{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00013772","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Http4s: Ember chunk parser lenience (TE.TE request smuggling)","revision":2,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-jrpm-956j-96jg","CVE-2026-69216"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_2.12, org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_2.13, org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_3, org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_2.13, org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_3. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-105105c1acd7ed8a3d6a6a50317170e3"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-09-15T20:01:01.000Z","value":"5.4 medium","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-000120125ecbb868b6d5e6e30aaa9371"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-11-03T12:00:27.000Z","value":"0.368%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.30713. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-105105c1acd7ed8a3d6a6a50317170e3"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-000120125ecbb868b6d5e6e30aaa9371","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-jrpm-956j-96jg","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-jrpm-956j-96jg","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T19:09:30.244Z"},{"id":"sr-105105c1acd7ed8a3d6a6a50317170e3","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-69216","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-11-03T17:45:16.077Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-000120125ecbb868b6d5e6e30aaa9371"],"technology":"org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_2.12","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nEmber's chunk decoder parses the size token leniently: it strips leading and trailing whitespace and accepts a leading `+` or `-` sign.  RFC9112 §7.1 defines `chunk-size = 1*HEXDIG`.  An intermediary that parses the chunk boundary differently (or rejects it) will disagree with Ember on request framing, enabling HTTP request smuggling (TE.TE).\n\n## Impact\n\n### Server\n\nRequest smuggling (TE.TE) when ember-server is an origin behind an intermediary that forwards the body verbatim but interprets the malformed chunk sizes differently\n\n- Front-end security bypass: the smuggled request reaches paths the intermediary might have blocked, with attacker-chosen method and headers.\n- Cache poisoning: the smuggled response is associated with the next request key in a caching proxy.\n- Request queue hijack:\n\n### Client\n\nember-client has the same leniencies on the response path, which enables response smuggling when http4s is used as a gateway.  This is less severe, as it requires a malicious or compromised upstream rather than an anonymous remote client.\n\n## Preconditions\n\n- Unauthenticated remote attacker (server)\n- ember-server as origin behind a keep-alive intermediary\n- Malicious or","public_affected_ranges":["<= 0.23.34"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-000120125ecbb868b6d5e6e30aaa9371"],"technology":"org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_2.13","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nEmber's chunk decoder parses the size token leniently: it strips leading and trailing whitespace and accepts a leading `+` or `-` sign.  RFC9112 §7.1 defines `chunk-size = 1*HEXDIG`.  An intermediary that parses the chunk boundary differently (or rejects it) will disagree with Ember on request framing, enabling HTTP request smuggling (TE.TE).\n\n## Impact\n\n### Server\n\nRequest smuggling (TE.TE) when ember-server is an origin behind an intermediary that forwards the body verbatim but interprets the malformed chunk sizes differently\n\n- Front-end security bypass: the smuggled request reaches paths the intermediary might have blocked, with attacker-chosen method and headers.\n- Cache poisoning: the smuggled response is associated with the next request key in a caching proxy.\n- Request queue hijack:\n\n### Client\n\nember-client has the same leniencies on the response path, which enables response smuggling when http4s is used as a gateway.  This is less severe, as it requires a malicious or compromised upstream rather than an anonymous remote client.\n\n## Preconditions\n\n- Unauthenticated remote attacker (server)\n- ember-server as origin behind a keep-alive intermediary\n- Malicious or","public_affected_ranges":["<= 0.23.34"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-000120125ecbb868b6d5e6e30aaa9371"],"technology":"org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_3","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nEmber's chunk decoder parses the size token leniently: it strips leading and trailing whitespace and accepts a leading `+` or `-` sign.  RFC9112 §7.1 defines `chunk-size = 1*HEXDIG`.  An intermediary that parses the chunk boundary differently (or rejects it) will disagree with Ember on request framing, enabling HTTP request smuggling (TE.TE).\n\n## Impact\n\n### Server\n\nRequest smuggling (TE.TE) when ember-server is an origin behind an intermediary that forwards the body verbatim but interprets the malformed chunk sizes differently\n\n- Front-end security bypass: the smuggled request reaches paths the intermediary might have blocked, with attacker-chosen method and headers.\n- Cache poisoning: the smuggled response is associated with the next request key in a caching proxy.\n- Request queue hijack:\n\n### Client\n\nember-client has the same leniencies on the response path, which enables response smuggling when http4s is used as a gateway.  This is less severe, as it requires a malicious or compromised upstream rather than an anonymous remote client.