{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00013983","kind":"vulnerability","title":"OpenChoreo: cluster-gateway internal proxy performs no caller authentication and is not read-only — data-plane Secret disclosure and arbitrary Kubernetes mutation","revision":2,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected.","NVD lastModified does not establish freshness of every associated CPE record."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-rh53-xvx2-j327","CVE-2026-73842"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for github.com/openchoreo/openchoreo, github.com/openchoreo/openchoreo, github.com/openchoreo/openchoreo. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-36aeae114e3256c512e6c9bf1c9bf412"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-09-04T21:41:40.000Z","value":"9 critical","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-2cb4c085099b084d6a3a176ff54f3fe5"},{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-09-08T20:56:50.520Z","value":"9 CRITICAL (3.1)","meaning":"security-advisories@github.com severity; no combined Null risk score.","source_id":"sr-36aeae114e3256c512e6c9bf1c9bf412"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-2cb4c085099b084d6a3a176ff54f3fe5","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-rh53-xvx2-j327","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-rh53-xvx2-j327","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-02T02:20:52.377Z"},{"id":"sr-36aeae114e3256c512e6c9bf1c9bf412","url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-73842","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"This product uses data from the NVD API but is not endorsed or certified by the NVD.","title":"CVE-2026-73842","publisher":"NIST National Vulnerability Database","observed_at":"2026-11-08T19:45:24.870Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-2cb4c085099b084d6a3a176ff54f3fe5"],"technology":"github.com/openchoreo/openchoreo","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\nThe OpenChoreo control-plane cluster-gateway exposes internal management APIs (`/api/proxy/`, `/api/exec/`, `/api/wirelogs/`) that tunnel requests through to connected data planes' Kubernetes APIs, but the internal listener authenticates no caller. Its request validator permits mutating HTTP methods and reads of Secrets in tenant namespaces (only kube-system Secrets are blocked), so although the client library documents these requests as \"read-only,\" the server enforces no such restriction. Any party able to reach the internal listener can — with no client certificate or token — read Secrets in any tenant namespace, create/modify/delete workloads, and exec into pods across every connected data plane.\n\n### Impact\n\nAn attacker with network access to the cluster-gateway internal listener obtains tunneled access to every connected data plane's Kubernetes API with no caller-level access control. Across all connected data planes, this allows:\n\n- Secret disclosure — reading any Secret outside `kube-system` in any tenant namespace (database credentials, cloud/KMS keys, TLS private keys), independent of any workload ServiceAccount permissions.\n- Workload tampering or destructio","public_affected_ranges":["< 1.0.3"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-2cb4c085099b084d6a3a176ff54f3fe5"],"technology":"github.com/openchoreo/openchoreo","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\nThe OpenChoreo control-plane cluster-gateway exposes internal management APIs (`/api/proxy/`, `/api/exec/`, `/api/wirelogs/`) that tunnel requests through to connected data planes' Kubernetes APIs, but the internal listener authenticates no caller. Its request validator permits mutating HTTP methods and reads of Secrets in tenant namespaces (only kube-system Secrets are blocked), so although the client library documents these requests as \"read-only,\" the server enforces no such restriction. Any party able to reach the internal listener can — with no client certificate or token — read Secrets in any tenant namespace, create/modify/delete workloads, and exec into pods across every connected data plane.\n\n### Impact\n\nAn attacker with network access to the cluster-gateway internal listener obtains tunneled access to every connected data plane's Kubernetes API with no caller-level access control. Across all connected data planes, this allows:\n\n- Secret disclosure — reading any Secret outside `kube-system` in any tenant namespace (database credentials, cloud/KMS keys, TLS private keys), independent of any workload ServiceAccount permissions.\n- Workload tampering or destructio","public_affected_ranges":[">= 1.1.0, < 1.1.3"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-2cb4c085099b084d6a3a176ff54f3fe5"],"technology":"github.com/openchoreo/openchoreo","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\nThe OpenChoreo control-plane cluster-gateway exposes internal management APIs (`/api/proxy/`, `/api/exec/`, `/api/wirelogs/`) that tunnel requests through to connected data planes' Kubernetes APIs, but the internal listener authenticates no caller. Its request validator permits mutating HTTP methods and reads of Secrets in tenant namespaces (only kube-system Secrets are blocked), so although the client library documents these requests as \"read-only,\" the server enforces no such restriction. Any party able to reach the internal listener can — with no client certificate or token — read Secrets in any tenant namespace, create/modify/delete workloads, and exec into pods across every connected data plane.\n\n### Impact\n\nAn attacker with network access to the cluster-gateway internal listener obtains tunneled access to every connected data plane's Kubernetes API with no caller-level access control. Across all connected data planes, this allows:\n\n- Secret disclosure — reading any Secret outside `kube-system` in any tenant namespace (database credentials, cloud/KMS keys, TLS private keys), independent of any workload ServiceAccount permissions.