{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00013906","kind":"vulnerability","title":"MySQL2: Unbounded zlib inflate in compressed MySQL protocol handler allows decompression-bomb DoS","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-rgwj-5xj2-c3m3"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for mysql2. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-1a90634c282e11d33198cf5327bedb03"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-09-02T15:28:47.000Z","value":"5.9 medium","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-1a90634c282e11d33198cf5327bedb03"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-1a90634c282e11d33198cf5327bedb03","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-rgwj-5xj2-c3m3","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-rgwj-5xj2-c3m3","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-02T02:21:43.711Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-1a90634c282e11d33198cf5327bedb03"],"technology":"mysql2","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Vulnerability Details\n\n**File**: `lib/compressed_protocol.js`\n**Line**: 43 (`zlib.inflate(body, (err, data) => { ... })` inside `handleCompressedPacket`)\n\n### Root Cause\nWhen a connection is created with `compress: true` (and the server advertises `CLIENT_COMPRESS`), every incoming packet is unwrapped by `handleCompressedPacket()` in `lib/compressed_protocol.js`, which calls:\n\n```js\nzlib.inflate(body, (err, data) => { ... });\n```\n\nNo options object (in particular, no `maxOutputLength`) is passed. Node's zlib convenience methods default `maxOutputLength` to `buffer.kMaxLength`, which on this platform is `Number.MAX_SAFE_INTEGER` — i.e. effectively unbounded until the process runs out of memory. The 3-byte \"length of payload before compression\" field in the compressed-packet header is read (`packet.readInt24()`) but is only used to branch on `!== 0`; it is never used to cap or validate the actual inflate output size, and the real decompressed size is determined purely by the attacker-supplied deflate stream.\n\nBecause DEFLATE can reach compression ratios over 1000:1 for crafted repetitive input, an attacker who controls (or MITMs, on a non-TLS connection) the MySQL server endpoint ","public_affected_ranges":["<= 3.23.0"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-02T10:00:37.173Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-02T15:28:47.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-08-31T22:36:20.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-02T02:21:43.711Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}