{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00013793","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Apache Camel-Vertx-Http and Camel-Netty-Http: Unsafe Java deserialization of HTTP response bodies via a raw ObjectInputStream when transferException is enabled","revision":3,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.","NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-6qw3-4796-5984","CVE-2026-40859"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for org.apache.camel:camel-vertx-http, org.apache.camel:camel-vertx-http, org.apache.camel:camel-vertx-http, org.apache.camel:camel-netty-http, org.apache.camel:camel-netty-http. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-05ae85f9d7a5ee804cfe80d3737618d1"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-08-26T15:17:42.000Z","value":"8.1 high","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-054b21600c4a3c341475381f4e8f2084"},{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-25T15:10:00.147Z","value":"8.1 HIGH (3.1)","meaning":"134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0 severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-0ec57091d725216030be061df078313a"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-11-02T12:00:30.000Z","value":"0.886%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.5928. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-05ae85f9d7a5ee804cfe80d3737618d1"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-054b21600c4a3c341475381f4e8f2084","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-6qw3-4796-5984","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-6qw3-4796-5984","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-02T09:56:37.775Z"},{"id":"sr-0ec57091d725216030be061df078313a","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-40859","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.","title":"CVE-2026-40859","publisher":"NIST National Vulnerability Database","observed_at":"2026-11-07T22:21:47.738Z"},{"id":"sr-05ae85f9d7a5ee804cfe80d3737618d1","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-40859","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-11-02T20:15:58.852Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-054b21600c4a3c341475381f4e8f2084"],"technology":"org.apache.camel:camel-vertx-http","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerability in Apache Camel.\n\nThe camel-vertx-http component deserializes HTTP response bodies carrying the Content-Type application/x-java-serialized-object using a raw java.io.ObjectInputStream, without applying any ObjectInputFilter (VertxHttpHelper.deserializeJavaObjectFromStream) This deserialization path is reached only when the producer endpoint is configured with transferException=true (or the component-level allowJavaSerializedObject=true) and throwExceptionOnFailure is left at its default value of true; in that case a backend HTTP response with a 5xx status and the application/x-java-serialized-object content type has its body deserialized with no class restrictions. An attacker who controls the backend the Camel producer talks to - through a man-in-the-middle position on an unencrypted (plain HTTP) connection, or by compromising the backend service - can return a crafted serialized Java object and, if a suitable gadget chain is present on the classpath, achieve remote code execution on the Camel application host. The path is not reachable in the default configuration, where transferException is false.\nThis issue affects Apache Camel: f","public_affected_ranges":[">= 4.0.0, < 4.14.8"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-054b21600c4a3c341475381f4e8f2084"],"technology":"org.apache.camel:camel-vertx-http","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerability in Apache Camel.\n\nThe camel-vertx-http component deserializes HTTP response bodies carrying the Content-Type application/x-java-serialized-object using a raw java.io.ObjectInputStream, without applying any ObjectInputFilter (VertxHttpHelper.deserializeJavaObjectFromStream) This deserialization path is reached only when the producer endpoint is configured with transferException=true (or the component-level allowJavaSerializedObject=true) and throwExceptionOnFailure is left at its default value of true; in that case a backend HTTP response with a 5xx status and the application/x-java-serialized-object content type has its body deserialized with no class restrictions. An attacker who controls the backend the Camel producer talks to - through a man-in-the-middle position on an unencrypted (plain HTTP) connection, or by compromising the backend service - can return a crafted serialized Java object and, if a suitable gadget chain is present on the classpath, achieve remote code execution on the Camel application host. The path is not reachable in the default configuration, where transferException is false.\nThis issue affects Apache Camel: f","public_affected_ranges":[">= 4.15.0, < 4.18.3"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-054b21600c4a3c341475381f4e8f2084"],"technology":"org.apache.camel:camel-vertx-http","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerability in Apache Camel.