{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00013192","kind":"vulnerability","title":"zebrad has consensus divergence via P2SH sigop undercount in pure-Rust disabled-opcode parser","revision":3,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.","NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-gf9r-m956-97qx","CVE-2026-52735"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for zebra-script, zebrad. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-238d234f312daddc7025ca78571bf3f6"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-22T22:10:00.250Z","value":"9.3 CRITICAL (4.0)","meaning":"security-advisories@github.com severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-7f6dfcc385bf9e6ff118b9dd05348ea6"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-11-02T12:00:30.000Z","value":"0.507%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.43249. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-238d234f312daddc7025ca78571bf3f6"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-8b3bfe4d2d73cda3d809eba58ef0c306","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-gf9r-m956-97qx","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-gf9r-m956-97qx","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T07:22:52.960Z"},{"id":"sr-7f6dfcc385bf9e6ff118b9dd05348ea6","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-52735","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.","title":"CVE-2026-52735","publisher":"NIST National Vulnerability Database","observed_at":"2026-11-03T22:35:42.883Z"},{"id":"sr-238d234f312daddc7025ca78571bf3f6","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-52735","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-11-02T20:15:58.856Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-8b3bfe4d2d73cda3d809eba58ef0c306"],"technology":"zebra-script","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Am I affected\n\nYou are affected if:\n\n1. You run any version of `zebrad` up to and including `v4.4.1`.\n2. Your node validates blocks on mainnet, testnet, or any network where both Zebra and zcashd nodes participate.\n\nAll default configurations are affected. No feature flags, non-default settings, or special build options are required.\n\n### Summary\n\nZebra's P2SH sigop counter uses a pure-Rust code path that short-circuits on disabled opcodes (such as `OP_CODESEPARATOR`), returning a partial count of zero for any sigops following the disabled opcode. The reference implementation (zcashd) correctly counts through disabled opcodes in its static sigop analysis. This produces a consensus divergence: Zebra accepts blocks that zcashd rejects when the block-wide `MAX_BLOCK_SIGOPS = 20,000` threshold is crossed on one side but not the other.\n\nAn attacker can exploit this without mining capability. Broadcasting transactions that spend P2SH outputs with malicious redeem scripts is sufficient; any Zebra miner who includes those transactions in a block triggers a chain split between Zebra and zcashd validators.\n\n### Details\n\nThe P2SH sigop counter at `zebra-script/src/lib.rs:399` calls `scrip","public_affected_ranges":["<= 6.0.1"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-8b3bfe4d2d73cda3d809eba58ef0c306"],"technology":"zebrad","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Am I affected\n\nYou are affected if:\n\n1. You run any version of `zebrad` up to and including `v4.4.1`.\n2. Your node validates blocks on mainnet, testnet, or any network where both Zebra and zcashd nodes participate.\n\nAll default configurations are affected. No feature flags, non-default settings, or special build options are required.\n\n### Summary\n\nZebra's P2SH sigop counter uses a pure-Rust code path that short-circuits on disabled opcodes (such as `OP_CODESEPARATOR`), returning a partial count of zero for any sigops following the disabled opcode. The reference implementation (zcashd) correctly counts through disabled opcodes in its static sigop analysis. This produces a consensus divergence: Zebra accepts blocks that zcashd rejects when the block-wide `MAX_BLOCK_SIGOPS = 20,000` threshold is crossed on one side but not the other.\n\nAn attacker can exploit this without mining capability. Broadcasting transactions that spend P2SH outputs with malicious redeem scripts is sufficient; any Zebra miner who includes those transactions in a block triggers a chain split between Zebra and zcashd validators.\n\n### Details\n\nThe P2SH sigop counter at `zebra-script/src/lib.rs:399` calls `scrip","public_affected_ranges":["<= 4.4.1"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-08T15:11:49.378Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-30T22:55:26.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-07-02T19:43:36.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-01T07:22:52.960Z"},{"id":"NVI-00013192","kind":"vulnerability","title":"zebrad has consensus divergence via P2SH sigop undercount in pure-Rust disabled-opcode parser","revision":2,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-gf9r-m956-97qx","CVE-2026-52735"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for zebra-script, zebrad. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-238d234f312daddc7025ca78571bf3f6"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-11-02T12:00:30.000Z","value":"0.507%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.43249. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-238d234f312daddc7025ca78571bf3f6"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-8b3bfe4d2d73cda3d809eba58ef0c306","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-gf9r-m956-97qx","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-gf9r-m956-97qx","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T07:22:52.960Z"},{"id":"sr-238d234f312daddc7025ca78571bf3f6","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-52735","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-11-02T20:15:58.856Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-8b3bfe4d2d73cda3d809eba58ef0c306"],"technology":"zebra-script","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Am I affected\n\nYou are affected if:\n\n1. You run any version of `zebrad` up to and including `v4.4.1`.\n2. Your node validates blocks on mainnet, testnet, or any network where both Zebra and zcashd nodes participate.\n\nAll default configurations are affected. No feature flags, non-default settings, or special build options are required.