{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00013933","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Http4s Ember accepts Transfer-Encoding combined with Content-Length (CL.TE request smuggling)","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-8h4c-x2wg-6xp8","CVE-2026-69204"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_2.12, org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_2.13, org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_3, org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_2.13, org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_3. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-1fe842de6fbcc8312e32c6bb8846ae20"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-1fe842de6fbcc8312e32c6bb8846ae20","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-8h4c-x2wg-6xp8","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-8h4c-x2wg-6xp8","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T19:09:30.244Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-1fe842de6fbcc8312e32c6bb8846ae20"],"technology":"org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_2.12","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nEmber's HTTP/1.1 request parser does not reject a message that carries both a\n`Transfer-Encoding` and a `Content-Length` header. RFC 9112 §6.1 requires a\nserver to treat such a message as a framing error and close the connection.\nAn intermediary that follows the RFC's CL-strip-and-forward path (or that\nprioritises `Content-Length`) will frame the body differently from Ember,\nenabling HTTP request smuggling (CL.TE).\n\n## Impact\n\n### Server\n\nRequest smuggling when ember-server is an origin behind an intermediary that\nforwards both headers over a keep-alive backend connection and frames by\n`Content-Length` while Ember frames by chunked:\n\n- Front-end security bypass: the smuggled request reaches paths the\n  intermediary's ACL/auth layer would have blocked, with attacker-chosen\n  method and headers.\n- Cross-user request hijack: a dangling smuggled prefix concatenates with the\n  next victim's request on the shared backend socket, capturing its headers.\n- Cache poisoning: the smuggled response is associated with the next request\n  key in a caching proxy.\n\n### Client\n\nember-client shares the same parser on the response path. An upstream that\nsends both headers can desync a poole","public_affected_ranges":["<= 0.23.34"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-1fe842de6fbcc8312e32c6bb8846ae20"],"technology":"org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_2.13","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nEmber's HTTP/1.1 request parser does not reject a message that carries both a\n`Transfer-Encoding` and a `Content-Length` header. RFC 9112 §6.1 requires a\nserver to treat such a message as a framing error and close the connection.\nAn intermediary that follows the RFC's CL-strip-and-forward path (or that\nprioritises `Content-Length`) will frame the body differently from Ember,\nenabling HTTP request smuggling (CL.TE).\n\n## Impact\n\n### Server\n\nRequest smuggling when ember-server is an origin behind an intermediary that\nforwards both headers over a keep-alive backend connection and frames by\n`Content-Length` while Ember frames by chunked:\n\n- Front-end security bypass: the smuggled request reaches paths the\n  intermediary's ACL/auth layer would have blocked, with attacker-chosen\n  method and headers.\n- Cross-user request hijack: a dangling smuggled prefix concatenates with the\n  next victim's request on the shared backend socket, capturing its headers.\n- Cache poisoning: the smuggled response is associated with the next request\n  key in a caching proxy.\n\n### Client\n\nember-client shares the same parser on the response path. An upstream that\nsends both headers can desync a poole","public_affected_ranges":["<= 0.23.34"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-1fe842de6fbcc8312e32c6bb8846ae20"],"technology":"org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_3","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nEmber's HTTP/1.1 request parser does not reject a message that carries both a\n`Transfer-Encoding` and a `Content-Length` header. RFC 9112 §6.1 requires a\nserver to treat such a message as a framing error and close the connection.\nAn intermediary that follows the RFC's CL-strip-and-forward path (or that\nprioritises `Content-Length`) will frame the body differently from Ember,\nenabling HTTP request smuggling (CL.TE).\n\n## Impact\n\n### Server\n\nRequest smuggling when ember-server is an origin behind an intermediary that\nforwards both headers over a keep-alive backend connection and frames by\n`Content-Length` while Ember frames by chunked:\n\n- Front-end security bypass: the smuggled request reaches paths the\n  intermediary's ACL/auth layer would have blocked, with attacker-chosen\n  method and headers.\n- Cross-user request hijack: a dangling smuggled prefix concatenates with the\n  next victim's request on the shared backend socket, capturing its headers.\n- Cache poisoning: the smuggled response is associated with the next request\n  key in a caching proxy.\n\n### Client\n\nember-client shares the same parser on the response path. An upstream that\nsends both headers can desync a poole","public_affected_ranges":["<= 0.23.34"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-1fe842de6fbcc8312e32c6bb8846ae20"],"technology":"org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_2.13","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nEmber's HTTP/1.1 request parser does not reject a message that carries both a\n`Transfer-Encoding` and a `Content-Length` header. RFC 9112 §6.1 requires a\nserver to treat such a message as a framing error and close the connection.\nAn intermediary that follows the RFC's CL-strip-and-forward path (or that\nprioritises `Content-Length`) will frame the body differently from Ember,\nenabling HTTP request smuggling (CL.TE).\n\n## Impact\n\n### Server\n\nRequest smuggling when ember-server is an origin behind an intermediary that\nforwards both headers over a keep-alive backend connection and frames by\n`Content-Length` while Ember frames by chunked:\n\n- Front-end security bypass: the smuggled request reaches paths the\n  intermediary's ACL/auth layer would have blocked, with attacker-chosen\n  method and headers.\n- Cross-user request hijack: a dangling smuggled prefix concatenates with the\n  next victim's request on the shared backend socket, capturing its headers.\n- Cache poisoning: the smuggled response is associated with the next request\n  key in a caching proxy.\n\n### Client\n\nember-client shares the same parser on the response path. An upstream that\nsends both headers can desync a poole","public_affected_ranges":[">= 1.0.0-M1, <= 1.0.0-M46"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-1fe842de6fbcc8312e32c6bb8846ae20"],"technology":"org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_3","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nEmber's HTTP/1.1 request parser does not reject a message that carries both a\n`Transfer-Encoding` and a `Content-Length` header. RFC 9112 §6.1 requires a\nserver to treat such a message as a framing error and close the connection.\nAn intermediary that follows the RFC's CL-strip-and-forward path (or that\nprioritises `Content-Length`) will frame the body differently from Ember,\nenabling HTTP request smuggling (CL.TE).\n\n## Impact\n\n### Server\n\nRequest smuggling when ember-server is an origin behind an intermediary that\nforwards both headers over a keep-alive backend connection and frames by\n`Content-Length` while Ember frames by chunked:\n\n- Front-end security bypass: the smuggled request reaches paths the\n  intermediary's ACL/auth layer would have blocked, with attacker-chosen\n  method and headers.\n- Cross-user request hijack: a dangling smuggled prefix concatenates with the\n  next victim's request on the shared backend socket, capturing its headers.\n- Cache poisoning: the smuggled response is associated with the next request\n  key in a caching proxy.\n\n### Client\n\nember-client shares the same parser on the response path. An upstream that\nsends both headers can desync a poole","public_affected_ranges":[">= 1.0.0-M1, <= 1.0.0-M46"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-02T10:00:37.176Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-15T19:53:44.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-09-15T19:53:44.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-01T19:09:30.244Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}