{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00014095","kind":"vulnerability","title":"xmldom: Element name injection via createElement() bypasses requireWellFormed","revision":2,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-w2rr-34g9-rvrj","CVE-2026-83607"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for @xmldom/xmldom, @xmldom/xmldom, xmldom. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-235bf5942a1c2779bcd52691ef4fa1ce"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-11-03T12:00:27.000Z","value":"0.612%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.49349. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-235bf5942a1c2779bcd52691ef4fa1ce"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-448c67f2701de3bd31942451e5abebd8","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-w2rr-34g9-rvrj","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-w2rr-34g9-rvrj","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-02T02:20:31.767Z"},{"id":"sr-235bf5942a1c2779bcd52691ef4fa1ce","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-83607","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-11-03T17:45:16.083Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-448c67f2701de3bd31942451e5abebd8"],"technology":"@xmldom/xmldom","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`Document.createElement()` in `@xmldom/xmldom` accepts arbitrary strings as the `tagName` parameter with zero validation. The serializer emits the tag name verbatim into XML/HTML output. Critically, the `requireWellFormed: true` serializer option — the recommended mitigation from CVE-2026-41672, CVE-2026-41674, and CVE-2026-34601 — did NOT catch this, making it a bypass of the existing security controls.\n\nAn attacker who controls the element name string can inject arbitrary attributes (including event handlers) into the serialized output, leading to XSS when the output is consumed by a browser or downstream parser.\n\n## Details\n\n`Document.createElement()` accepts any string as `tagName` and stores it directly on the element node without validation. When the document is later serialized via `XMLSerializer.serializeToString()`, the serializer emits the `tagName` verbatim into the output.\n\nThe XML specification requires element names to conform to the `Name` production. The existing `createAttributeNS()` and `createElementNS()` methods validate qualified names against an anchored name/`QName` pattern, but `createElement()` bypasses this entirely, and the `requireWellFormed:","public_affected_ranges":[">= 0.9.0, <= 0.9.10"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-448c67f2701de3bd31942451e5abebd8"],"technology":"@xmldom/xmldom","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`Document.createElement()` in `@xmldom/xmldom` accepts arbitrary strings as the `tagName` parameter with zero validation. The serializer emits the tag name verbatim into XML/HTML output. Critically, the `requireWellFormed: true` serializer option — the recommended mitigation from CVE-2026-41672, CVE-2026-41674, and CVE-2026-34601 — did NOT catch this, making it a bypass of the existing security controls.\n\nAn attacker who controls the element name string can inject arbitrary attributes (including event handlers) into the serialized output, leading to XSS when the output is consumed by a browser or downstream parser.\n\n## Details\n\n`Document.createElement()` accepts any string as `tagName` and stores it directly on the element node without validation. When the document is later serialized via `XMLSerializer.serializeToString()`, the serializer emits the `tagName` verbatim into the output.\n\nThe XML specification requires element names to conform to the `Name` production. The existing `createAttributeNS()` and `createElementNS()` methods validate qualified names against an anchored name/`QName` pattern, but `createElement()` bypasses this entirely, and the `requireWellFormed:","public_affected_ranges":[">= 0.7.0, <= 0.8.13"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-448c67f2701de3bd31942451e5abebd8"],"technology":"xmldom","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`Document.createElement()` in `@xmldom/xmldom` accepts arbitrary strings as the `tagName` parameter with zero validation. The serializer emits the tag name verbatim into XML/HTML output. Critically, the `requireWellFormed: true` serializer option — the recommended mitigation from CVE-2026-41672, CVE-2026-41674, and CVE-2026-34601 — did NOT catch this, making it a bypass of the existing security controls.\n\nAn attacker who controls the element name string can inject arbitrary attributes (including event handlers) into the serialized output, leading to XSS when the output is consumed by a browser or downstream parser.\n\n## Details\n\n`Document.createElement()` accepts any string as `tagName` and stores it directly on the element node without validation. When the document is later serialized via `XMLSerializer.serializeToString()`, the serializer emits the `tagName` verbatim into the output.\n\nThe XML specification requires element names to conform to the `Name` production. The existing `createAttributeNS()` and `createElementNS()` methods validate qualified names against an anchored name/`QName` pattern, but `createElement()` bypasses this entirely, and the `requireWellFormed:","public_affected_ranges":["<= 0.6.0"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-08T19:53:33.521Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-08T20:31:09.