{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00013806","kind":"vulnerability","title":"@roomi-fields/notebooklm-mcp has a path traversal in vault.batch tool that allows arbitrary file write outside intended vault directory","revision":2,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.","NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-jjhp-8crj-mppq","CVE-2026-61647"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for @roomi-fields/notebooklm-mcp. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-6f499ca2e63cb1d48e758c68d7b34793"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-09-24T21:25:27.050Z","value":"7.1 HIGH (4.0)","meaning":"security-advisories@github.com severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-6f499ca2e63cb1d48e758c68d7b34793"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-083166400b45e046025afb083b5b6b6c","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-jjhp-8crj-mppq","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-jjhp-8crj-mppq","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T14:29:31.527Z"},{"id":"sr-6f499ca2e63cb1d48e758c68d7b34793","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-61647","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.","title":"CVE-2026-61647","publisher":"NIST National Vulnerability Database","observed_at":"2026-11-08T15:05:24.474Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-083166400b45e046025afb083b5b6b6c"],"technology":"@roomi-fields/notebooklm-mcp","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nThe `vault_batch` MCP tool (and the equivalent `POST /batch-to-vault` HTTP endpoint) accepted a caller-supplied `vault_dir` path that was passed directly to `path.resolve()` + `fs.mkdir()` with no containment check. A caller — or a prompt-injected LLM driving the MCP — could therefore create directories and write `.md` / `.json` answer files anywhere the server process can write.\n\nThe `slug_prefix` parameter had a parallel, smaller traversal vector: it was concatenated into the filename without sanitization, so a prefix containing `/` or `..` could escape the resolved vault directory through the filename component.\n\n## Impact\n\nFile write (markdown + JSON sidecars) to any location writable by the server process. The written files are inert content (no code execution by themselves), but in a multi-user context — or when the MCP server is driven by an LLM that has read untrusted content (prompt injection) — this allows an attacker to plant files in sensitive locations (autostart folders, shell startup files, etc.) for downstream exploitation.\n\nThe vulnerability exists from **v1.6.0** (when the HTTP `/batch-to-vault` endpoint was introduced) and v1.7.0 (when the same logic ","public_affected_ranges":[">= 1.6.0, < 2.0.3"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-08T19:53:48.747Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-22T14:43:27.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-09-22T14:43:26.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-01T14:29:31.527Z"},{"id":"NVI-00013806","kind":"vulnerability","title":"@roomi-fields/notebooklm-mcp has a path traversal in vault.batch tool that allows arbitrary file write outside intended vault directory","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-jjhp-8crj-mppq","CVE-2026-61647"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for @roomi-fields/notebooklm-mcp. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-083166400b45e046025afb083b5b6b6c"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-083166400b45e046025afb083b5b6b6c","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-jjhp-8crj-mppq","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-jjhp-8crj-mppq","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T14:29:31.527Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-083166400b45e046025afb083b5b6b6c"],"technology":"@roomi-fields/notebooklm-mcp","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nThe `vault_batch` MCP tool (and the equivalent `POST /batch-to-vault` HTTP endpoint) accepted a caller-supplied `vault_dir` path that was passed directly to `path.resolve()` + `fs.mkdir()` with no containment check. A caller — or a prompt-injected LLM driving the MCP — could therefore create directories and write `.md` / `.json` answer files anywhere the server process can write.\n\nThe `slug_prefix` parameter had a parallel, smaller traversal vector: it was concatenated into the filename without sanitization, so a prefix containing `/` or `..` could escape the resolved vault directory through the filename component.\n\n## Impact\n\nFile write (markdown + JSON sidecars) to any location writable by the server process. The written files are inert content (no code execution by themselves), but in a multi-user context — or when the MCP server is driven by an LLM that has read untrusted content (prompt injection) — this allows an attacker to plant files in sensitive locations (autostart folders, shell startup files, etc.) for downstream exploitation.\n\nThe vulnerability exists from **v1.6.0** (when the HTTP `/batch-to-vault` endpoint was introduced) and v1.7.0 (when the same logic ","public_affected_ranges":[">= 1.6.0, < 2.0.3"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-02T10:00:37.153Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-22T14:43:27.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-09-22T14:43:26.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-01T14:29:31.527Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}