{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00013847","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Apache Camel-IRC: The irc.sendTo (and other irc.*) Exchange header constants used non-Camel-prefixed names that bypass the HTTP header filter","revision":2,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.","NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-463m-2hr2-q2j7","CVE-2026-49097"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for org.apache.camel:camel-irc, org.apache.camel:camel-irc, org.apache.camel:camel-irc. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-60970d9f0717d4bc643e68a9825f62ed"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-08-28T20:13:50.000Z","value":"6.5 medium","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-0ee3f1d911b6516ee98f1b913372046b"},{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-25T15:10:00.147Z","value":"6.5 MEDIUM (3.1)","meaning":"134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0 severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-60970d9f0717d4bc643e68a9825f62ed"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-0ee3f1d911b6516ee98f1b913372046b","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-463m-2hr2-q2j7","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-463m-2hr2-q2j7","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-02T02:21:58.521Z"},{"id":"sr-60970d9f0717d4bc643e68a9825f62ed","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-49097","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.","title":"CVE-2026-49097","publisher":"NIST National Vulnerability Database","observed_at":"2026-11-08T01:47:50.916Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-0ee3f1d911b6516ee98f1b913372046b"],"technology":"org.apache.camel:camel-irc","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"Improper Input Validation, Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component ('Injection') vulnerability in Apache Camel IRC component.\n\nThe camel-irc producer chooses the destination of an outgoing IRC message from the irc.sendTo Exchange header (the constant IrcConstants.IRC_SEND_TO, value irc.sendTo); when that header is present it overrides the channel list configured on the endpoint, and the message is sent only to the specified destination. This and the component's other control headers (irc.target, irc.messageType, irc.user.*, irc.num, irc.value) used plain, non-Camel-prefixed values. Because these names do not start with the Camel / camel prefix, HttpHeaderFilterStrategy - which blocks only the Camel header namespace on the HTTP boundary - let them pass from an inbound HTTP request straight into the Exchange. In a route that bridges an HTTP consumer (for example platform-http) into an irc: producer, any HTTP client could therefore set the irc.sendTo header and redirect a message that the route intended for a configured channel to an arbitrary IRC channel or user - exfiltrating the message content to an attacker-chosen nickname, leaking it ","public_affected_ranges":[">= 4.0.0, < 4.14.8"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-0ee3f1d911b6516ee98f1b913372046b"],"technology":"org.apache.camel:camel-irc","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"Improper Input Validation, Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component ('Injection') vulnerability in Apache Camel IRC component.\n\nThe camel-irc producer chooses the destination of an outgoing IRC message from the irc.sendTo Exchange header (the constant IrcConstants.IRC_SEND_TO, value irc.sendTo); when that header is present it overrides the channel list configured on the endpoint, and the message is sent only to the specified destination. This and the component's other control headers (irc.target, irc.messageType, irc.user.*, irc.num, irc.value) used plain, non-Camel-prefixed values. Because these names do not start with the Camel / camel prefix, HttpHeaderFilterStrategy - which blocks only the Camel header namespace on the HTTP boundary - let them pass from an inbound HTTP request straight into the Exchange. In a route that bridges an HTTP consumer (for example platform-http) into an irc: producer, any HTTP client could therefore set the irc.sendTo header and redirect a message that the route intended for a configured channel to an arbitrary IRC channel or user - exfiltrating the message content to an attacker-chosen nickname, leaking it ","public_affected_ranges":[">= 4.15.0, < 4.18.3"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-0ee3f1d911b6516ee98f1b913372046b"],"technology":"org.apache.camel:camel-irc","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"Improper Input Validation, Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component ('Injection') vulnerability in Apache Camel IRC component.\n\nThe camel-irc producer chooses the destination of an outgoing IRC message from the irc.sendTo Exchange header (the constant IrcConstants.IRC_SEND_TO, value irc.sendTo); when that header is present it overrides the channel list configured on the endpoint, and the message is sent only to the specified destination. This and the component's other control headers (irc.target, irc.messageType, irc.user.*, irc.num, irc.value) used plain, non-Camel-prefixed values. Because these names do not start with the Camel / camel prefix, HttpHeaderFilterStrategy - which blocks only the Camel header namespace on the HTTP boundary - let them pass from an inbound HTTP request straight into the Exchange. In a route that bridges an HTTP consumer (for example platform-http) into an irc: producer, any HTTP client could therefore set the irc.sendTo header and redirect a message that the route intended for a configured channel to an arbitrary IRC channel or user - exfiltrating the message content to an attacker-chosen nickname, leaking it ","public_affected_ranges":[">= 4.19.0, < 4.21.0"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-08T19:53:44.061Z","source_updated_at":"2026-08-28T20:13:50.