{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00013814","kind":"vulnerability","title":"DiceBear: SVG injection via the unescaped rotate option in @dicebear/core (and fontSize/fontWeight in @dicebear/initials)","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-gcr2-9v8m-gq45","CVE-2026-68921"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for @dicebear/core, @dicebear/initials. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-0a5be4d1710157cae5aa1a593d149fac"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-09-02T22:44:26.000Z","value":"4.7 medium","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-0a5be4d1710157cae5aa1a593d149fac"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-0a5be4d1710157cae5aa1a593d149fac","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-gcr2-9v8m-gq45","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-gcr2-9v8m-gq45","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-02T02:21:29.477Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-0a5be4d1710157cae5aa1a593d149fac"],"technology":"@dicebear/core","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`@dicebear/core` builds avatar SVGs from caller-supplied options. The numeric `rotate` option is interpolated into an SVG `transform` attribute without XML-escaping. It is typed as a number, but nothing checks the type at runtime, so a string value passes straight through and can break out of the attribute to inject arbitrary SVG markup.\n\nThis is the same root cause as CVE-2026-33311 (GHSA-mr9r-mww3-v6gv), which escaped the string options `backgroundColor`, `fontFamily`, and `textColor` but did not cover `rotate`. `@dicebear/initials` has the same gap in its numeric `fontSize` and `fontWeight` options.\n\n## Impact\n\nCross-site scripting (CWE-79). When the generated avatar is rendered inline (for example via `innerHTML`) or served as `image/svg+xml` and opened directly, injected markup such as an `` handler runs script in the page's origin.\n\nExploitation requires the application to pass untrusted input into one of these options:\n\n- `rotate` (`@dicebear/core`)\n- `fontSize`, `fontWeight` (`@dicebear/initials`)\n\nIn most integrations these options are set by the developer and only `seed` is user-controlled, so the vulnerable configuration is uncommon. Applicatio","public_affected_ranges":["<= 9.4.2"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-0a5be4d1710157cae5aa1a593d149fac"],"technology":"@dicebear/initials","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`@dicebear/core` builds avatar SVGs from caller-supplied options. The numeric `rotate` option is interpolated into an SVG `transform` attribute without XML-escaping. It is typed as a number, but nothing checks the type at runtime, so a string value passes straight through and can break out of the attribute to inject arbitrary SVG markup.\n\nThis is the same root cause as CVE-2026-33311 (GHSA-mr9r-mww3-v6gv), which escaped the string options `backgroundColor`, `fontFamily`, and `textColor` but did not cover `rotate`. `@dicebear/initials` has the same gap in its numeric `fontSize` and `fontWeight` options.\n\n## Impact\n\nCross-site scripting (CWE-79). When the generated avatar is rendered inline (for example via `innerHTML`) or served as `image/svg+xml` and opened directly, injected markup such as an `` handler runs script in the page's origin.\n\nExploitation requires the application to pass untrusted input into one of these options:\n\n- `rotate` (`@dicebear/core`)\n- `fontSize`, `fontWeight` (`@dicebear/initials`)\n\nIn most integrations these options are set by the developer and only `seed` is user-controlled, so the vulnerable configuration is uncommon. Applicatio","public_affected_ranges":["<= 9.4.2"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-02T10:00:37.154Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-02T22:44:26.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-09-02T22:44:25.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-02T02:21:29.477Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}