\n- Workload tampering or destructio","public_affected_ranges":[">= 1.2.0-rc.1, < 1.2.0-rc.2"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-08T19:53:44.049Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-04T21:41:40.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-09-04T21:41:38.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Source facts changed; compare the preserved prior revision.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-02T02:20:52.377Z"},{"id":"NVI-00013983","kind":"vulnerability","title":"OpenChoreo: cluster-gateway internal proxy performs no caller authentication and is not read-only — data-plane Secret disclosure and arbitrary Kubernetes mutation","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-rh53-xvx2-j327","CVE-2026-73842"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for github.com/openchoreo/openchoreo, github.com/openchoreo/openchoreo, github.com/openchoreo/openchoreo. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-2cb4c085099b084d6a3a176ff54f3fe5"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-09-04T21:41:40.000Z","value":"9 critical","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-2cb4c085099b084d6a3a176ff54f3fe5"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-2cb4c085099b084d6a3a176ff54f3fe5","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-rh53-xvx2-j327","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-rh53-xvx2-j327","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-02T02:20:52.377Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-2cb4c085099b084d6a3a176ff54f3fe5"],"technology":"github.com/openchoreo/openchoreo","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\nThe OpenChoreo control-plane cluster-gateway exposes internal management APIs (`/api/proxy/`, `/api/exec/`, `/api/wirelogs/`) that tunnel requests through to connected data planes' Kubernetes APIs, but the internal listener authenticates no caller. Its request validator permits mutating HTTP methods and reads of Secrets in tenant namespaces (only kube-system Secrets are blocked), so although the client library documents these requests as \"read-only,\" the server enforces no such restriction. Any party able to reach the internal listener can — with no client certificate or token — read Secrets in any tenant namespace, create/modify/delete workloads, and exec into pods across every connected data plane.\n\n### Impact\n\nAn attacker with network access to the cluster-gateway internal listener obtains tunneled access to every connected data plane's Kubernetes API with no caller-level access control. Across all connected data planes, this allows:\n\n- Secret disclosure — reading any Secret outside `kube-system` in any tenant namespace (database credentials, cloud/KMS keys, TLS private keys), independent of any workload ServiceAccount permissions.\n- Workload tampering or destructio","public_affected_ranges":["< 1.0.3"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-2cb4c085099b084d6a3a176ff54f3fe5"],"technology":"github.com/openchoreo/openchoreo","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\nThe OpenChoreo control-plane cluster-gateway exposes internal management APIs (`/api/proxy/`, `/api/exec/`, `/api/wirelogs/`) that tunnel requests through to connected data planes' Kubernetes APIs, but the internal listener authenticates no caller. Its request validator permits mutating HTTP methods and reads of Secrets in tenant namespaces (only kube-system Secrets are blocked), so although the client library documents these requests as \"read-only,\" the server enforces no such restriction. Any party able to reach the internal listener can — with no client certificate or token — read Secrets in any tenant namespace, create/modify/delete workloads, and exec into pods across every connected data plane.\n\n### Impact\n\nAn attacker with network access to the cluster-gateway internal listener obtains tunneled access to every connected data plane's Kubernetes API with no caller-level access control. Across all connected data planes, this allows:\n\n- Secret disclosure — reading any Secret outside `kube-system` in any tenant namespace (database credentials, cloud/KMS keys, TLS private keys), independent of any workload ServiceAccount permissions.\n- Workload tampering or destructio","public_affected_ranges":[">= 1.1.0, < 1.1.3"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-2cb4c085099b084d6a3a176ff54f3fe5"],"technology":"github.com/openchoreo/openchoreo","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\nThe OpenChoreo control-plane cluster-gateway exposes internal management APIs (`/api/proxy/`, `/api/exec/`, `/api/wirelogs/`) that tunnel requests through to connected data planes' Kubernetes APIs, but the internal listener authenticates no caller. Its request validator permits mutating HTTP methods and reads of Secrets in tenant namespaces (only kube-system Secrets are blocked), so although the client library documents these requests as \"read-only,\" the server enforces no such restriction. Any party able to reach the internal listener can — with no client certificate or token — read Secrets in any tenant namespace, create/modify/delete workloads, and exec into pods across every connected data plane.\n\n### Impact\n\nAn attacker with network access to the cluster-gateway internal listener obtains tunneled access to every connected data plane's Kubernetes API with no caller-level access control. Across all connected data planes, this allows:\n\n- Secret disclosure — reading any Secret outside `kube-system` in any tenant namespace (database credentials, cloud/KMS keys, TLS private keys), independent of any workload ServiceAccount permissions.\n- Workload tampering or destructio","public_affected_ranges":[">= 1.2.0-rc.1, < 1.2.0-rc.2"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-02T10:00:37.194Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-04T21:41:40.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-09-04T21:41:38.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-02T02:20:52.377Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}