{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00013862","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Obot: OAuth Dynamic Client Registration Enables API Token Theft via Audience Confusion","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-xwmw-prc4-v3cr"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for github.com/obot-platform/obot. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-120ea23151aeca8b7c1731c0600a2a79"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-09-18T17:59:36.000Z","value":"8.8 high","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-120ea23151aeca8b7c1731c0600a2a79"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-120ea23151aeca8b7c1731c0600a2a79","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-xwmw-prc4-v3cr","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-xwmw-prc4-v3cr","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T14:29:31.527Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-120ea23151aeca8b7c1731c0600a2a79"],"technology":"github.com/obot-platform/obot","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nIn affected versions, an unauthenticated attacker could register an OAuth client with an arbitrary external redirect URI, and the authorization flow would auto-complete without a consent screen. If a logged-in victim visited a crafted authorization URL, an authorization code was delivered to the attacker's redirect URI and exchanged for an access token. That token was minted with the victim's full set of groups, so it could be used as a bearer token against the Obot API endpoints the victim had access to — rather than being scoped to just the requested MCP server.\n\n## Am I affected?\n\nYou are affected if you run Obot `<= v0.22.1` with `OBOT_SERVER_ENABLE_AUTHENTICATION=true`. Exploitation requires a logged-in victim to visit a single attacker-controlled  authorization URL.\n\n## Details\n\nThree issues combined to create this vulnerability. First, OAuth dynamic client registration was reachable without authentication and applied no restriction on the redirect URIs a client could register, so an attacker could register a client pointing at their own domain. The authorization flow then auto-completed for an already-logged-in user with no consent step, so simply loading the aut","public_affected_ranges":["< 0.23.0"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-02T10:00:37.162Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-18T17:59:36.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-09-18T17:59:35.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-01T14:29:31.527Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}