{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00013961","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Http4s Ember Transfer-Encoding value parsing (TE.CL / TE.0 request smuggling)","revision":3,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.","NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-9998-894r-fwvr","CVE-2026-69205"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_3, org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_2.13, org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_2.12, org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_2.13, org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_3. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-0ce3280abc700cf89bdb293bc4044af4"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-09-15T19:54:26.000Z","value":"8.7 high","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-28c45957c5c181df2043219019e33b2c"},{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-09-16T20:38:04.943Z","value":"8.7 HIGH (3.1)","meaning":"security-advisories@github.com severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-40d33f3f36661aea2ca70ddac7bacce0"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-11-02T12:00:30.000Z","value":"0.480%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.41391. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-0ce3280abc700cf89bdb293bc4044af4"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-28c45957c5c181df2043219019e33b2c","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-9998-894r-fwvr","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-9998-894r-fwvr","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T19:09:30.244Z"},{"id":"sr-40d33f3f36661aea2ca70ddac7bacce0","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-69205","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.","title":"CVE-2026-69205","publisher":"NIST National Vulnerability Database","observed_at":"2026-11-08T15:07:54.921Z"},{"id":"sr-0ce3280abc700cf89bdb293bc4044af4","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-69205","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-11-02T20:15:58.861Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-28c45957c5c181df2043219019e33b2c"],"technology":"org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_3","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nEmber's HTTP/1.1 header parser matches the `Transfer-Encoding` header value\nwith a case-sensitive substring test (`hValue.contains(\"chunked\")`). RFC\n9112 §7 requires transfer-coding names to be compared case-insensitively. A\nrequest carrying `Transfer-Encoding: Chunked` (capital C) is therefore not\nrecognised as chunked, and Ember falls back to framing by `Content-Length`\n(or zero if absent) while a compliant intermediary frames the same bytes by\nchunked encoding. The two parsers then disagree on where the request body\nends, enabling HTTP request smuggling (TE.CL / TE.0).\n\nThe same line of code admits two further variants:\n\n- The substring test misfires on `Transfer-Encoding: notchunked` (an inverse\n  desync — Ember treats it as chunked while a compliant intermediary\n  rejects the unknown coding).\n- Header field bytes are decoded with the platform-default charset. Under\n  UTF-8 the wire bytes `E2 84 AA` decode to U+212A KELVIN SIGN, which\n  `String.equalsIgnoreCase` Unicode-case-folds to `k`, so\n  `Transfer-Encoding: chuned` matches `chunked` once the comparison\n  is made case-insensitive without also pinning the decode to ISO-8859-1.\n\n## Impact\n\n### Server\n\nReq","public_affected_ranges":["<= 0.23.34"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-28c45957c5c181df2043219019e33b2c"],"technology":"org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_2.13","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nEmber's HTTP/1.1 header parser matches the `Transfer-Encoding` header value\nwith a case-sensitive substring test (`hValue.contains(\"chunked\")`). RFC\n9112 §7 requires transfer-coding names to be compared case-insensitively. A\nrequest carrying `Transfer-Encoding: Chunked` (capital C) is therefore not\nrecognised as chunked, and Ember falls back to framing by `Content-Length`\n(or zero if absent) while a compliant intermediary frames the same bytes by\nchunked encoding. The two parsers then disagree on where the request body\nends, enabling HTTP request smuggling (TE.CL / TE.0).\n\nThe same line of code admits two further variants:\n\n- The substring test misfires on `Transfer-Encoding: notchunked` (an inverse\n  desync — Ember treats it as chunked while a compliant intermediary\n  rejects the unknown coding).