\n\nThe camel-vertx-http component deserializes HTTP response bodies carrying the Content-Type application/x-java-serialized-object using a raw java.io.ObjectInputStream, without applying any ObjectInputFilter (VertxHttpHelper.deserializeJavaObjectFromStream) This deserialization path is reached only when the producer endpoint is configured with transferException=true (or the component-level allowJavaSerializedObject=true) and throwExceptionOnFailure is left at its default value of true; in that case a backend HTTP response with a 5xx status and the application/x-java-serialized-object content type has its body deserialized with no class restrictions. An attacker who controls the backend the Camel producer talks to - through a man-in-the-middle position on an unencrypted (plain HTTP) connection, or by compromising the backend service - can return a crafted serialized Java object and, if a suitable gadget chain is present on the classpath, achieve remote code execution on the Camel application host. The path is not reachable in the default configuration, where transferException is false.\nThis issue affects Apache Camel: f","public_affected_ranges":[">= 4.19.0, < 4.20.0"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-054b21600c4a3c341475381f4e8f2084"],"technology":"org.apache.camel:camel-netty-http","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerability in Apache Camel.\n\nThe camel-vertx-http component deserializes HTTP response bodies carrying the Content-Type application/x-java-serialized-object using a raw java.io.ObjectInputStream, without applying any ObjectInputFilter (VertxHttpHelper.deserializeJavaObjectFromStream) This deserialization path is reached only when the producer endpoint is configured with transferException=true (or the component-level allowJavaSerializedObject=true) and throwExceptionOnFailure is left at its default value of true; in that case a backend HTTP response with a 5xx status and the application/x-java-serialized-object content type has its body deserialized with no class restrictions. An attacker who controls the backend the Camel producer talks to - through a man-in-the-middle position on an unencrypted (plain HTTP) connection, or by compromising the backend service - can return a crafted serialized Java object and, if a suitable gadget chain is present on the classpath, achieve remote code execution on the Camel application host. The path is not reachable in the default configuration, where transferException is false.\nThis issue affects Apache Camel: f","public_affected_ranges":[">= 4.0.0, < 4.14.8"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-054b21600c4a3c341475381f4e8f2084"],"technology":"org.apache.camel:camel-netty-http","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerability in Apache Camel.\n\nThe camel-vertx-http component deserializes HTTP response bodies carrying the Content-Type application/x-java-serialized-object using a raw java.io.ObjectInputStream, without applying any ObjectInputFilter (VertxHttpHelper.deserializeJavaObjectFromStream) This deserialization path is reached only when the producer endpoint is configured with transferException=true (or the component-level allowJavaSerializedObject=true) and throwExceptionOnFailure is left at its default value of true; in that case a backend HTTP response with a 5xx status and the application/x-java-serialized-object content type has its body deserialized with no class restrictions. An attacker who controls the backend the Camel producer talks to - through a man-in-the-middle position on an unencrypted (plain HTTP) connection, or by compromising the backend service - can return a crafted serialized Java object and, if a suitable gadget chain is present on the classpath, achieve remote code execution on the Camel application host. The path is not reachable in the default configuration, where transferException is false.\nThis issue affects Apache Camel: f","public_affected_ranges":[">= 4.15.0, < 4.18.3"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-054b21600c4a3c341475381f4e8f2084"],"technology":"org.apache.camel:camel-netty-http","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerability in Apache Camel.\n\nThe camel-vertx-http component deserializes HTTP response bodies carrying the Content-Type application/x-java-serialized-object using a raw java.io.ObjectInputStream, without applying any ObjectInputFilter (VertxHttpHelper.deserializeJavaObjectFromStream) This deserialization path is reached only when the producer endpoint is configured with transferException=true (or the component-level allowJavaSerializedObject=true) and throwExceptionOnFailure is left at its default value of true; in that case a backend HTTP response with a 5xx status and the application/x-java-serialized-object content type has its body deserialized with no class restrictions. An attacker who controls the backend the Camel producer talks to - through a man-in-the-middle position on an unencrypted (plain HTTP) connection, or by compromising the backend service - can return a crafted serialized Java object and, if a suitable gadget chain is present on the classpath, achieve remote code execution on the Camel application host. The path is not reachable in the default configuration, where transferException is false.