\n\n### Summary\n\nZebra's P2SH sigop counter uses a pure-Rust code path that short-circuits on disabled opcodes (such as `OP_CODESEPARATOR`), returning a partial count of zero for any sigops following the disabled opcode. The reference implementation (zcashd) correctly counts through disabled opcodes in its static sigop analysis. This produces a consensus divergence: Zebra accepts blocks that zcashd rejects when the block-wide `MAX_BLOCK_SIGOPS = 20,000` threshold is crossed on one side but not the other.\n\nAn attacker can exploit this without mining capability. Broadcasting transactions that spend P2SH outputs with malicious redeem scripts is sufficient; any Zebra miner who includes those transactions in a block triggers a chain split between Zebra and zcashd validators.\n\n### Details\n\nThe P2SH sigop counter at `zebra-script/src/lib.rs:399` calls `scrip","public_affected_ranges":["<= 6.0.1"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-8b3bfe4d2d73cda3d809eba58ef0c306"],"technology":"zebrad","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Am I affected\n\nYou are affected if:\n\n1. You run any version of `zebrad` up to and including `v4.4.1`.\n2. Your node validates blocks on mainnet, testnet, or any network where both Zebra and zcashd nodes participate.\n\nAll default configurations are affected. No feature flags, non-default settings, or special build options are required.\n\n### Summary\n\nZebra's P2SH sigop counter uses a pure-Rust code path that short-circuits on disabled opcodes (such as `OP_CODESEPARATOR`), returning a partial count of zero for any sigops following the disabled opcode. The reference implementation (zcashd) correctly counts through disabled opcodes in its static sigop analysis. This produces a consensus divergence: Zebra accepts blocks that zcashd rejects when the block-wide `MAX_BLOCK_SIGOPS = 20,000` threshold is crossed on one side but not the other.\n\nAn attacker can exploit this without mining capability. Broadcasting transactions that spend P2SH outputs with malicious redeem scripts is sufficient; any Zebra miner who includes those transactions in a block triggers a chain split between Zebra and zcashd validators.\n\n### Details\n\nThe P2SH sigop counter at `zebra-script/src/lib.rs:399` calls `scrip","public_affected_ranges":["<= 4.4.1"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-07T14:01:58.743Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-30T22:55:26.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-07-02T19:43:36.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-01T07:22:52.960Z"},{"id":"NVI-00013192","kind":"vulnerability","title":"zebrad has consensus divergence via P2SH sigop undercount in pure-Rust disabled-opcode parser","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-gf9r-m956-97qx","CVE-2026-52735"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for zebra-script, zebrad. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-8b3bfe4d2d73cda3d809eba58ef0c306"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-8b3bfe4d2d73cda3d809eba58ef0c306","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-gf9r-m956-97qx","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-gf9r-m956-97qx","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T07:22:52.960Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-8b3bfe4d2d73cda3d809eba58ef0c306"],"technology":"zebra-script","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Am I affected\n\nYou are affected if:\n\n1. You run any version of `zebrad` up to and including `v4.4.1`.\n2. Your node validates blocks on mainnet, testnet, or any network where both Zebra and zcashd nodes participate.\n\nAll default configurations are affected. No feature flags, non-default settings, or special build options are required.\n\n### Summary\n\nZebra's P2SH sigop counter uses a pure-Rust code path that short-circuits on disabled opcodes (such as `OP_CODESEPARATOR`), returning a partial count of zero for any sigops following the disabled opcode. The reference implementation (zcashd) correctly counts through disabled opcodes in its static sigop analysis. This produces a consensus divergence: Zebra accepts blocks that zcashd rejects when the block-wide `MAX_BLOCK_SIGOPS = 20,000` threshold is crossed on one side but not the other.\n\nAn attacker can exploit this without mining capability. Broadcasting transactions that spend P2SH outputs with malicious redeem scripts is sufficient; any Zebra miner who includes those transactions in a block triggers a chain split between Zebra and zcashd validators.\n\n### Details\n\nThe P2SH sigop counter at `zebra-script/src/lib.rs:399` calls `scrip","public_affected_ranges":["<= 6.0.1"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-8b3bfe4d2d73cda3d809eba58ef0c306"],"technology":"zebrad","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Am I affected\n\nYou are affected if:\n\n1. You run any version of `zebrad` up to and including `v4.4.1`.\n2. Your node validates blocks on mainnet, testnet, or any network where both Zebra and zcashd nodes participate.\n\nAll default configurations are affected. No feature flags, non-default settings, or special build options are required.\n\n### Summary\n\nZebra's P2SH sigop counter uses a pure-Rust code path that short-circuits on disabled opcodes (such as `OP_CODESEPARATOR`), returning a partial count of zero for any sigops following the disabled opcode. The reference implementation (zcashd) correctly counts through disabled opcodes in its static sigop analysis. This produces a consensus divergence: Zebra accepts blocks that zcashd rejects when the block-wide `MAX_BLOCK_SIGOPS = 20,000` threshold is crossed on one side but not the other.\n\nAn attacker can exploit this without mining capability. Broadcasting transactions that spend P2SH outputs with malicious redeem scripts is sufficient; any Zebra miner who includes those transactions in a block triggers a chain split between Zebra and zcashd validators.\n\n### Details\n\nThe P2SH sigop counter at `zebra-script/src/lib.rs:399` calls `scrip","public_affected_ranges":["<= 4.4.1"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-01T07:29:12.928Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-30T22:55:26.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-07-02T19:43:36.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-01T07:22:52.960Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}