\n\n## Preconditions\n\n- Unauthenticated remote attacker (server)\n- ember-server as origin behind a keep-alive intermediary\n- Malicious or","public_affected_ranges":["<= 0.23.34"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-000120125ecbb868b6d5e6e30aaa9371"],"technology":"org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_2.13","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nEmber's chunk decoder parses the size token leniently: it strips leading and trailing whitespace and accepts a leading `+` or `-` sign.  RFC9112 §7.1 defines `chunk-size = 1*HEXDIG`.  An intermediary that parses the chunk boundary differently (or rejects it) will disagree with Ember on request framing, enabling HTTP request smuggling (TE.TE).\n\n## Impact\n\n### Server\n\nRequest smuggling (TE.TE) when ember-server is an origin behind an intermediary that forwards the body verbatim but interprets the malformed chunk sizes differently\n\n- Front-end security bypass: the smuggled request reaches paths the intermediary might have blocked, with attacker-chosen method and headers.\n- Cache poisoning: the smuggled response is associated with the next request key in a caching proxy.\n- Request queue hijack:\n\n### Client\n\nember-client has the same leniencies on the response path, which enables response smuggling when http4s is used as a gateway.  This is less severe, as it requires a malicious or compromised upstream rather than an anonymous remote client.\n\n## Preconditions\n\n- Unauthenticated remote attacker (server)\n- ember-server as origin behind a keep-alive intermediary\n- Malicious or","public_affected_ranges":[">= 1.0.0-M1, <= 1.0.0-M46"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-000120125ecbb868b6d5e6e30aaa9371"],"technology":"org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_3","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nEmber's chunk decoder parses the size token leniently: it strips leading and trailing whitespace and accepts a leading `+` or `-` sign.  RFC9112 §7.1 defines `chunk-size = 1*HEXDIG`.  An intermediary that parses the chunk boundary differently (or rejects it) will disagree with Ember on request framing, enabling HTTP request smuggling (TE.TE).\n\n## Impact\n\n### Server\n\nRequest smuggling (TE.TE) when ember-server is an origin behind an intermediary that forwards the body verbatim but interprets the malformed chunk sizes differently\n\n- Front-end security bypass: the smuggled request reaches paths the intermediary might have blocked, with attacker-chosen method and headers.\n- Cache poisoning: the smuggled response is associated with the next request key in a caching proxy.\n- Request queue hijack:\n\n### Client\n\nember-client has the same leniencies on the response path, which enables response smuggling when http4s is used as a gateway.  This is less severe, as it requires a malicious or compromised upstream rather than an anonymous remote client.\n\n## Preconditions\n\n- Unauthenticated remote attacker (server)\n- ember-server as origin behind a keep-alive intermediary\n- Malicious or","public_affected_ranges":[">= 1.0.0-M1, <= 1.0.0-M46"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-06T00:29:57.285Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-15T20:01:01.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-09-15T20:01:00.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-01T19:09:30.244Z"},{"id":"NVI-00013772","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Http4s: Ember chunk parser lenience (TE.TE request smuggling)","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-jrpm-956j-96jg","CVE-2026-69216"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_2.12, org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_2.13, org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_3, org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_2.13, org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_3. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-000120125ecbb868b6d5e6e30aaa9371"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-09-15T20:01:01.000Z","value":"5.4 medium","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-000120125ecbb868b6d5e6e30aaa9371"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-000120125ecbb868b6d5e6e30aaa9371","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-jrpm-956j-96jg","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-jrpm-956j-96jg","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T19:09:30.244Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-000120125ecbb868b6d5e6e30aaa9371"],"technology":"org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_2.12","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nEmber's chunk decoder parses the size token leniently: it strips leading and trailing whitespace and accepts a leading `+` or `-` sign.  RFC9112 §7.1 defines `chunk-size = 1*HEXDIG`.  An intermediary that parses the chunk boundary differently (or rejects it) will disagree with Ember on request framing, enabling HTTP request smuggling (TE.TE).\n\n## Impact\n\n### Server\n\nRequest smuggling (TE.TE) when ember-server is an origin behind an intermediary that forwards the body verbatim but interprets the malformed chunk sizes differently\n\n- Front-end security bypass: the smuggled request reaches paths the intermediary might have blocked, with attacker-chosen method and headers.\n- Cache poisoning: the smuggled response is associated with the next request key in a caching proxy.\n- Request queue hijack:\n\n### Client\n\nember-client has the same leniencies on the response path, which enables response smuggling when http4s is used as a gateway.  This is less severe, as it requires a malicious or compromised upstream rather than an anonymous remote client.\n\n## Preconditions\n\n- Unauthenticated remote attacker (server)\n- ember-server as origin behind a keep-alive intermediary\n- Malicious or","public_affected_ranges":["<= 0.23.34"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-000120125ecbb868b6d5e6e30aaa9371"],"technology":"org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_2.13","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nEmber's chunk decoder parses the size token leniently: it strips leading and trailing whitespace and accepts a leading `+` or `-` sign.  