\n- Header field bytes are decoded with the platform-default charset. Under\n  UTF-8 the wire bytes `E2 84 AA` decode to U+212A KELVIN SIGN, which\n  `String.equalsIgnoreCase` Unicode-case-folds to `k`, so\n  `Transfer-Encoding: chuned` matches `chunked` once the comparison\n  is made case-insensitive without also pinning the decode to ISO-8859-1.\n\n## Impact\n\n### Server\n\nReq","public_affected_ranges":["<= 0.23.34"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-28c45957c5c181df2043219019e33b2c"],"technology":"org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_2.12","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nEmber's HTTP/1.1 header parser matches the `Transfer-Encoding` header value\nwith a case-sensitive substring test (`hValue.contains(\"chunked\")`). RFC\n9112 §7 requires transfer-coding names to be compared case-insensitively. A\nrequest carrying `Transfer-Encoding: Chunked` (capital C) is therefore not\nrecognised as chunked, and Ember falls back to framing by `Content-Length`\n(or zero if absent) while a compliant intermediary frames the same bytes by\nchunked encoding. The two parsers then disagree on where the request body\nends, enabling HTTP request smuggling (TE.CL / TE.0).\n\nThe same line of code admits two further variants:\n\n- The substring test misfires on `Transfer-Encoding: notchunked` (an inverse\n  desync — Ember treats it as chunked while a compliant intermediary\n  rejects the unknown coding).\n- Header field bytes are decoded with the platform-default charset. Under\n  UTF-8 the wire bytes `E2 84 AA` decode to U+212A KELVIN SIGN, which\n  `String.equalsIgnoreCase` Unicode-case-folds to `k`, so\n  `Transfer-Encoding: chuned` matches `chunked` once the comparison\n  is made case-insensitive without also pinning the decode to ISO-8859-1.\n\n## Impact\n\n### Server\n\nReq","public_affected_ranges":["<= 0.23.34"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-28c45957c5c181df2043219019e33b2c"],"technology":"org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_2.13","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nEmber's HTTP/1.1 header parser matches the `Transfer-Encoding` header value\nwith a case-sensitive substring test (`hValue.contains(\"chunked\")`). RFC\n9112 §7 requires transfer-coding names to be compared case-insensitively. A\nrequest carrying `Transfer-Encoding: Chunked` (capital C) is therefore not\nrecognised as chunked, and Ember falls back to framing by `Content-Length`\n(or zero if absent) while a compliant intermediary frames the same bytes by\nchunked encoding. The two parsers then disagree on where the request body\nends, enabling HTTP request smuggling (TE.CL / TE.0).\n\nThe same line of code admits two further variants:\n\n- The substring test misfires on `Transfer-Encoding: notchunked` (an inverse\n  desync — Ember treats it as chunked while a compliant intermediary\n  rejects the unknown coding).\n- Header field bytes are decoded with the platform-default charset. Under\n  UTF-8 the wire bytes `E2 84 AA` decode to U+212A KELVIN SIGN, which\n  `String.equalsIgnoreCase` Unicode-case-folds to `k`, so\n  `Transfer-Encoding: chuned` matches `chunked` once the comparison\n  is made case-insensitive without also pinning the decode to ISO-8859-1.\n\n## Impact\n\n### Server\n\nReq","public_affected_ranges":[">= 1.0.0-M1, <= 1.0.0-M46"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-28c45957c5c181df2043219019e33b2c"],"technology":"org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_3","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nEmber's HTTP/1.1 header parser matches the `Transfer-Encoding` header value\nwith a case-sensitive substring test (`hValue.contains(\"chunked\")`). RFC\n9112 §7 requires transfer-coding names to be compared case-insensitively. A\nrequest carrying `Transfer-Encoding: Chunked` (capital C) is therefore not\nrecognised as chunked, and Ember falls back to framing by `Content-Length`\n(or zero if absent) while a compliant intermediary frames the same bytes by\nchunked encoding. The two parsers then disagree on where the request body\nends, enabling HTTP request smuggling (TE.CL / TE.0).\n\nThe same line of code admits two further variants:\n\n- The substring test misfires on `Transfer-Encoding: notchunked` (an inverse\n  desync — Ember treats it as chunked while a compliant intermediary\n  rejects the unknown coding).