nThis is exploitable by any authenticated user who can configure a Classic portlet - which, with the default role map, includes regular users on their personal dashboard. The result is code execution in the context of the Plone process, i.e. a privilege escalation across the trust boundary between an authenticated web user and the server-side process.\n\n### Patches\nThe problem has been patched in `plone.app.portlets`\n\n* For Plone 6.2, upgrade to `plone.app.portlets` 7.0.2.\n* For Plone 6.1, upgrade to `plone.app.portlets` 6.0.4.\n* For Plone 6.0, upgrade to `plone.app.portlets` 5.0.8.\n\n### Workarounds\nIf upgrading is not immediately possible:\n\n- Restrict who can manage portlets: remove the `plone.app.portlets.ManageOwnPortlets` permission from untrusted roles, and limit Manage portlets to","public_affected_ranges":[">= 6.0.0, <= 6.0.3"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-8509524a8aa2ec73f236a5ef7f934b86"],"technology":"plone.app.portlets","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\nThe Classic portlet (plone.app.portlets.portlets.classic) used its user-supplied template/macro fields to build a TALES path expression that was then evaluated by the TAL path() helper. Because the value was interpreted as a full TALES expression, a user able to add or edit a Classic portlet could supply a crafted value that escapes simple path traversal and is evaluated as arbitrary code.\n\nThis is exploitable by any authenticated user who can configure a Classic portlet - which, with the default role map, includes regular users on their personal dashboard. The result is code execution in the context of the Plone process, i.e. a privilege escalation across the trust boundary between an authenticated web user and the server-side process.\n\n### Patches\nThe problem has been patched in `plone.app.portlets`\n\n* For Plone 6.2, upgrade to `plone.app.portlets` 7.0.2.\n* For Plone 6.1, upgrade to `plone.app.portlets` 6.0.4.\n* For Plone 6.0, upgrade to `plone.app.portlets` 5.0.8.\n\n### Workarounds\nIf upgrading is not immediately possible:\n\n- Restrict who can manage portlets: remove the `plone.app.portlets.ManageOwnPortlets` permission from untrusted roles, and limit Manage portlets to","public_affected_ranges":[">= 5.0.0, <= 5.0.7"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-07T07:07:42.513Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-23T13:55:49.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-09-23T13:55:47.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-01T07:25:10.521Z"},{"id":"NVI-00013173","kind":"vulnerability","title":"plone.app.portlets Vulnerable to Remote Code Execution via TALES Injection","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-rr49-f9g6-c9r5","CVE-2026-57149"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for plone.app.portlets, plone.app.portlets, plone.app.portlets. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-8509524a8aa2ec73f236a5ef7f934b86"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-09-23T13:55:49.000Z","value":"9.9 critical","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-8509524a8aa2ec73f236a5ef7f934b86"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-8509524a8aa2ec73f236a5ef7f934b86","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-rr49-f9g6-c9r5","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-rr49-f9g6-c9r5","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T07:25:10.521Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-8509524a8aa2ec73f236a5ef7f934b86"],"technology":"plone.app.portlets","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\nThe Classic portlet (plone.app.portlets.portlets.classic) used its user-supplied template/macro fields to build a TALES path expression that was then evaluated by the TAL path() helper. Because the value was interpreted as a full TALES expression, a user able to add or edit a Classic portlet could supply a crafted value that escapes simple path traversal and is evaluated as arbitrary code.\n\nThis is exploitable by any authenticated user who can configure a Classic portlet - which, with the default role map, includes regular users on their personal dashboard. The result is code execution in the context of the Plone process, i.e. a privilege escalation across the trust boundary between an authenticated web user and the server-side process.\n\n### Patches\nThe problem has been patched in `plone.app.portlets`\n\n* For Plone 6.2, upgrade to `plone.app.portlets` 7.0.2.\n* For Plone 6.1, upgrade to `plone.app.portlets` 6.0.4.\n* For Plone 6.0, upgrade to `plone.app.portlets` 5.0.8.\n\n### Workarounds\nIf upgrading is not immediately possible:\n\n- Restrict who can manage portlets: remove the `plone.app.portlets.ManageOwnPortlets` permission from untrusted roles, and limit Manage portlets to","public_affected_ranges":[">= 7.0.0, <= 7.0.1"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-8509524a8aa2ec73f236a5ef7f934b86"],"technology":"plone.app.portlets","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\nThe Classic portlet (plone.app.portlets.portlets.classic) used its user-supplied template/macro fields to build a TALES path expression that was then evaluated by the TAL path() helper. Because the value was interpreted as a full TALES expression, a user able to add or edit a Classic portlet could supply a crafted value that escapes simple path traversal and is evaluated as arbitrary code.\n\nThis is exploitable by any authenticated user who can configure a Classic portlet - which, with the default role map, includes regular users on their personal dashboard. The result is code execution in the context of the Plone process, i.e. a privilege escalation across the trust boundary between an authenticated web user and the server-side process.\n\n### Patches\nThe problem has been patched in `plone.app.portlets`\n\n* For Plone 6.2, upgrade to `plone.app.portlets` 7.0.2.\n* For Plone 6.1, upgrade to `plone.app.portlets` 6.0.4.\n* For Plone 6.0, upgrade to `plone.app.portlets` 5.0.8.\n\n### Workarounds\nIf upgrading is not immediately possible:\n\n- Restrict who can manage portlets: remove the `plone.app.portlets.ManageOwnPortlets` permission from untrusted roles, and limit Manage portlets to","public_affected_ranges":[">= 6.0.0, <= 6.0.3"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-8509524a8aa2ec73f236a5ef7f934b86"],"technology":"plone.app.portlets","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\nThe Classic portlet (plone.app.portlets.portlets.classic) used its user-supplied template/macro fields to build a TALES path expression that was then evaluated by the TAL path() helper. Because the value was interpreted as a full TALES expression, a user able to add or edit a Classic portlet could supply a crafted value that escapes simple path traversal and is evaluated as arbitrary code.\n\nThis is exploitable by any authenticated user who can configure a Classic portlet - which, with the default role map, includes regular users on their personal dashboard. The result is code execution in the context of the Plone process, i.e. a privilege escalation across the trust boundary between an authenticated web user and the server-side process.\n\n### Patches\nThe problem has been patched in `plone.app.portlets`\n\n* For Plone 6.2, upgrade to `plone.app.portlets` 7.0.2.\n* For Plone 6.1, upgrade to `plone.app.portlets` 6.0.4.\n* For Plone 6.0, upgrade to `plone.app.portlets` 5.0.8.\n\n### Workarounds\nIf upgrading is not immediately possible:\n\n- Restrict who can manage portlets: remove the `plone.app.portlets.ManageOwnPortlets` permission from untrusted roles, and limit Manage portlets to","public_affected_ranges":[">= 5.0.0, <= 5.0.7"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-01T07:29:12.927Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-23T13:55:49.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-09-23T13:55:47.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-01T07:25:10.521Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}