{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00013894","kind":"vulnerability","title":"CodeWhale: exec_shell_interact sends LLM-controlled input to a running shell without an approval prompt (privilege escalation)","revision":2,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.","NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-g29h-pfmp-qp9r","CVE-2026-75857"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for deepseek-tui, deepseek-tui, codewhale-tui, codewhale. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-575beb6d206a68c4f6a7d475127cf736"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-09-04T18:02:11.000Z","value":"7 high","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-17ab9b4366953bbbff70215d4676a266"},{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-29T21:17:33.107Z","value":"7 HIGH (3.1)","meaning":"disclosure@vulncheck.com severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-575beb6d206a68c4f6a7d475127cf736"},{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-10-29T21:17:33.107Z","value":"7.3 HIGH (4.0)","meaning":"disclosure@vulncheck.com severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-575beb6d206a68c4f6a7d475127cf736"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-17ab9b4366953bbbff70215d4676a266","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-g29h-pfmp-qp9r","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-g29h-pfmp-qp9r","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-02T02:20:52.377Z"},{"id":"sr-575beb6d206a68c4f6a7d475127cf736","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-75857","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.","title":"CVE-2026-75857","publisher":"NIST National Vulnerability Database","observed_at":"2026-11-08T19:47:48.947Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-17ab9b4366953bbbff70215d4676a266"],"technology":"deepseek-tui","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Maintainer resolution\n\nThe CodeWhale maintainers validated this report. The affected package ranges are recorded in the advisory metadata. Version 0.8.64 contains the fix in commit 57f3c89471e27ac4032d9791f6885e5d4408c381. Users should upgrade to 0.8.64 or later. The original reporter analysis is preserved below.\n\n### Summary\n`exec_shell` is correctly approval-gated. Its sibling `exec_shell_interact` returns `ApprovalRequirement::Auto`, so when the model writes input into a shell the user already approved (a `python3 -i` REPL, `mysql`, `ssh`, `sudo -i`, etc.), no prompt fires. Inside those processes, \"stdin\" is the command surface, so the model gets to run commands at whatever privilege that process holds. The user approved opening the shell once, for a stated purpose; the input that then runs in it is chosen by the model, and can be steered by any prompt injection the agent ingests afterward.\n\n### Details\nThe vulnerability requires two ordinary preconditions: shell tools are enabled (the normal config for using CodeWhale as a coding agent), and the session already has one approved long-running interactive process. After that, any untrusted content the agent reads can drive a `","public_affected_ranges":[">= 0.3.10, <= 0.8.41"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-17ab9b4366953bbbff70215d4676a266"],"technology":"deepseek-tui","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Maintainer resolution\n\nThe CodeWhale maintainers validated this report. The affected package ranges are recorded in the advisory metadata. Version 0.8.64 contains the fix in commit 57f3c89471e27ac4032d9791f6885e5d4408c381. Users should upgrade to 0.8.64 or later. The original reporter analysis is preserved below.\n\n### Summary\n`exec_shell` is correctly approval-gated. Its sibling `exec_shell_interact` returns `ApprovalRequirement::Auto`, so when the model writes input into a shell the user already approved (a `python3 -i` REPL, `mysql`, `ssh`, `sudo -i`, etc.), no prompt fires. Inside those processes, \"stdin\" is the command surface, so the model gets to run commands at whatever privilege that process holds. The user approved opening the shell once, for a stated purpose; the input that then runs in it is chosen by the model, and can be steered by any prompt injection the agent ingests afterward.\n\n### Details\nThe vulnerability requires two ordinary preconditions: shell tools are enabled (the normal config for using CodeWhale as a coding agent), and the session already has one approved long-running interactive process. After that, any untrusted content the agent reads can drive a `","public_affected_ranges":[">= 0.3.10, < 0.8.41"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-17ab9b4366953bbbff70215d4676a266"],"technology":"codewhale-tui","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Maintainer resolution\n\nThe CodeWhale maintainers validated this report. The affected package ranges are recorded in the advisory metadata. Version 0.8.64 contains the fix in commit 57f3c89471e27ac4032d9791f6885e5d4408c381. Users should upgrade to 0.8.64 or later. The original reporter analysis is preserved below.