{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00014086","kind":"vulnerability","title":"RabbitMQ amqp091-go: Consumer Message Flooding via Signed-to-Unsigned Integer Casting in Qos Configuration","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-rm6m-hrcw-jw33","CVE-2026-77406"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for github.com/rabbitmq/amqp091-go. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-42ca6156408871fb40ae7f8834eb5880"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-42ca6156408871fb40ae7f8834eb5880","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-rm6m-hrcw-jw33","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-rm6m-hrcw-jw33","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T19:09:30.244Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-42ca6156408871fb40ae7f8834eb5880"],"technology":"github.com/rabbitmq/amqp091-go","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\nA logic and resource exhaustion vulnerability exists in the AMQP client's Quality of Service (`Qos`) configuration method. The `Qos` function accepts signed integers (`int`) for the `prefetchCount` and `prefetchSize` parameters but casts them directly to unsigned integers (`uint16` and `uint32`, respectively) when formatting the wire-level frame.\n\nIf a developer passes a negative integer (such as `-1`) to these parameters—frequently intended as a sentinel value meaning \"no change\" or \"no limit\"—the application performs an implicit signed-to-unsigned conversion. This wraps the values to their absolute maximum limit ($65535$ and $4294967295$). Consequently, a consumer expecting restricted message delivery rates is suddenly flooded with an unlimited volume of messages, potentially exhausting memory resources and crashing the application.\n\n---\n\n## Vulnerability Details\n\n### Mechanism\nThe bug manifests during the structural assignment inside the channel's `Qos` method:\n\n```go\n// channel.go:795-796\nPrefetchCount: uint16(prefetchCount),  // -1 wraps to 65535\nPrefetchSize:  uint32(prefetchSize),   // -1 wraps to 4294967295\n```\n\nIn Go, converting a negative signed integer to an u","public_affected_ranges":["< 1.13.0"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-02T10:00:37.205Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-17T17:04:07.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-09-17T17:04:05.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-01T19:09:30.244Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}