\n- Header field bytes are decoded with the platform-default charset. Under\n  UTF-8 the wire bytes `E2 84 AA` decode to U+212A KELVIN SIGN, which\n  `String.equalsIgnoreCase` Unicode-case-folds to `k`, so\n  `Transfer-Encoding: chuned` matches `chunked` once the comparison\n  is made case-insensitive without also pinning the decode to ISO-8859-1.\n\n## Impact\n\n### Server\n\nReq","public_affected_ranges":[">= 1.0.0-M1, <= 1.0.0-M46"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-08T19:53:44.052Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-15T19:54:26.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-09-15T19:54:25.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-01T19:09:30.244Z"},{"id":"NVI-00013961","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Http4s Ember Transfer-Encoding value parsing (TE.CL / TE.0 request smuggling)","revision":2,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-9998-894r-fwvr","CVE-2026-69205"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_3, org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_2.13, org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_2.12, org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_2.13, org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_3. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-0ce3280abc700cf89bdb293bc4044af4"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-09-15T19:54:26.000Z","value":"8.7 high","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-28c45957c5c181df2043219019e33b2c"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-11-02T12:00:30.000Z","value":"0.480%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.41391. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-0ce3280abc700cf89bdb293bc4044af4"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-28c45957c5c181df2043219019e33b2c","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-9998-894r-fwvr","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-9998-894r-fwvr","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T19:09:30.244Z"},{"id":"sr-0ce3280abc700cf89bdb293bc4044af4","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-69205","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-11-02T20:15:58.861Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-28c45957c5c181df2043219019e33b2c"],"technology":"org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_3","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nEmber's HTTP/1.1 header parser matches the `Transfer-Encoding` header value\nwith a case-sensitive substring test (`hValue.contains(\"chunked\")`). RFC\n9112 §7 requires transfer-coding names to be compared case-insensitively. A\nrequest carrying `Transfer-Encoding: Chunked` (capital C) is therefore not\nrecognised as chunked, and Ember falls back to framing by `Content-Length`\n(or zero if absent) while a compliant intermediary frames the same bytes by\nchunked encoding. The two parsers then disagree on where the request body\nends, enabling HTTP request smuggling (TE.CL / TE.0).\n\nThe same line of code admits two further variants:\n\n- The substring test misfires on `Transfer-Encoding: notchunked` (an inverse\n  desync — Ember treats it as chunked while a compliant intermediary\n  rejects the unknown coding).\n- Header field bytes are decoded with the platform-default charset. Under\n  UTF-8 the wire bytes `E2 84 AA` decode to U+212A KELVIN SIGN, which\n  `String.equalsIgnoreCase` Unicode-case-folds to `k`, so\n  `Transfer-Encoding: chuned` matches `chunked` once the comparison\n  is made case-insensitive without also pinning the decode to ISO-8859-1.\n\n## Impact\n\n### Server\n\nReq","public_affected_ranges":["<= 0.23.34"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-28c45957c5c181df2043219019e33b2c"],"technology":"org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_2.13","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nEmber's HTTP/1.1 header parser matches the `Transfer-Encoding` header value\nwith a case-sensitive substring test (`hValue.contains(\"chunked\")`). RFC\n9112 §7 requires transfer-coding names to be compared case-insensitively. A\nrequest carrying `Transfer-Encoding: Chunked` (capital C) is therefore not\nrecognised as chunked, and Ember falls back to framing by `Content-Length`\n(or zero if absent) while a compliant intermediary frames the same bytes by\nchunked encoding. The two parsers then disagree on where the request body\nends, enabling HTTP request smuggling (TE.CL / TE.0).\n\nThe same line of code admits two further variants:\n\n- The substring test misfires on `Transfer-Encoding: notchunked` (an inverse\n  desync — Ember treats it as chunked while a compliant intermediary\n  rejects the unknown coding).