\n\n### Summary\n`exec_shell` is correctly approval-gated. Its sibling `exec_shell_interact` returns `ApprovalRequirement::Auto`, so when the model writes input into a shell the user already approved (a `python3 -i` REPL, `mysql`, `ssh`, `sudo -i`, etc.), no prompt fires. Inside those processes, \"stdin\" is the command surface, so the model gets to run commands at whatever privilege that process holds. The user approved opening the shell once, for a stated purpose; the input that then runs in it is chosen by the model, and can be steered by any prompt injection the agent ingests afterward.\n\n### Details\nThe vulnerability requires two ordinary preconditions: shell tools are enabled (the normal config for using CodeWhale as a coding agent), and the session already has one approved long-running interactive process. After that, any untrusted content the agent reads can drive a `","public_affected_ranges":[">= 0.8.41, < 0.8.64"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-17ab9b4366953bbbff70215d4676a266"],"technology":"codewhale","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Maintainer resolution\n\nThe CodeWhale maintainers validated this report. The affected package ranges are recorded in the advisory metadata. Version 0.8.64 contains the fix in commit 57f3c89471e27ac4032d9791f6885e5d4408c381. Users should upgrade to 0.8.64 or later. The original reporter analysis is preserved below.\n\n### Summary\n`exec_shell` is correctly approval-gated. Its sibling `exec_shell_interact` returns `ApprovalRequirement::Auto`, so when the model writes input into a shell the user already approved (a `python3 -i` REPL, `mysql`, `ssh`, `sudo -i`, etc.), no prompt fires. Inside those processes, \"stdin\" is the command surface, so the model gets to run commands at whatever privilege that process holds. The user approved opening the shell once, for a stated purpose; the input that then runs in it is chosen by the model, and can be steered by any prompt injection the agent ingests afterward.\n\n### Details\nThe vulnerability requires two ordinary preconditions: shell tools are enabled (the normal config for using CodeWhale as a coding agent), and the session already has one approved long-running interactive process. After that, any untrusted content the agent reads can drive a `","public_affected_ranges":[">= 0.8.41, < 0.8.64"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-08T19:53:44.058Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-04T18:02:11.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-09-04T18:02:10.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-02T02:20:52.377Z"},{"id":"NVI-00013894","kind":"vulnerability","title":"CodeWhale: exec_shell_interact sends LLM-controlled input to a running shell without an approval prompt (privilege escalation)","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-g29h-pfmp-qp9r","CVE-2026-75857"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for deepseek-tui, deepseek-tui, codewhale-tui, codewhale. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-17ab9b4366953bbbff70215d4676a266"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-09-04T18:02:11.000Z","value":"7 high","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-17ab9b4366953bbbff70215d4676a266"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-17ab9b4366953bbbff70215d4676a266","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-g29h-pfmp-qp9r","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-g29h-pfmp-qp9r","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-02T02:20:52.377Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-17ab9b4366953bbbff70215d4676a266"],"technology":"deepseek-tui","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Maintainer resolution\n\nThe CodeWhale maintainers validated this report. The affected package ranges are recorded in the advisory metadata. Version 0.8.64 contains the fix in commit 57f3c89471e27ac4032d9791f6885e5d4408c381. Users should upgrade to 0.8.64 or later. The original reporter analysis is preserved below.\n\n### Summary\n`exec_shell` is correctly approval-gated. Its sibling `exec_shell_interact` returns `ApprovalRequirement::Auto`, so when the model writes input into a shell the user already approved (a `python3 -i` REPL, `mysql`, `ssh`, `sudo -i`, etc.), no prompt fires. Inside those processes, \"stdin\" is the command surface, so the model gets to run commands at whatever privilege that process holds. The user approved opening the shell once, for a stated purpose; the input that then runs in it is chosen by the model, and can be steered by any prompt injection the agent ingests afterward.