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-07-06T09:30:30.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-02T02:21:58.521Z"},{"id":"NVI-00013847","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Apache Camel-IRC: The irc.sendTo (and other irc.*) Exchange header constants used non-Camel-prefixed names that bypass the HTTP header filter","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-463m-2hr2-q2j7","CVE-2026-49097"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for org.apache.camel:camel-irc, org.apache.camel:camel-irc, org.apache.camel:camel-irc. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-0ee3f1d911b6516ee98f1b913372046b"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-08-28T20:13:50.000Z","value":"6.5 medium","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-0ee3f1d911b6516ee98f1b913372046b"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-0ee3f1d911b6516ee98f1b913372046b","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-463m-2hr2-q2j7","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-463m-2hr2-q2j7","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-02T02:21:58.521Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-0ee3f1d911b6516ee98f1b913372046b"],"technology":"org.apache.camel:camel-irc","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"Improper Input Validation, Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component ('Injection') vulnerability in Apache Camel IRC component.\n\nThe camel-irc producer chooses the destination of an outgoing IRC message from the irc.sendTo Exchange header (the constant IrcConstants.IRC_SEND_TO, value irc.sendTo); when that header is present it overrides the channel list configured on the endpoint, and the message is sent only to the specified destination. This and the component's other control headers (irc.target, irc.messageType, irc.user.*, irc.num, irc.value) used plain, non-Camel-prefixed values. Because these names do not start with the Camel / camel prefix, HttpHeaderFilterStrategy - which blocks only the Camel header namespace on the HTTP boundary - let them pass from an inbound HTTP request straight into the Exchange. In a route that bridges an HTTP consumer (for example platform-http) into an irc: producer, any HTTP client could therefore set the irc.sendTo header and redirect a message that the route intended for a configured channel to an arbitrary IRC channel or user - exfiltrating the message content to an attacker-chosen nickname, leaking it ","public_affected_ranges":[">= 4.0.0, < 4.14.8"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-0ee3f1d911b6516ee98f1b913372046b"],"technology":"org.apache.camel:camel-irc","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"Improper Input Validation, Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component ('Injection') vulnerability in Apache Camel IRC component.\n\nThe camel-irc producer chooses the destination of an outgoing IRC message from the irc.sendTo Exchange header (the constant IrcConstants.IRC_SEND_TO, value irc.sendTo); when that header is present it overrides the channel list configured on the endpoint, and the message is sent only to the specified destination. This and the component's other control headers (irc.target, irc.messageType, irc.user.*, irc.num, irc.value) used plain, non-Camel-prefixed values. Because these names do not start with the Camel / camel prefix, HttpHeaderFilterStrategy - which blocks only the Camel header namespace on the HTTP boundary - let them pass from an inbound HTTP request straight into the Exchange. In a route that bridges an HTTP consumer (for example platform-http) into an irc: producer, any HTTP client could therefore set the irc.sendTo header and redirect a message that the route intended for a configured channel to an arbitrary IRC channel or user - exfiltrating the message content to an attacker-chosen nickname, leaking it ","public_affected_ranges":[">= 4.15.0, < 4.18.3"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-0ee3f1d911b6516ee98f1b913372046b"],"technology":"org.apache.camel:camel-irc","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"Improper Input Validation, Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component ('Injection') vulnerability in Apache Camel IRC component.\n\nThe camel-irc producer chooses the destination of an outgoing IRC message from the irc.sendTo Exchange header (the constant IrcConstants.IRC_SEND_TO, value irc.sendTo); when that header is present it overrides the channel list configured on the endpoint, and the message is sent only to the specified destination. This and the component's other control headers (irc.target, irc.messageType, irc.user.*, irc.num, irc.value) used plain, non-Camel-prefixed values. Because these names do not start with the Camel / camel prefix, HttpHeaderFilterStrategy - which blocks only the Camel header namespace on the HTTP boundary - let them pass from an inbound HTTP request straight into the Exchange. In a route that bridges an HTTP consumer (for example platform-http) into an irc: producer, any HTTP client could therefore set the irc.sendTo header and redirect a message that the route intended for a configured channel to an arbitrary IRC channel or user - exfiltrating the message content to an attacker-chosen nickname, leaking it ","public_affected_ranges":[">= 4.19.0, < 4.21.0"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-02T10:00:37.159Z","source_updated_at":"2026-08-28T20:13:50.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-07-06T09:30:30.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-02T02:21:58.521Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}