\n- Header field bytes are decoded with the platform-default charset. Under\n  UTF-8 the wire bytes `E2 84 AA` decode to U+212A KELVIN SIGN, which\n  `String.equalsIgnoreCase` Unicode-case-folds to `k`, so\n  `Transfer-Encoding: chuned` matches `chunked` once the comparison\n  is made case-insensitive without also pinning the decode to ISO-8859-1.\n\n## Impact\n\n### Server\n\nReq","public_affected_ranges":["<= 0.23.34"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-28c45957c5c181df2043219019e33b2c"],"technology":"org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_2.12","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nEmber's HTTP/1.1 header parser matches the `Transfer-Encoding` header value\nwith a case-sensitive substring test (`hValue.contains(\"chunked\")`). RFC\n9112 §7 requires transfer-coding names to be compared case-insensitively. A\nrequest carrying `Transfer-Encoding: Chunked` (capital C) is therefore not\nrecognised as chunked, and Ember falls back to framing by `Content-Length`\n(or zero if absent) while a compliant intermediary frames the same bytes by\nchunked encoding. The two parsers then disagree on where the request body\nends, enabling HTTP request smuggling (TE.CL / TE.0).\n\nThe same line of code admits two further variants:\n\n- The substring test misfires on `Transfer-Encoding: notchunked` (an inverse\n  desync — Ember treats it as chunked while a compliant intermediary\n  rejects the unknown coding).\n- Header field bytes are decoded with the platform-default charset. Under\n  UTF-8 the wire bytes `E2 84 AA` decode to U+212A KELVIN SIGN, which\n  `String.equalsIgnoreCase` Unicode-case-folds to `k`, so\n  `Transfer-Encoding: chuned` matches `chunked` once the comparison\n  is made case-insensitive without also pinning the decode to ISO-8859-1.\n\n## Impact\n\n### Server\n\nReq","public_affected_ranges":["<= 0.23.34"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-28c45957c5c181df2043219019e33b2c"],"technology":"org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_2.13","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nEmber's HTTP/1.1 header parser matches the `Transfer-Encoding` header value\nwith a case-sensitive substring test (`hValue.contains(\"chunked\")`). RFC\n9112 §7 requires transfer-coding names to be compared case-insensitively. A\nrequest carrying `Transfer-Encoding: Chunked` (capital C) is therefore not\nrecognised as chunked, and Ember falls back to framing by `Content-Length`\n(or zero if absent) while a compliant intermediary frames the same bytes by\nchunked encoding. The two parsers then disagree on where the request body\nends, enabling HTTP request smuggling (TE.CL / TE.0).\n\nThe same line of code admits two further variants:\n\n- The substring test misfires on `Transfer-Encoding: notchunked` (an inverse\n  desync — Ember treats it as chunked while a compliant intermediary\n  rejects the unknown coding).\n- Header field bytes are decoded with the platform-default charset. Under\n  UTF-8 the wire bytes `E2 84 AA` decode to U+212A KELVIN SIGN, which\n  `String.equalsIgnoreCase` Unicode-case-folds to `k`, so\n  `Transfer-Encoding: chuned` matches `chunked` once the comparison\n  is made case-insensitive without also pinning the decode to ISO-8859-1.\n\n## Impact\n\n### Server\n\nReq","public_affected_ranges":[">= 1.0.0-M1, <= 1.0.0-M46"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-28c45957c5c181df2043219019e33b2c"],"technology":"org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_3","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nEmber's HTTP/1.1 header parser matches the `Transfer-Encoding` header value\nwith a case-sensitive substring test (`hValue.contains(\"chunked\")`). RFC\n9112 §7 requires transfer-coding names to be compared case-insensitively. A\nrequest carrying `Transfer-Encoding: Chunked` (capital C) is therefore not\nrecognised as chunked, and Ember falls back to framing by `Content-Length`\n(or zero if absent) while a compliant intermediary frames the same bytes by\nchunked encoding. The two parsers then disagree on where the request body\nends, enabling HTTP request smuggling (TE.CL / TE.0).\n\nThe same line of code admits two further variants:\n\n- The substring test misfires on `Transfer-Encoding: notchunked` (an inverse\n  desync — Ember treats it as chunked while a compliant intermediary\n  rejects the unknown coding).\n- Header field bytes are decoded with the platform-default charset. Under\n  UTF-8 the wire bytes `E2 84 AA` decode to U+212A KELVIN SIGN, which\n  `String.equalsIgnoreCase` Unicode-case-folds to `k`, so\n  `Transfer-Encoding: chuned` matches `chunked` once the comparison\n  is made case-insensitive without also pinning the decode to ISO-8859-1.