{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00013896","kind":"vulnerability","title":"ffuf denial of service (OOM) via HTTP response decompression bomb","revision":4,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.","NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-jcvh-xf52-2cwm","CVE-2026-73232"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for github.com/ffuf/ffuf/v2, github.com/ffuf/ffuf. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-16b3652808d9bca266771ea25d5b1701"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-09-03T18:02:11.000Z","value":"7.5 high","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-17fc6443af324902ab9f3072dabe97fe"},{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-09-18T20:09:01.757Z","value":"7.5 HIGH (3.1)","meaning":"security-advisories@github.com severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-5889605ad09c23c72ed8eed8896eb1aa"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-11-03T12:00:27.000Z","value":"0.630%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.50226. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-16b3652808d9bca266771ea25d5b1701"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-17fc6443af324902ab9f3072dabe97fe","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-jcvh-xf52-2cwm","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-jcvh-xf52-2cwm","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-02T02:21:29.477Z"},{"id":"sr-5889605ad09c23c72ed8eed8896eb1aa","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-73232","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.","title":"CVE-2026-73232","publisher":"NIST National Vulnerability Database","observed_at":"2026-11-08T19:45:24.870Z"},{"id":"sr-16b3652808d9bca266771ea25d5b1701","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-73232","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-11-03T17:45:16.079Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-17fc6443af324902ab9f3072dabe97fe"],"technology":"github.com/ffuf/ffuf/v2","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\n  A malicious or attacker-controlled target server can crash ffuf with an out-of-memory condition by returning a compressed HTTP response that decompresses to a very large body (a decompression\n  bomb). This works against default usage with no special flags.\n\n  ### Details\n\n  The response body size guard in `pkg/runner/simple.go` only checks the server-supplied `Content-Length` header, which reflects the *compressed* size and is absent for chunked responses or when Go's\n  `net/http` transport transparently decompresses the body. After that check, `io.ReadAll` reads the entire *decompressed* stream into memory with no upper bound, so a small compressed body that\n  expands to gigabytes causes unbounded allocation and the process is terminated by the OS OOM killer.\n\n  The guard is bypassed in three independent ways:\n\n  1. **gzip (default configuration):** the transport requests gzip on its own and transparently decompresses the response, stripping `Content-Encoding` and `Content-Length`, so the size check is\n  skipped and the already-decoded body is read unbounded.\n  2. **brotli/deflate (or gzip with headers preserved):** `Content-Length` reflects the small compressed siz","public_affected_ranges":["<= 2.1.0"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-17fc6443af324902ab9f3072dabe97fe"],"technology":"github.com/ffuf/ffuf","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\n  A malicious or attacker-controlled target server can crash ffuf with an out-of-memory condition by returning a compressed HTTP response that decompresses to a very large body (a decompression\n  bomb). This works against default usage with no special flags.\n\n  ### Details\n\n  The response body size guard in `pkg/runner/simple.go` only checks the server-supplied `Content-Length` header, which reflects the *compressed* size and is absent for chunked responses or when Go's\n  `net/http` transport transparently decompresses the body. After that check, `io.ReadAll` reads the entire *decompressed* stream into memory with no upper bound, so a small compressed body that\n  expands to gigabytes causes unbounded allocation and the process is terminated by the OS OOM killer.\n\n  The guard is bypassed in three independent ways:\n\n  1. **gzip (default configuration):** the transport requests gzip on its own and transparently decompresses the response, stripping `Content-Encoding` and `Content-Length`, so the size check is\n  skipped and the already-decoded body is read unbounded.\n  2. **brotli/deflate (or gzip with headers preserved):** `Content-Length` reflects the small compressed siz","public_affected_ranges":["<= 1.5.0"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-08T19:53:44.059Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-03T18:02:11.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-09-03T18:02:09.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-02T02:21:29.477Z"},{"id":"NVI-00013896","kind":"vulnerability","title":"ffuf denial of service (OOM) via HTTP response decompression bomb","revision":3,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-jcvh-xf52-2cwm","CVE-2026-73232"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for github.com/ffuf/ffuf/v2, github.com/ffuf/ffuf. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-16b3652808d9bca266771ea25d5b1701"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-09-03T18:02:11.000Z","value":"7.5 high","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-17fc6443af324902ab9f3072dabe97fe"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-11-03T12:00:27.000Z","value":"0.630%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.50226. