{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00013996","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Nodemailer: Recipient-domain validation bypass via RFC 5322 comment mis-parsing leads to email delivery to an attacker-controlled domain","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-cc9r-2j5m-2m83"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for nodemailer. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-2ec7c95666c709a10fc45e6eedb3c27b"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-09-08T21:32:53.000Z","value":"6.5 medium","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-2ec7c95666c709a10fc45e6eedb3c27b"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-2ec7c95666c709a10fc45e6eedb3c27b","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-cc9r-2j5m-2m83","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-cc9r-2j5m-2m83","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T22:54:12.705Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-2ec7c95666c709a10fc45e6eedb3c27b"],"technology":"nodemailer","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\nNodemailer's email-address parser treats an **RFC 5322 comment** `( ... )` inside the domain as a point to **concatenate** the surrounding text, rather than as folding whitespace (CFWS) that **terminates** the domain. Consequently a recipient address such as `user@good-corp.com(x)evil.com` is parsed and **delivered to `good-corp.comevil.com`** (registrable domain `comevil.com`, attacker‑controlled), while a conformant RFC 5322 parser terminates the domain at the comment and reads `good-corp.com`.\n\nAn application that decides *whether it is allowed to email a recipient* by parsing/validating the recipient's domain — with a strict RFC 5322 parser (used without inspecting parse defects) or with a naive prefix/substring allow‑list — and then hands the raw address to Nodemailer for delivery, can be induced to send mail to a domain the attacker controls. This is an **Interpretation Conflict (CWE‑436)**, the same class as CVE‑2025‑13033, reached through the RFC 5322 *comment* construct (the \"Comments\" technique in PortSwigger's *Splitting the email atom* research, which produced a Postfix fix).\n\nSeverity is **Moderate**: exploitation requires the app's domain check to disagre","public_affected_ranges":[">= 6.9.16, < 9.1.0"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-02T10:00:37.195Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-08T21:32:53.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-09-08T21:32:51.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-01T22:54:12.705Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}