\n\n## Impact\n\n### Server\n\nReq","public_affected_ranges":[">= 1.0.0-M1, <= 1.0.0-M46"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-04T10:04:47.589Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-15T19:54:26.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-09-15T19:54:25.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-01T19:09:30.244Z"},{"id":"NVI-00013961","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Http4s Ember Transfer-Encoding value parsing (TE.CL / TE.0 request smuggling)","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-9998-894r-fwvr","CVE-2026-69205"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_3, org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_2.13, org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_2.12, org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_2.13, org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_3. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-28c45957c5c181df2043219019e33b2c"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-09-15T19:54:26.000Z","value":"8.7 high","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-28c45957c5c181df2043219019e33b2c"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-28c45957c5c181df2043219019e33b2c","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-9998-894r-fwvr","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-9998-894r-fwvr","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T19:09:30.244Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-28c45957c5c181df2043219019e33b2c"],"technology":"org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_3","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nEmber's HTTP/1.1 header parser matches the `Transfer-Encoding` header value\nwith a case-sensitive substring test (`hValue.contains(\"chunked\")`). RFC\n9112 §7 requires transfer-coding names to be compared case-insensitively. A\nrequest carrying `Transfer-Encoding: Chunked` (capital C) is therefore not\nrecognised as chunked, and Ember falls back to framing by `Content-Length`\n(or zero if absent) while a compliant intermediary frames the same bytes by\nchunked encoding. The two parsers then disagree on where the request body\nends, enabling HTTP request smuggling (TE.CL / TE.0).\n\nThe same line of code admits two further variants:\n\n- The substring test misfires on `Transfer-Encoding: notchunked` (an inverse\n  desync — Ember treats it as chunked while a compliant intermediary\n  rejects the unknown coding).\n- Header field bytes are decoded with the platform-default charset. Under\n  UTF-8 the wire bytes `E2 84 AA` decode to U+212A KELVIN SIGN, which\n  `String.equalsIgnoreCase` Unicode-case-folds to `k`, so\n  `Transfer-Encoding: chuned` matches `chunked` once the comparison\n  is made case-insensitive without also pinning the decode to ISO-8859-1.\n\n## Impact\n\n### Server\n\nReq","public_affected_ranges":["<= 0.23.34"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-28c45957c5c181df2043219019e33b2c"],"technology":"org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_2.13","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nEmber's HTTP/1.1 header parser matches the `Transfer-Encoding` header value\nwith a case-sensitive substring test (`hValue.contains(\"chunked\")`). RFC\n9112 §7 requires transfer-coding names to be compared case-insensitively. A\nrequest carrying `Transfer-Encoding: Chunked` (capital C) is therefore not\nrecognised as chunked, and Ember falls back to framing by `Content-Length`\n(or zero if absent) while a compliant intermediary frames the same bytes by\nchunked encoding. The two parsers then disagree on where the request body\nends, enabling HTTP request smuggling (TE.CL / TE.0).\n\nThe same line of code admits two further variants:\n\n- The substring test misfires on `Transfer-Encoding: notchunked` (an inverse\n  desync — Ember treats it as chunked while a compliant intermediary\n  rejects the unknown coding).\n- Header field bytes are decoded with the platform-default charset. Under\n  UTF-8 the wire bytes `E2 84 AA` decode to U+212A KELVIN SIGN, which\n  `String.equalsIgnoreCase` Unicode-case-folds to `k`, so\n  `Transfer-Encoding: chuned` matches `chunked` once the comparison\n  is made case-insensitive without also pinning the decode to ISO-8859-1.