\nThis issue affects Apache Camel: f","public_affected_ranges":[">= 4.19.0, < 4.20.0"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-08T19:53:44.025Z","source_updated_at":"2026-08-26T15:17:42.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-07-06T09:30:28.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-02T09:56:37.775Z"},{"id":"NVI-00013793","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Apache Camel-Vertx-Http and Camel-Netty-Http: Unsafe Java deserialization of HTTP response bodies via a raw ObjectInputStream when transferException is enabled","revision":2,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-6qw3-4796-5984","CVE-2026-40859"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for org.apache.camel:camel-vertx-http, org.apache.camel:camel-vertx-http, org.apache.camel:camel-vertx-http, org.apache.camel:camel-netty-http, org.apache.camel:camel-netty-http. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-05ae85f9d7a5ee804cfe80d3737618d1"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-08-26T15:17:42.000Z","value":"8.1 high","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-054b21600c4a3c341475381f4e8f2084"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-11-02T12:00:30.000Z","value":"0.886%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.5928. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-05ae85f9d7a5ee804cfe80d3737618d1"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-054b21600c4a3c341475381f4e8f2084","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-6qw3-4796-5984","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-6qw3-4796-5984","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-02T09:56:37.775Z"},{"id":"sr-05ae85f9d7a5ee804cfe80d3737618d1","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-40859","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-11-02T20:15:58.852Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-054b21600c4a3c341475381f4e8f2084"],"technology":"org.apache.camel:camel-vertx-http","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerability in Apache Camel.\n\nThe camel-vertx-http component deserializes HTTP response bodies carrying the Content-Type application/x-java-serialized-object using a raw java.io.ObjectInputStream, without applying any ObjectInputFilter (VertxHttpHelper.deserializeJavaObjectFromStream) This deserialization path is reached only when the producer endpoint is configured with transferException=true (or the component-level allowJavaSerializedObject=true) and throwExceptionOnFailure is left at its default value of true; in that case a backend HTTP response with a 5xx status and the application/x-java-serialized-object content type has its body deserialized with no class restrictions. An attacker who controls the backend the Camel producer talks to - through a man-in-the-middle position on an unencrypted (plain HTTP) connection, or by compromising the backend service - can return a crafted serialized Java object and, if a suitable gadget chain is present on the classpath, achieve remote code execution on the Camel application host. The path is not reachable in the default configuration, where transferException is false.\nThis issue affects Apache Camel: f","public_affected_ranges":[">= 4.0.0, < 4.14.8"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-054b21600c4a3c341475381f4e8f2084"],"technology":"org.apache.camel:camel-vertx-http","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerability in Apache Camel.\n\nThe camel-vertx-http component deserializes HTTP response bodies carrying the Content-Type application/x-java-serialized-object using a raw java.io.ObjectInputStream, without applying any ObjectInputFilter (VertxHttpHelper.deserializeJavaObjectFromStream) This deserialization path is reached only when the producer endpoint is configured with transferException=true (or the component-level allowJavaSerializedObject=true) and throwExceptionOnFailure is left at its default value of true; in that case a backend HTTP response with a 5xx status and the application/x-java-serialized-object content type has its body deserialized with no class restrictions. An attacker who controls the backend the Camel producer talks to - through a man-in-the-middle position on an unencrypted (plain HTTP) connection, or by compromising the backend service - can return a crafted serialized Java object and, if a suitable gadget chain is present on the classpath, achieve remote code execution on the Camel application host. The path is not reachable in the default configuration, where transferException is false.\nThis issue affects Apache Camel: f","public_affected_ranges":[">= 4.15.0, < 4.18.3"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-054b21600c4a3c341475381f4e8f2084"],"technology":"org.apache.camel:camel-vertx-http","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerability in Apache Camel.