RFC9112 §7.1 defines `chunk-size = 1*HEXDIG`.  An intermediary that parses the chunk boundary differently (or rejects it) will disagree with Ember on request framing, enabling HTTP request smuggling (TE.TE).\n\n## Impact\n\n### Server\n\nRequest smuggling (TE.TE) when ember-server is an origin behind an intermediary that forwards the body verbatim but interprets the malformed chunk sizes differently\n\n- Front-end security bypass: the smuggled request reaches paths the intermediary might have blocked, with attacker-chosen method and headers.\n- Cache poisoning: the smuggled response is associated with the next request key in a caching proxy.\n- Request queue hijack:\n\n### Client\n\nember-client has the same leniencies on the response path, which enables response smuggling when http4s is used as a gateway.  This is less severe, as it requires a malicious or compromised upstream rather than an anonymous remote client.\n\n## Preconditions\n\n- Unauthenticated remote attacker (server)\n- ember-server as origin behind a keep-alive intermediary\n- Malicious or","public_affected_ranges":["<= 0.23.34"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-000120125ecbb868b6d5e6e30aaa9371"],"technology":"org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_3","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nEmber's chunk decoder parses the size token leniently: it strips leading and trailing whitespace and accepts a leading `+` or `-` sign.  RFC9112 §7.1 defines `chunk-size = 1*HEXDIG`.  An intermediary that parses the chunk boundary differently (or rejects it) will disagree with Ember on request framing, enabling HTTP request smuggling (TE.TE).\n\n## Impact\n\n### Server\n\nRequest smuggling (TE.TE) when ember-server is an origin behind an intermediary that forwards the body verbatim but interprets the malformed chunk sizes differently\n\n- Front-end security bypass: the smuggled request reaches paths the intermediary might have blocked, with attacker-chosen method and headers.\n- Cache poisoning: the smuggled response is associated with the next request key in a caching proxy.\n- Request queue hijack:\n\n### Client\n\nember-client has the same leniencies on the response path, which enables response smuggling when http4s is used as a gateway.  This is less severe, as it requires a malicious or compromised upstream rather than an anonymous remote client.\n\n## Preconditions\n\n- Unauthenticated remote attacker (server)\n- ember-server as origin behind a keep-alive intermediary\n- Malicious or","public_affected_ranges":["<= 0.23.34"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-000120125ecbb868b6d5e6e30aaa9371"],"technology":"org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_2.13","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nEmber's chunk decoder parses the size token leniently: it strips leading and trailing whitespace and accepts a leading `+` or `-` sign.  RFC9112 §7.1 defines `chunk-size = 1*HEXDIG`.  An intermediary that parses the chunk boundary differently (or rejects it) will disagree with Ember on request framing, enabling HTTP request smuggling (TE.TE).\n\n## Impact\n\n### Server\n\nRequest smuggling (TE.TE) when ember-server is an origin behind an intermediary that forwards the body verbatim but interprets the malformed chunk sizes differently\n\n- Front-end security bypass: the smuggled request reaches paths the intermediary might have blocked, with attacker-chosen method and headers.\n- Cache poisoning: the smuggled response is associated with the next request key in a caching proxy.\n- Request queue hijack:\n\n### Client\n\nember-client has the same leniencies on the response path, which enables response smuggling when http4s is used as a gateway.  This is less severe, as it requires a malicious or compromised upstream rather than an anonymous remote client.\n\n## Preconditions\n\n- Unauthenticated remote attacker (server)\n- ember-server as origin behind a keep-alive intermediary\n- Malicious or","public_affected_ranges":[">= 1.0.0-M1, <= 1.0.0-M46"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-000120125ecbb868b6d5e6e30aaa9371"],"technology":"org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_3","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nEmber's chunk decoder parses the size token leniently: it strips leading and trailing whitespace and accepts a leading `+` or `-` sign.  RFC9112 §7.1 defines `chunk-size = 1*HEXDIG`.  An intermediary that parses the chunk boundary differently (or rejects it) will disagree with Ember on request framing, enabling HTTP request smuggling (TE.TE).\n\n## Impact\n\n### Server\n\nRequest smuggling (TE.TE) when ember-server is an origin behind an intermediary that forwards the body verbatim but interprets the malformed chunk sizes differently\n\n- Front-end security bypass: the smuggled request reaches paths the intermediary might have blocked, with attacker-chosen method and headers.\n- Cache poisoning: the smuggled response is associated with the next request key in a caching proxy.\n- Request queue hijack:\n\n### Client\n\nember-client has the same leniencies on the response path, which enables response smuggling when http4s is used as a gateway.  This is less severe, as it requires a malicious or compromised upstream rather than an anonymous remote client.\n\n## Preconditions\n\n- Unauthenticated remote attacker (server)\n- ember-server as origin behind a keep-alive intermediary\n- Malicious or","public_affected_ranges":[">= 1.0.0-M1, <= 1.0.0-M46"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-02T10:00:37.139Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-15T20:01:01.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-09-15T20:01:00.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-01T19:09:30.244Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}