{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00014060","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Capsule: Tenant owner bypasses Capsule's forbidden namespace/service/node label and annotation enforcement","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-gjw4-3v3v-rqxg","CVE-2026-61672"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for github.com/projectcapsule/capsule. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-3a8fdc2bbf095d5af79ff30c2622faed"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-09-18T17:14:32.000Z","value":"7.1 high","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-3a8fdc2bbf095d5af79ff30c2622faed"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-3a8fdc2bbf095d5af79ff30c2622faed","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-gjw4-3v3v-rqxg","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-gjw4-3v3v-rqxg","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T14:29:49.409Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-3a8fdc2bbf095d5af79ff30c2622faed"],"technology":"github.com/projectcapsule/capsule","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nCapsule lets a cluster administrator forbid specific metadata keys that tenant owners must not place on their own resources: `Tenant.spec.namespaceOptions.forbiddenLabels` / `forbiddenAnnotations` (namespaces), `Tenant.spec.serviceOptions.forbiddenLabels` / `forbiddenAnnotations` (Services), and the cluster-wide forbidden worker-node labels/annotations. These lists are an isolation control — they exist to stop a tenant owner from setting metadata that other controllers or admission plugins key on (Pod Security Admission labels, `kubernetes.io/metadata.name`, LoadBalancer/externalIP service annotations, scheduler annotations, vendor labels that grant network reach, etc.). The validating webhooks enforce them through `api.ValidateForbidden`, which calls `ForbiddenListSpec.ExactMatch(key)` for every key the tenant submits.\n\n`ExactMatch` is broken. It sorts the denied list **case-insensitively** (`sort.SliceStable` with a `strings.ToLower` comparator) and then performs a **byte-order binary search** (`sort.SearchStrings`) over the result. `sort.SearchStrings` is only correct on a slice sorted in plain byte-ascending order. Whenever the denied list contains an entry whose ca","public_affected_ranges":["<= 0.13.6"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-02T10:00:37.202Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-18T17:14:32.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-09-18T17:14:31.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-01T14:29:49.409Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}