\n\n### Details\nThe vulnerability requires two ordinary preconditions: shell tools are enabled (the normal config for using CodeWhale as a coding agent), and the session already has one approved long-running interactive process. After that, any untrusted content the agent reads can drive a `","public_affected_ranges":[">= 0.3.10, <= 0.8.41"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-17ab9b4366953bbbff70215d4676a266"],"technology":"deepseek-tui","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Maintainer resolution\n\nThe CodeWhale maintainers validated this report. The affected package ranges are recorded in the advisory metadata. Version 0.8.64 contains the fix in commit 57f3c89471e27ac4032d9791f6885e5d4408c381. Users should upgrade to 0.8.64 or later. The original reporter analysis is preserved below.\n\n### Summary\n`exec_shell` is correctly approval-gated. Its sibling `exec_shell_interact` returns `ApprovalRequirement::Auto`, so when the model writes input into a shell the user already approved (a `python3 -i` REPL, `mysql`, `ssh`, `sudo -i`, etc.), no prompt fires. Inside those processes, \"stdin\" is the command surface, so the model gets to run commands at whatever privilege that process holds. The user approved opening the shell once, for a stated purpose; the input that then runs in it is chosen by the model, and can be steered by any prompt injection the agent ingests afterward.\n\n### Details\nThe vulnerability requires two ordinary preconditions: shell tools are enabled (the normal config for using CodeWhale as a coding agent), and the session already has one approved long-running interactive process. After that, any untrusted content the agent reads can drive a `","public_affected_ranges":[">= 0.3.10, < 0.8.41"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-17ab9b4366953bbbff70215d4676a266"],"technology":"codewhale-tui","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Maintainer resolution\n\nThe CodeWhale maintainers validated this report. The affected package ranges are recorded in the advisory metadata. Version 0.8.64 contains the fix in commit 57f3c89471e27ac4032d9791f6885e5d4408c381. Users should upgrade to 0.8.64 or later. The original reporter analysis is preserved below.\n\n### Summary\n`exec_shell` is correctly approval-gated. Its sibling `exec_shell_interact` returns `ApprovalRequirement::Auto`, so when the model writes input into a shell the user already approved (a `python3 -i` REPL, `mysql`, `ssh`, `sudo -i`, etc.), no prompt fires. Inside those processes, \"stdin\" is the command surface, so the model gets to run commands at whatever privilege that process holds. The user approved opening the shell once, for a stated purpose; the input that then runs in it is chosen by the model, and can be steered by any prompt injection the agent ingests afterward.\n\n### Details\nThe vulnerability requires two ordinary preconditions: shell tools are enabled (the normal config for using CodeWhale as a coding agent), and the session already has one approved long-running interactive process. After that, any untrusted content the agent reads can drive a `","public_affected_ranges":[">= 0.8.41, < 0.8.64"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-17ab9b4366953bbbff70215d4676a266"],"technology":"codewhale","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Maintainer resolution\n\nThe CodeWhale maintainers validated this report. The affected package ranges are recorded in the advisory metadata. Version 0.8.64 contains the fix in commit 57f3c89471e27ac4032d9791f6885e5d4408c381. Users should upgrade to 0.8.64 or later. The original reporter analysis is preserved below.\n\n### Summary\n`exec_shell` is correctly approval-gated. Its sibling `exec_shell_interact` returns `ApprovalRequirement::Auto`, so when the model writes input into a shell the user already approved (a `python3 -i` REPL, `mysql`, `ssh`, `sudo -i`, etc.), no prompt fires. Inside those processes, \"stdin\" is the command surface, so the model gets to run commands at whatever privilege that process holds. The user approved opening the shell once, for a stated purpose; the input that then runs in it is chosen by the model, and can be steered by any prompt injection the agent ingests afterward.\n\n### Details\nThe vulnerability requires two ordinary preconditions: shell tools are enabled (the normal config for using CodeWhale as a coding agent), and the session already has one approved long-running interactive process. After that, any untrusted content the agent reads can drive a `","public_affected_ranges":[">= 0.8.41, < 0.8.64"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-02T10:00:37.170Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-04T18:02:11.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-09-04T18:02:10.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-02T02:20:52.377Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}