{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00013874","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Hatchet: SSRF via Unsigned UnsubscribeURL in SNS UnsubscribeConfirmation Handler","revision":2,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.","NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-fjwv-jf2v-j499","CVE-2026-61681"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for hatchet-dev/hatchet. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-30dedc566ae827e974c8c2f8505f31cc"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-09-22T20:34:14.000Z","value":"4.1 medium","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-13fdddeaf08b93b6bc6aa3d07cbaa9eb"},{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-09-24T23:17:13.400Z","value":"4.1 MEDIUM (3.1)","meaning":"security-advisories@github.com severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-30dedc566ae827e974c8c2f8505f31cc"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-13fdddeaf08b93b6bc6aa3d07cbaa9eb","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-fjwv-jf2v-j499","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-fjwv-jf2v-j499","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T14:29:31.527Z"},{"id":"sr-30dedc566ae827e974c8c2f8505f31cc","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-61681","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.","title":"CVE-2026-61681","publisher":"NIST National Vulnerability Database","observed_at":"2026-11-08T15:05:24.474Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-13fdddeaf08b93b6bc6aa3d07cbaa9eb"],"technology":"hatchet-dev/hatchet","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n  The SNS `UnsubscribeConfirmation` handler in `internal/integrations/ingestors/sns/sns.go` makes an unvalidated\n  `http.Get()` call to `payload.UnsubscribeURL` without any URL restriction. Because `UnsubscribeURL` is intentionally\n  excluded from the `BuildSignature()` signed field list, an attacker can replace this field in a legitimately\n  AWS-signed message with an arbitrary internal URL, bypassing the `VerifyPayload()` signature check entirely and\n  triggering a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) against internal infrastructure — including the EC2 Instance Metadata\n  Service (IMDS) at `169.254.169.254`.\n\n ### Impact\n\n  This is a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability. An attacker with a Hatchet account and an AWS Free Tier\n  account can:\n\n  - Reach the EC2 IMDS endpoint and retrieve IAM temporary credentials if Hatchet is deployed on AWS\n  - Port-scan and probe internal services not exposed to the internet\n  - Access internal HTTP APIs (e.g., Kubernetes API server, internal dashboards) from the Hatchet server's network\n  context","public_affected_ranges":["< 0.91.1"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-08T19:53:44.046Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-22T20:34:14.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-09-22T20:34:12.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-01T14:29:31.527Z"},{"id":"NVI-00013874","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Hatchet: SSRF via Unsigned UnsubscribeURL in SNS UnsubscribeConfirmation Handler","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-fjwv-jf2v-j499","CVE-2026-61681"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for hatchet-dev/hatchet. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-13fdddeaf08b93b6bc6aa3d07cbaa9eb"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-09-22T20:34:14.000Z","value":"4.1 medium","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-13fdddeaf08b93b6bc6aa3d07cbaa9eb"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-13fdddeaf08b93b6bc6aa3d07cbaa9eb","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-fjwv-jf2v-j499","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-fjwv-jf2v-j499","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T14:29:31.527Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-13fdddeaf08b93b6bc6aa3d07cbaa9eb"],"technology":"hatchet-dev/hatchet","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n  The SNS `UnsubscribeConfirmation` handler in `internal/integrations/ingestors/sns/sns.go` makes an unvalidated\n  `http.Get()` call to `payload.UnsubscribeURL` without any URL restriction. Because `UnsubscribeURL` is intentionally\n  excluded from the `BuildSignature()` signed field list, an attacker can replace this field in a legitimately\n  AWS-signed message with an arbitrary internal URL, bypassing the `VerifyPayload()` signature check entirely and\n  triggering a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) against internal infrastructure — including the EC2 Instance Metadata\n  Service (IMDS) at `169.254.169.254`.\n\n ### Impact\n\n  This is a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability. An attacker with a Hatchet account and an AWS Free Tier\n  account can:\n\n  - Reach the EC2 IMDS endpoint and retrieve IAM temporary credentials if Hatchet is deployed on AWS\n  - Port-scan and probe internal services not exposed to the internet\n  - Access internal HTTP APIs (e.g., Kubernetes API server, internal dashboards) from the Hatchet server's network\n  context","public_affected_ranges":["< 0.91.1"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-02T10:00:37.165Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-22T20:34:14.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-09-22T20:34:12.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-01T14:29:31.527Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}