\n\nThe camel-vertx-http component deserializes HTTP response bodies carrying the Content-Type application/x-java-serialized-object using a raw java.io.ObjectInputStream, without applying any ObjectInputFilter (VertxHttpHelper.deserializeJavaObjectFromStream) This deserialization path is reached only when the producer endpoint is configured with transferException=true (or the component-level allowJavaSerializedObject=true) and throwExceptionOnFailure is left at its default value of true; in that case a backend HTTP response with a 5xx status and the application/x-java-serialized-object content type has its body deserialized with no class restrictions. An attacker who controls the backend the Camel producer talks to - through a man-in-the-middle position on an unencrypted (plain HTTP) connection, or by compromising the backend service - can return a crafted serialized Java object and, if a suitable gadget chain is present on the classpath, achieve remote code execution on the Camel application host. The path is not reachable in the default configuration, where transferException is false.\nThis issue affects Apache Camel: f","public_affected_ranges":[">= 4.19.0, < 4.20.0"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-054b21600c4a3c341475381f4e8f2084"],"technology":"org.apache.camel:camel-netty-http","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerability in Apache Camel.\n\nThe camel-vertx-http component deserializes HTTP response bodies carrying the Content-Type application/x-java-serialized-object using a raw java.io.ObjectInputStream, without applying any ObjectInputFilter (VertxHttpHelper.deserializeJavaObjectFromStream) This deserialization path is reached only when the producer endpoint is configured with transferException=true (or the component-level allowJavaSerializedObject=true) and throwExceptionOnFailure is left at its default value of true; in that case a backend HTTP response with a 5xx status and the application/x-java-serialized-object content type has its body deserialized with no class restrictions. An attacker who controls the backend the Camel producer talks to - through a man-in-the-middle position on an unencrypted (plain HTTP) connection, or by compromising the backend service - can return a crafted serialized Java object and, if a suitable gadget chain is present on the classpath, achieve remote code execution on the Camel application host. The path is not reachable in the default configuration, where transferException is false.\nThis issue affects Apache Camel: f","public_affected_ranges":[">= 4.0.0, < 4.14.8"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-054b21600c4a3c341475381f4e8f2084"],"technology":"org.apache.camel:camel-netty-http","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerability in Apache Camel.\n\nThe camel-vertx-http component deserializes HTTP response bodies carrying the Content-Type application/x-java-serialized-object using a raw java.io.ObjectInputStream, without applying any ObjectInputFilter (VertxHttpHelper.deserializeJavaObjectFromStream) This deserialization path is reached only when the producer endpoint is configured with transferException=true (or the component-level allowJavaSerializedObject=true) and throwExceptionOnFailure is left at its default value of true; in that case a backend HTTP response with a 5xx status and the application/x-java-serialized-object content type has its body deserialized with no class restrictions. An attacker who controls the backend the Camel producer talks to - through a man-in-the-middle position on an unencrypted (plain HTTP) connection, or by compromising the backend service - can return a crafted serialized Java object and, if a suitable gadget chain is present on the classpath, achieve remote code execution on the Camel application host. The path is not reachable in the default configuration, where transferException is false.\nThis issue affects Apache Camel: f","public_affected_ranges":[">= 4.15.0, < 4.18.3"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-054b21600c4a3c341475381f4e8f2084"],"technology":"org.apache.camel:camel-netty-http","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerability in Apache Camel.\n\nThe camel-vertx-http component deserializes HTTP response bodies carrying the Content-Type application/x-java-serialized-object using a raw java.io.ObjectInputStream, without applying any ObjectInputFilter (VertxHttpHelper.deserializeJavaObjectFromStream) This deserialization path is reached only when the producer endpoint is configured with transferException=true (or the component-level allowJavaSerializedObject=true) and throwExceptionOnFailure is left at its default value of true; in that case a backend HTTP response with a 5xx status and the application/x-java-serialized-object content type has its body deserialized with no class restrictions. An attacker who controls the backend the Camel producer talks to - through a man-in-the-middle position on an unencrypted (plain HTTP) connection, or by compromising the backend service - can return a crafted serialized Java object and, if a suitable gadget chain is present on the classpath, achieve remote code execution on the Camel application host. The path is not reachable in the default configuration, where transferException is false.