{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00013880","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Echo: Encoded slash (%2F) bypasses route-level protection and exposes static files","revision":2,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.","NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-vfp3-v2gw-7wfq","CVE-2026-55677"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for github.com/labstack/echo/v5, github.com/labstack/echo/v4, github.com/labstack/echo. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-6e87e3c78d16af1712e5a9bb86a2c747"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-08-25T16:13:29.000Z","value":"7.5 high","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-1556cb6738b44435e3f59619aebad84c"},{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-25T17:10:00.197Z","value":"7.5 HIGH (3.1)","meaning":"security-advisories@github.com severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-6e87e3c78d16af1712e5a9bb86a2c747"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-1556cb6738b44435e3f59619aebad84c","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-vfp3-v2gw-7wfq","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-vfp3-v2gw-7wfq","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-02T09:56:37.775Z"},{"id":"sr-6e87e3c78d16af1712e5a9bb86a2c747","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-55677","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.","title":"CVE-2026-55677","publisher":"NIST National Vulnerability Database","observed_at":"2026-11-08T01:48:26.418Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-1556cb6738b44435e3f59619aebad84c"],"technology":"github.com/labstack/echo/v5","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\nEcho's router and static file handler disagree on URL path decoding. The router matches routes using the raw encoded path (preserving `%2F` as-is), while `StaticDirectoryHandler` unescapes `%2F` to `/` before resolving filesystem paths. This allows an attacker to bypass route-level access controls and read static files without authorization.\n\n### Details\n\n**Root cause 1 — `router.go` lines 798-802:**\nThe router uses `req.URL.RawPath` for route matching when `useEscapedPathForRouting` is false (the default). This means `/admin%2Fsecret.txt` is treated as a single path segment and does NOT match the `/admin/*` route pattern.\n\n```go\nif !r.useEscapedPathForRouting && req.URL.RawPath != \"\" {\n    path = req.URL.RawPath\n}\n```\n\n**Root cause 2 — `echo.go` lines 559-568:**\n`StaticDirectoryHandler` calls `url.PathUnescape()` on the path parameter before opening files. This converts `%2F` back to `/`, resolving `admin/secret.txt` on disk.\n\n```go\nif !disablePathUnescaping {\n    tmpPath, err := url.PathUnescape(p)\n    p = tmpPath\n}\nname := filepath.ToSlash(filepath.Clean(strings.TrimPrefix(p, \"/\")))\n```\n\n### PoC (Screenshot)\nSample:\n<img width=\"1291\" height=\"970\" alt=\"image\" src=\"ht","public_affected_ranges":["< 5.2.0"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-1556cb6738b44435e3f59619aebad84c"],"technology":"github.com/labstack/echo/v4","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\nEcho's router and static file handler disagree on URL path decoding. The router matches routes using the raw encoded path (preserving `%2F` as-is), while `StaticDirectoryHandler` unescapes `%2F` to `/` before resolving filesystem paths. This allows an attacker to bypass route-level access controls and read static files without authorization.\n\n### Details\n\n**Root cause 1 — `router.go` lines 798-802:**\nThe router uses `req.URL.RawPath` for route matching when `useEscapedPathForRouting` is false (the default). This means `/admin%2Fsecret.txt` is treated as a single path segment and does NOT match the `/admin/*` route pattern.\n\n```go\nif !r.useEscapedPathForRouting && req.URL.RawPath != \"\" {\n    path = req.URL.RawPath\n}\n```\n\n**Root cause 2 — `echo.go` lines 559-568:**\n`StaticDirectoryHandler` calls `url.PathUnescape()` on the path parameter before opening files. This converts `%2F` back to `/`, resolving `admin/secret.txt` on disk.\n\n```go\nif !disablePathUnescaping {\n    tmpPath, err := url.PathUnescape(p)\n    p = tmpPath\n}\nname := filepath.ToSlash(filepath.Clean(strings.TrimPrefix(p, \"/\")))\n```\n\n### PoC (Screenshot)\nSample:\n<img width=\"1291\" height=\"970\" alt=\"image\" src=\"ht","public_affected_ranges":["< 4.15.3"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-1556cb6738b44435e3f59619aebad84c"],"technology":"github.com/labstack/echo","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\nEcho's router and static file handler disagree on URL path decoding. The router matches routes using the raw encoded path (preserving `%2F` as-is), while `StaticDirectoryHandler` unescapes `%2F` to `/` before resolving filesystem paths. This allows an attacker to bypass route-level access controls and read static files without authorization.\n\n### Details\n\n**Root cause 1 — `router.go` lines 798-802:**\nThe router uses `req.URL.RawPath` for route matching when `useEscapedPathForRouting` is false (the default). This means `/admin%2Fsecret.txt` is treated as a single path segment and does NOT match the `/admin/*` route pattern.\n\n```go\nif !r.useEscapedPathForRouting && req.URL.RawPath != \"\" {\n    path = req.URL.RawPath\n}\n```\n\n**Root cause 2 — `echo.go` lines 559-568:**\n`StaticDirectoryHandler` calls `url.PathUnescape()` on the path parameter before opening files. This converts `%2F` back to `/`, resolving `admin/secret.txt` on disk.\n\n```go\nif !disablePathUnescaping {\n    tmpPath, err := url.PathUnescape(p)\n    p = tmpPath\n}\nname := filepath.ToSlash(filepath.Clean(strings.TrimPrefix(p, \"/\")))\n```\n\n### PoC (Screenshot)\nSample:\n<img width=\"1291\" height=\"970\" alt=\"image\" src=\"ht","public_affected_ranges":["<= 3.3.10"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-08T19:53:48.746Z","source_updated_at":"2026-08-25T16:13:29.