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-16b3652808d9bca266771ea25d5b1701"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-17fc6443af324902ab9f3072dabe97fe","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-jcvh-xf52-2cwm","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-jcvh-xf52-2cwm","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-02T02:21:29.477Z"},{"id":"sr-16b3652808d9bca266771ea25d5b1701","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-73232","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-11-03T17:45:16.079Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-17fc6443af324902ab9f3072dabe97fe"],"technology":"github.com/ffuf/ffuf/v2","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\n  A malicious or attacker-controlled target server can crash ffuf with an out-of-memory condition by returning a compressed HTTP response that decompresses to a very large body (a decompression\n  bomb). This works against default usage with no special flags.\n\n  ### Details\n\n  The response body size guard in `pkg/runner/simple.go` only checks the server-supplied `Content-Length` header, which reflects the *compressed* size and is absent for chunked responses or when Go's\n  `net/http` transport transparently decompresses the body. After that check, `io.ReadAll` reads the entire *decompressed* stream into memory with no upper bound, so a small compressed body that\n  expands to gigabytes causes unbounded allocation and the process is terminated by the OS OOM killer.\n\n  The guard is bypassed in three independent ways:\n\n  1. **gzip (default configuration):** the transport requests gzip on its own and transparently decompresses the response, stripping `Content-Encoding` and `Content-Length`, so the size check is\n  skipped and the already-decoded body is read unbounded.\n  2. **brotli/deflate (or gzip with headers preserved):** `Content-Length` reflects the small compressed siz","public_affected_ranges":["<= 2.1.0"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-17fc6443af324902ab9f3072dabe97fe"],"technology":"github.com/ffuf/ffuf","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\n  A malicious or attacker-controlled target server can crash ffuf with an out-of-memory condition by returning a compressed HTTP response that decompresses to a very large body (a decompression\n  bomb). This works against default usage with no special flags.\n\n  ### Details\n\n  The response body size guard in `pkg/runner/simple.go` only checks the server-supplied `Content-Length` header, which reflects the *compressed* size and is absent for chunked responses or when Go's\n  `net/http` transport transparently decompresses the body. After that check, `io.ReadAll` reads the entire *decompressed* stream into memory with no upper bound, so a small compressed body that\n  expands to gigabytes causes unbounded allocation and the process is terminated by the OS OOM killer.\n\n  The guard is bypassed in three independent ways:\n\n  1. **gzip (default configuration):** the transport requests gzip on its own and transparently decompresses the response, stripping `Content-Encoding` and `Content-Length`, so the size check is\n  skipped and the already-decoded body is read unbounded.\n  2. **brotli/deflate (or gzip with headers preserved):** `Content-Length` reflects the small compressed siz","public_affected_ranges":["<= 1.5.0"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-06T00:29:57.325Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-03T18:02:11.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-09-03T18:02:09.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-02T02:21:29.477Z"},{"id":"NVI-00013896","kind":"vulnerability","title":"ffuf denial of service (OOM) via HTTP response decompression bomb","revision":2,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-jcvh-xf52-2cwm","CVE-2026-73232"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for github.com/ffuf/ffuf/v2, github.com/ffuf/ffuf. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-0cd15f3d1fa0f13c84df613c03ccf7ec"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-09-03T18:02:11.000Z","value":"7.5 high","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-17fc6443af324902ab9f3072dabe97fe"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-11-02T12:00:30.000Z","value":"0.630%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.50186. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-0cd15f3d1fa0f13c84df613c03ccf7ec"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-17fc6443af324902ab9f3072dabe97fe","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-jcvh-xf52-2cwm","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-jcvh-xf52-2cwm","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-02T02:21:29.477Z"},{"id":"sr-0cd15f3d1fa0f13c84df613c03ccf7ec","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-73232","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-11-02T20:15:58.862Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-17fc6443af324902ab9f3072dabe97fe"],"technology":"github.com/ffuf/ffuf/v2","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\n  A malicious or attacker-controlled target server can crash ffuf with an out-of-memory condition by returning a compressed HTTP response that decompresses to a very large body (a decompression\n  bomb). This works against default usage with no special flags.\n\n  ### Details\n\n  The response body size guard in `pkg/runner/simple.go` only checks the server-supplied `Content-Length` header, which reflects the *compressed* size and is absent for chunked responses or when Go's\n  `net/http` transport transparently decompresses the body. After that check, `io.ReadAll` reads the entire *decompressed* stream into memory with no upper bound, so a small compressed body that\n  expands to gigabytes causes unbounded allocation and the process is terminated by the OS OOM killer.\n\n  The guard is bypassed in three independent ways:\n\n  1. **gzip (default configuration):** the transport requests gzip on its own and transparently decompresses the response, stripping `Content-Encoding` and `Content-Length`, so the size check is\n  skipped and the already-decoded body is read unbounded.