{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00013945","kind":"vulnerability","title":"RabbitMQ Java client has frame-level OOM: Math.min(maxInboundMessageBodySize, 0) defeats frame size enforcement","revision":2,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-jh4v-gfqj-7rhx","CVE-2026-75516"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for com.rabbitmq:amqp-client. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-13b41cb831890b8b5e00a513234d95c5"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-11-03T12:00:27.000Z","value":"0.552%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.46194. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-13b41cb831890b8b5e00a513234d95c5"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-2333221b80e2313f66d81f5ca5b53dfa","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-jh4v-gfqj-7rhx","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-jh4v-gfqj-7rhx","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T19:09:30.244Z"},{"id":"sr-13b41cb831890b8b5e00a513234d95c5","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-75516","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-11-03T17:45:16.081Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-2333221b80e2313f66d81f5ca5b53dfa"],"technology":"com.rabbitmq:amqp-client","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Vulnerability\n\nIn `AMQConnection.java` (line 435-436), after `Connection.Tune` negotiation, the frame-max limit is set via:\n\n```java\n_frameHandler.setFrameMax(\n    Math.min(this.maxInboundMessageBodySize, frameMax));\n```\n\nWhen `frameMax = 0` (meaning \"unlimited\" per AMQP spec), `Math.min(67108864, 0) = 0`. This value is then passed to `Utils.framePayloadLimit(0)` which returns `Integer.MAX_VALUE` (line 77-79 of Utils.java):\n\n```java\nstatic int framePayloadLimit(int frameMax) {\n    if (frameMax <= 0) {\n      return Integer.MAX_VALUE;\n    }\n    // ...\n}\n```\n\nThis completely defeats the `maxInboundMessageBodySize` protection (default 64MB) at the frame level.\n\n## Attack Scenario\n\nA malicious AMQP server (or MITM) sends `Connection.Tune` with `frameMax=0`:\n\n1. Client defaults: `requestedFrameMax = 0` (`ConnectionFactory.DEFAULT_FRAME_MAX`, line 82)\n2. `negotiatedMaxValue(0, 0)` = `Math.max(0, 0)` = 0 (line 673-676)\n3. `Math.min(maxInboundMessageBodySize, 0)` = 0 — **64MB cap defeated**\n4. `framePayloadLimit(0)` = `Integer.MAX_VALUE` — no frame size enforcement\n5. Attacker sends a single frame with `frameSize = 0x1FFFFFFF` (~500MB)\n6. `Frame.readFrom()` (line 135) executes `new byte[","public_affected_ranges":["< 5.34.0"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-06T00:29:57.319Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-17T14:52:23.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-09-17T14:52:21.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-01T19:09:30.244Z"},{"id":"NVI-00013945","kind":"vulnerability","title":"RabbitMQ Java client has frame-level OOM: Math.min(maxInboundMessageBodySize, 0) defeats frame size enforcement","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-jh4v-gfqj-7rhx","CVE-2026-75516"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for com.rabbitmq:amqp-client. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-2333221b80e2313f66d81f5ca5b53dfa"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-2333221b80e2313f66d81f5ca5b53dfa","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-jh4v-gfqj-7rhx","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-jh4v-gfqj-7rhx","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T19:09:30.244Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-2333221b80e2313f66d81f5ca5b53dfa"],"technology":"com.rabbitmq:amqp-client","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Vulnerability\n\nIn `AMQConnection.java` (line 435-436), after `Connection.Tune` negotiation, the frame-max limit is set via:\n\n```java\n_frameHandler.setFrameMax(\n    Math.min(this.maxInboundMessageBodySize, frameMax));\n```\n\nWhen `frameMax = 0` (meaning \"unlimited\" per AMQP spec), `Math.min(67108864, 0) = 0`. This value is then passed to `Utils.framePayloadLimit(0)` which returns `Integer.MAX_VALUE` (line 77-79 of Utils.java):\n\n```java\nstatic int framePayloadLimit(int frameMax) {\n    if (frameMax <= 0) {\n      return Integer.MAX_VALUE;\n    }\n    // ...\n}\n```\n\nThis completely defeats the `maxInboundMessageBodySize` protection (default 64MB) at the frame level.\n\n## Attack Scenario\n\nA malicious AMQP server (or MITM) sends `Connection.Tune` with `frameMax=0`:\n\n1. Client defaults: `requestedFrameMax = 0` (`ConnectionFactory.DEFAULT_FRAME_MAX`, line 82)\n2. `negotiatedMaxValue(0, 0)` = `Math.max(0, 0)` = 0 (line 673-676)\n3. `Math.min(maxInboundMessageBodySize, 0)` = 0 — **64MB cap defeated**\n4. `framePayloadLimit(0)` = `Integer.MAX_VALUE` — no frame size enforcement\n5. Attacker sends a single frame with `frameSize = 0x1FFFFFFF` (~500MB)\n6. `Frame.readFrom()` (line 135) executes `new byte[","public_affected_ranges":["< 5.34.0"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-02T10:00:37.177Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-17T14:52:23.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-09-17T14:52:21.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-01T19:09:30.244Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}