\nThis issue affects Apache Camel: f","public_affected_ranges":[">= 4.19.0, < 4.20.0"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-03T17:49:15.008Z","source_updated_at":"2026-08-26T15:17:42.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-07-06T09:30:28.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-02T09:56:37.775Z"},{"id":"NVI-00013793","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Apache Camel-Vertx-Http and Camel-Netty-Http: Unsafe Java deserialization of HTTP response bodies via a raw ObjectInputStream when transferException is enabled","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-6qw3-4796-5984","CVE-2026-40859"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for org.apache.camel:camel-vertx-http, org.apache.camel:camel-vertx-http, org.apache.camel:camel-vertx-http, org.apache.camel:camel-netty-http, org.apache.camel:camel-netty-http. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-054b21600c4a3c341475381f4e8f2084"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-08-26T15:17:42.000Z","value":"8.1 high","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-054b21600c4a3c341475381f4e8f2084"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-054b21600c4a3c341475381f4e8f2084","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-6qw3-4796-5984","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-6qw3-4796-5984","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-02T09:56:37.775Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-054b21600c4a3c341475381f4e8f2084"],"technology":"org.apache.camel:camel-vertx-http","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerability in Apache Camel.\n\nThe camel-vertx-http component deserializes HTTP response bodies carrying the Content-Type application/x-java-serialized-object using a raw java.io.ObjectInputStream, without applying any ObjectInputFilter (VertxHttpHelper.deserializeJavaObjectFromStream) This deserialization path is reached only when the producer endpoint is configured with transferException=true (or the component-level allowJavaSerializedObject=true) and throwExceptionOnFailure is left at its default value of true; in that case a backend HTTP response with a 5xx status and the application/x-java-serialized-object content type has its body deserialized with no class restrictions. An attacker who controls the backend the Camel producer talks to - through a man-in-the-middle position on an unencrypted (plain HTTP) connection, or by compromising the backend service - can return a crafted serialized Java object and, if a suitable gadget chain is present on the classpath, achieve remote code execution on the Camel application host. The path is not reachable in the default configuration, where transferException is false.\nThis issue affects Apache Camel: f","public_affected_ranges":[">= 4.0.0, < 4.14.8"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-054b21600c4a3c341475381f4e8f2084"],"technology":"org.apache.camel:camel-vertx-http","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerability in Apache Camel.\n\nThe camel-vertx-http component deserializes HTTP response bodies carrying the Content-Type application/x-java-serialized-object using a raw java.io.ObjectInputStream, without applying any ObjectInputFilter (VertxHttpHelper.deserializeJavaObjectFromStream) This deserialization path is reached only when the producer endpoint is configured with transferException=true (or the component-level allowJavaSerializedObject=true) and throwExceptionOnFailure is left at its default value of true; in that case a backend HTTP response with a 5xx status and the application/x-java-serialized-object content type has its body deserialized with no class restrictions. An attacker who controls the backend the Camel producer talks to - through a man-in-the-middle position on an unencrypted (plain HTTP) connection, or by compromising the backend service - can return a crafted serialized Java object and, if a suitable gadget chain is present on the classpath, achieve remote code execution on the Camel application host. The path is not reachable in the default configuration, where transferException is false.\nThis issue affects Apache Camel: f","public_affected_ranges":[">= 4.15.0, < 4.18.3"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-054b21600c4a3c341475381f4e8f2084"],"technology":"org.apache.camel:camel-vertx-http","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerability in Apache Camel.\n\nThe camel-vertx-http component deserializes HTTP response bodies carrying the Content-Type application/x-java-serialized-object using a raw java.io.ObjectInputStream, without applying any ObjectInputFilter (VertxHttpHelper.deserializeJavaObjectFromStream) This deserialization path is reached only when the producer endpoint is configured with transferException=true (or the component-level allowJavaSerializedObject=true) and throwExceptionOnFailure is left at its default value of true; in that case a backend HTTP response with a 5xx status and the application/x-java-serialized-object content type has its body deserialized with no class restrictions. An attacker who controls the backend the Camel producer talks to - through a man-in-the-middle position on an unencrypted (plain HTTP) connection, or by compromising the backend service - can return a crafted serialized Java object and, if a suitable gadget chain is present on the classpath, achieve remote code execution on the Camel application host. The path is not reachable in the default configuration, where transferException is false.