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-08-25T16:13:29.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-02T09:56:37.775Z"},{"id":"NVI-00013880","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Echo: Encoded slash (%2F) bypasses route-level protection and exposes static files","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-vfp3-v2gw-7wfq","CVE-2026-55677"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for github.com/labstack/echo/v5, github.com/labstack/echo/v4, github.com/labstack/echo. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-1556cb6738b44435e3f59619aebad84c"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-08-25T16:13:29.000Z","value":"7.5 high","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-1556cb6738b44435e3f59619aebad84c"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-1556cb6738b44435e3f59619aebad84c","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-vfp3-v2gw-7wfq","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-vfp3-v2gw-7wfq","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-02T09:56:37.775Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-1556cb6738b44435e3f59619aebad84c"],"technology":"github.com/labstack/echo/v5","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\nEcho's router and static file handler disagree on URL path decoding. The router matches routes using the raw encoded path (preserving `%2F` as-is), while `StaticDirectoryHandler` unescapes `%2F` to `/` before resolving filesystem paths. This allows an attacker to bypass route-level access controls and read static files without authorization.\n\n### Details\n\n**Root cause 1 — `router.go` lines 798-802:**\nThe router uses `req.URL.RawPath` for route matching when `useEscapedPathForRouting` is false (the default). This means `/admin%2Fsecret.txt` is treated as a single path segment and does NOT match the `/admin/*` route pattern.\n\n```go\nif !r.useEscapedPathForRouting && req.URL.RawPath != \"\" {\n    path = req.URL.RawPath\n}\n```\n\n**Root cause 2 — `echo.go` lines 559-568:**\n`StaticDirectoryHandler` calls `url.PathUnescape()` on the path parameter before opening files. This converts `%2F` back to `/`, resolving `admin/secret.txt` on disk.\n\n```go\nif !disablePathUnescaping {\n    tmpPath, err := url.PathUnescape(p)\n    p = tmpPath\n}\nname := filepath.ToSlash(filepath.Clean(strings.TrimPrefix(p, \"/\")))\n```\n\n### PoC (Screenshot)\nSample:\n<img width=\"1291\" height=\"970\" alt=\"image\" src=\"ht","public_affected_ranges":["< 5.2.0"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-1556cb6738b44435e3f59619aebad84c"],"technology":"github.com/labstack/echo/v4","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\nEcho's router and static file handler disagree on URL path decoding. The router matches routes using the raw encoded path (preserving `%2F` as-is), while `StaticDirectoryHandler` unescapes `%2F` to `/` before resolving filesystem paths. This allows an attacker to bypass route-level access controls and read static files without authorization.\n\n### Details\n\n**Root cause 1 — `router.go` lines 798-802:**\nThe router uses `req.URL.RawPath` for route matching when `useEscapedPathForRouting` is false (the default). This means `/admin%2Fsecret.txt` is treated as a single path segment and does NOT match the `/admin/*` route pattern.\n\n```go\nif !r.useEscapedPathForRouting && req.URL.RawPath != \"\" {\n    path = req.URL.RawPath\n}\n```\n\n**Root cause 2 — `echo.go` lines 559-568:**\n`StaticDirectoryHandler` calls `url.PathUnescape()` on the path parameter before opening files. This converts `%2F` back to `/`, resolving `admin/secret.txt` on disk.\n\n```go\nif !disablePathUnescaping {\n    tmpPath, err := url.PathUnescape(p)\n    p = tmpPath\n}\nname := filepath.ToSlash(filepath.Clean(strings.TrimPrefix(p, \"/\")))\n```\n\n### PoC (Screenshot)\nSample:\n<img width=\"1291\" height=\"970\" alt=\"image\" src=\"ht","public_affected_ranges":["< 4.15.3"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-1556cb6738b44435e3f59619aebad84c"],"technology":"github.com/labstack/echo","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\nEcho's router and static file handler disagree on URL path decoding. The router matches routes using the raw encoded path (preserving `%2F` as-is), while `StaticDirectoryHandler` unescapes `%2F` to `/` before resolving filesystem paths. This allows an attacker to bypass route-level access controls and read static files without authorization.\n\n### Details\n\n**Root cause 1 — `router.go` lines 798-802:**\nThe router uses `req.URL.RawPath` for route matching when `useEscapedPathForRouting` is false (the default). This means `/admin%2Fsecret.txt` is treated as a single path segment and does NOT match the `/admin/*` route pattern.\n\n```go\nif !r.useEscapedPathForRouting && req.URL.RawPath != \"\" {\n    path = req.URL.RawPath\n}\n```\n\n**Root cause 2 — `echo.go` lines 559-568:**\n`StaticDirectoryHandler` calls `url.PathUnescape()` on the path parameter before opening files. This converts `%2F` back to `/`, resolving `admin/secret.txt` on disk.\n\n```go\nif !disablePathUnescaping {\n    tmpPath, err := url.PathUnescape(p)\n    p = tmpPath\n}\nname := filepath.ToSlash(filepath.Clean(strings.TrimPrefix(p, \"/\")))\n```\n\n### PoC (Screenshot)\nSample:\n<img width=\"1291\" height=\"970\" alt=\"image\" src=\"ht","public_affected_ranges":["<= 3.3.10"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-02T10:00:37.167Z","source_updated_at":"2026-08-25T16:13:29.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-08-25T16:13:29.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-02T09:56:37.775Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}