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-09-08T20:31:08.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-02T02:20:31.767Z"},{"id":"NVI-00014095","kind":"vulnerability","title":"xmldom: Element name injection via createElement() bypasses requireWellFormed","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-w2rr-34g9-rvrj","CVE-2026-83607"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for @xmldom/xmldom, @xmldom/xmldom, xmldom. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-448c67f2701de3bd31942451e5abebd8"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-448c67f2701de3bd31942451e5abebd8","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-w2rr-34g9-rvrj","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-w2rr-34g9-rvrj","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-02T02:20:31.767Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-448c67f2701de3bd31942451e5abebd8"],"technology":"@xmldom/xmldom","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`Document.createElement()` in `@xmldom/xmldom` accepts arbitrary strings as the `tagName` parameter with zero validation. The serializer emits the tag name verbatim into XML/HTML output. Critically, the `requireWellFormed: true` serializer option — the recommended mitigation from CVE-2026-41672, CVE-2026-41674, and CVE-2026-34601 — did NOT catch this, making it a bypass of the existing security controls.\n\nAn attacker who controls the element name string can inject arbitrary attributes (including event handlers) into the serialized output, leading to XSS when the output is consumed by a browser or downstream parser.\n\n## Details\n\n`Document.createElement()` accepts any string as `tagName` and stores it directly on the element node without validation. When the document is later serialized via `XMLSerializer.serializeToString()`, the serializer emits the `tagName` verbatim into the output.\n\nThe XML specification requires element names to conform to the `Name` production. The existing `createAttributeNS()` and `createElementNS()` methods validate qualified names against an anchored name/`QName` pattern, but `createElement()` bypasses this entirely, and the `requireWellFormed:","public_affected_ranges":[">= 0.9.0, <= 0.9.10"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-448c67f2701de3bd31942451e5abebd8"],"technology":"@xmldom/xmldom","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`Document.createElement()` in `@xmldom/xmldom` accepts arbitrary strings as the `tagName` parameter with zero validation. The serializer emits the tag name verbatim into XML/HTML output. Critically, the `requireWellFormed: true` serializer option — the recommended mitigation from CVE-2026-41672, CVE-2026-41674, and CVE-2026-34601 — did NOT catch this, making it a bypass of the existing security controls.\n\nAn attacker who controls the element name string can inject arbitrary attributes (including event handlers) into the serialized output, leading to XSS when the output is consumed by a browser or downstream parser.\n\n## Details\n\n`Document.createElement()` accepts any string as `tagName` and stores it directly on the element node without validation. When the document is later serialized via `XMLSerializer.serializeToString()`, the serializer emits the `tagName` verbatim into the output.\n\nThe XML specification requires element names to conform to the `Name` production. The existing `createAttributeNS()` and `createElementNS()` methods validate qualified names against an anchored name/`QName` pattern, but `createElement()` bypasses this entirely, and the `requireWellFormed:","public_affected_ranges":[">= 0.7.0, <= 0.8.13"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-448c67f2701de3bd31942451e5abebd8"],"technology":"xmldom","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`Document.createElement()` in `@xmldom/xmldom` accepts arbitrary strings as the `tagName` parameter with zero validation. The serializer emits the tag name verbatim into XML/HTML output. Critically, the `requireWellFormed: true` serializer option — the recommended mitigation from CVE-2026-41672, CVE-2026-41674, and CVE-2026-34601 — did NOT catch this, making it a bypass of the existing security controls.\n\nAn attacker who controls the element name string can inject arbitrary attributes (including event handlers) into the serialized output, leading to XSS when the output is consumed by a browser or downstream parser.\n\n## Details\n\n`Document.createElement()` accepts any string as `tagName` and stores it directly on the element node without validation. When the document is later serialized via `XMLSerializer.serializeToString()`, the serializer emits the `tagName` verbatim into the output.\n\nThe XML specification requires element names to conform to the `Name` production. The existing `createAttributeNS()` and `createElementNS()` methods validate qualified names against an anchored name/`QName` pattern, but `createElement()` bypasses this entirely, and the `requireWellFormed:","public_affected_ranges":["<= 0.6.0"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-02T10:00:37.206Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-08T20:31:09.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-09-08T20:31:08.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-02T02:20:31.767Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}