\n\n## Impact\n\n### Server\n\nReq","public_affected_ranges":["<= 0.23.34"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-28c45957c5c181df2043219019e33b2c"],"technology":"org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_2.12","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nEmber's HTTP/1.1 header parser matches the `Transfer-Encoding` header value\nwith a case-sensitive substring test (`hValue.contains(\"chunked\")`). RFC\n9112 §7 requires transfer-coding names to be compared case-insensitively. A\nrequest carrying `Transfer-Encoding: Chunked` (capital C) is therefore not\nrecognised as chunked, and Ember falls back to framing by `Content-Length`\n(or zero if absent) while a compliant intermediary frames the same bytes by\nchunked encoding. The two parsers then disagree on where the request body\nends, enabling HTTP request smuggling (TE.CL / TE.0).\n\nThe same line of code admits two further variants:\n\n- The substring test misfires on `Transfer-Encoding: notchunked` (an inverse\n  desync — Ember treats it as chunked while a compliant intermediary\n  rejects the unknown coding).\n- Header field bytes are decoded with the platform-default charset. Under\n  UTF-8 the wire bytes `E2 84 AA` decode to U+212A KELVIN SIGN, which\n  `String.equalsIgnoreCase` Unicode-case-folds to `k`, so\n  `Transfer-Encoding: chuned` matches `chunked` once the comparison\n  is made case-insensitive without also pinning the decode to ISO-8859-1.\n\n## Impact\n\n### Server\n\nReq","public_affected_ranges":["<= 0.23.34"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-28c45957c5c181df2043219019e33b2c"],"technology":"org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_2.13","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nEmber's HTTP/1.1 header parser matches the `Transfer-Encoding` header value\nwith a case-sensitive substring test (`hValue.contains(\"chunked\")`). RFC\n9112 §7 requires transfer-coding names to be compared case-insensitively. A\nrequest carrying `Transfer-Encoding: Chunked` (capital C) is therefore not\nrecognised as chunked, and Ember falls back to framing by `Content-Length`\n(or zero if absent) while a compliant intermediary frames the same bytes by\nchunked encoding. The two parsers then disagree on where the request body\nends, enabling HTTP request smuggling (TE.CL / TE.0).\n\nThe same line of code admits two further variants:\n\n- The substring test misfires on `Transfer-Encoding: notchunked` (an inverse\n  desync — Ember treats it as chunked while a compliant intermediary\n  rejects the unknown coding).\n- Header field bytes are decoded with the platform-default charset. Under\n  UTF-8 the wire bytes `E2 84 AA` decode to U+212A KELVIN SIGN, which\n  `String.equalsIgnoreCase` Unicode-case-folds to `k`, so\n  `Transfer-Encoding: chuned` matches `chunked` once the comparison\n  is made case-insensitive without also pinning the decode to ISO-8859-1.\n\n## Impact\n\n### Server\n\nReq","public_affected_ranges":[">= 1.0.0-M1, <= 1.0.0-M46"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-28c45957c5c181df2043219019e33b2c"],"technology":"org.http4s:http4s-ember-core_3","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nEmber's HTTP/1.1 header parser matches the `Transfer-Encoding` header value\nwith a case-sensitive substring test (`hValue.contains(\"chunked\")`). RFC\n9112 §7 requires transfer-coding names to be compared case-insensitively. A\nrequest carrying `Transfer-Encoding: Chunked` (capital C) is therefore not\nrecognised as chunked, and Ember falls back to framing by `Content-Length`\n(or zero if absent) while a compliant intermediary frames the same bytes by\nchunked encoding. The two parsers then disagree on where the request body\nends, enabling HTTP request smuggling (TE.CL / TE.0).\n\nThe same line of code admits two further variants:\n\n- The substring test misfires on `Transfer-Encoding: notchunked` (an inverse\n  desync — Ember treats it as chunked while a compliant intermediary\n  rejects the unknown coding).\n- Header field bytes are decoded with the platform-default charset. Under\n  UTF-8 the wire bytes `E2 84 AA` decode to U+212A KELVIN SIGN, which\n  `String.equalsIgnoreCase` Unicode-case-folds to `k`, so\n  `Transfer-Encoding: chuned` matches `chunked` once the comparison\n  is made case-insensitive without also pinning the decode to ISO-8859-1.\n\n## Impact\n\n### Server\n\nReq","public_affected_ranges":[">= 1.0.0-M1, <= 1.0.0-M46"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-02T10:00:37.192Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-15T19:54:26.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-09-15T19:54:25.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-01T19:09:30.244Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}