\n  2. **brotli/deflate (or gzip with headers preserved):** `Content-Length` reflects the small compressed siz","public_affected_ranges":["<= 2.1.0"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-17fc6443af324902ab9f3072dabe97fe"],"technology":"github.com/ffuf/ffuf","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\n  A malicious or attacker-controlled target server can crash ffuf with an out-of-memory condition by returning a compressed HTTP response that decompresses to a very large body (a decompression\n  bomb). This works against default usage with no special flags.\n\n  ### Details\n\n  The response body size guard in `pkg/runner/simple.go` only checks the server-supplied `Content-Length` header, which reflects the *compressed* size and is absent for chunked responses or when Go's\n  `net/http` transport transparently decompresses the body. After that check, `io.ReadAll` reads the entire *decompressed* stream into memory with no upper bound, so a small compressed body that\n  expands to gigabytes causes unbounded allocation and the process is terminated by the OS OOM killer.\n\n  The guard is bypassed in three independent ways:\n\n  1. **gzip (default configuration):** the transport requests gzip on its own and transparently decompresses the response, stripping `Content-Encoding` and `Content-Length`, so the size check is\n  skipped and the already-decoded body is read unbounded.\n  2. **brotli/deflate (or gzip with headers preserved):** `Content-Length` reflects the small compressed siz","public_affected_ranges":["<= 1.5.0"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-04T10:04:47.589Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-03T18:02:11.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-09-03T18:02:09.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-02T02:21:29.477Z"},{"id":"NVI-00013896","kind":"vulnerability","title":"ffuf denial of service (OOM) via HTTP response decompression bomb","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-jcvh-xf52-2cwm","CVE-2026-73232"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for github.com/ffuf/ffuf/v2, github.com/ffuf/ffuf. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-17fc6443af324902ab9f3072dabe97fe"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-09-03T18:02:11.000Z","value":"7.5 high","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-17fc6443af324902ab9f3072dabe97fe"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-17fc6443af324902ab9f3072dabe97fe","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-jcvh-xf52-2cwm","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-jcvh-xf52-2cwm","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-02T02:21:29.477Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-17fc6443af324902ab9f3072dabe97fe"],"technology":"github.com/ffuf/ffuf/v2","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\n  A malicious or attacker-controlled target server can crash ffuf with an out-of-memory condition by returning a compressed HTTP response that decompresses to a very large body (a decompression\n  bomb). This works against default usage with no special flags.\n\n  ### Details\n\n  The response body size guard in `pkg/runner/simple.go` only checks the server-supplied `Content-Length` header, which reflects the *compressed* size and is absent for chunked responses or when Go's\n  `net/http` transport transparently decompresses the body. After that check, `io.ReadAll` reads the entire *decompressed* stream into memory with no upper bound, so a small compressed body that\n  expands to gigabytes causes unbounded allocation and the process is terminated by the OS OOM killer.\n\n  The guard is bypassed in three independent ways:\n\n  1. **gzip (default configuration):** the transport requests gzip on its own and transparently decompresses the response, stripping `Content-Encoding` and `Content-Length`, so the size check is\n  skipped and the already-decoded body is read unbounded.\n  2. **brotli/deflate (or gzip with headers preserved):** `Content-Length` reflects the small compressed siz","public_affected_ranges":["<= 2.1.0"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-17fc6443af324902ab9f3072dabe97fe"],"technology":"github.com/ffuf/ffuf","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\n  A malicious or attacker-controlled target server can crash ffuf with an out-of-memory condition by returning a compressed HTTP response that decompresses to a very large body (a decompression\n  bomb). This works against default usage with no special flags.\n\n  ### Details\n\n  The response body size guard in `pkg/runner/simple.go` only checks the server-supplied `Content-Length` header, which reflects the *compressed* size and is absent for chunked responses or when Go's\n  `net/http` transport transparently decompresses the body. After that check, `io.ReadAll` reads the entire *decompressed* stream into memory with no upper bound, so a small compressed body that\n  expands to gigabytes causes unbounded allocation and the process is terminated by the OS OOM killer.\n\n  The guard is bypassed in three independent ways:\n\n  1. **gzip (default configuration):** the transport requests gzip on its own and transparently decompresses the response, stripping `Content-Encoding` and `Content-Length`, so the size check is\n  skipped and the already-decoded body is read unbounded.\n  2. **brotli/deflate (or gzip with headers preserved):** `Content-Length` reflects the small compressed siz","public_affected_ranges":["<= 1.5.0"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-02T10:00:37.171Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-03T18:02:11.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-09-03T18:02:09.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-02T02:21:29.477Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}