\nThis issue affects Apache Camel: f","public_affected_ranges":[">= 4.19.0, < 4.20.0"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-054b21600c4a3c341475381f4e8f2084"],"technology":"org.apache.camel:camel-netty-http","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerability in Apache Camel.\n\nThe camel-vertx-http component deserializes HTTP response bodies carrying the Content-Type application/x-java-serialized-object using a raw java.io.ObjectInputStream, without applying any ObjectInputFilter (VertxHttpHelper.deserializeJavaObjectFromStream) This deserialization path is reached only when the producer endpoint is configured with transferException=true (or the component-level allowJavaSerializedObject=true) and throwExceptionOnFailure is left at its default value of true; in that case a backend HTTP response with a 5xx status and the application/x-java-serialized-object content type has its body deserialized with no class restrictions. An attacker who controls the backend the Camel producer talks to - through a man-in-the-middle position on an unencrypted (plain HTTP) connection, or by compromising the backend service - can return a crafted serialized Java object and, if a suitable gadget chain is present on the classpath, achieve remote code execution on the Camel application host. The path is not reachable in the default configuration, where transferException is false.\nThis issue affects Apache Camel: f","public_affected_ranges":[">= 4.0.0, < 4.14.8"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-054b21600c4a3c341475381f4e8f2084"],"technology":"org.apache.camel:camel-netty-http","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerability in Apache Camel.\n\nThe camel-vertx-http component deserializes HTTP response bodies carrying the Content-Type application/x-java-serialized-object using a raw java.io.ObjectInputStream, without applying any ObjectInputFilter (VertxHttpHelper.deserializeJavaObjectFromStream) This deserialization path is reached only when the producer endpoint is configured with transferException=true (or the component-level allowJavaSerializedObject=true) and throwExceptionOnFailure is left at its default value of true; in that case a backend HTTP response with a 5xx status and the application/x-java-serialized-object content type has its body deserialized with no class restrictions. An attacker who controls the backend the Camel producer talks to - through a man-in-the-middle position on an unencrypted (plain HTTP) connection, or by compromising the backend service - can return a crafted serialized Java object and, if a suitable gadget chain is present on the classpath, achieve remote code execution on the Camel application host. The path is not reachable in the default configuration, where transferException is false.\nThis issue affects Apache Camel: f","public_affected_ranges":[">= 4.15.0, < 4.18.3"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-054b21600c4a3c341475381f4e8f2084"],"technology":"org.apache.camel:camel-netty-http","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"Deserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerability in Apache Camel.\n\nThe camel-vertx-http component deserializes HTTP response bodies carrying the Content-Type application/x-java-serialized-object using a raw java.io.ObjectInputStream, without applying any ObjectInputFilter (VertxHttpHelper.deserializeJavaObjectFromStream) This deserialization path is reached only when the producer endpoint is configured with transferException=true (or the component-level allowJavaSerializedObject=true) and throwExceptionOnFailure is left at its default value of true; in that case a backend HTTP response with a 5xx status and the application/x-java-serialized-object content type has its body deserialized with no class restrictions. An attacker who controls the backend the Camel producer talks to - through a man-in-the-middle position on an unencrypted (plain HTTP) connection, or by compromising the backend service - can return a crafted serialized Java object and, if a suitable gadget chain is present on the classpath, achieve remote code execution on the Camel application host. The path is not reachable in the default configuration, where transferException is false.\nThis issue affects Apache Camel: f","public_affected_ranges":[">= 4.19.0, < 4.20.0"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-02T10:00:37.150Z","source_updated_at":"2026-08-26T15:17:42.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-07-06T09:30:28.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-02T09:56:37.775Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}