{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00014096","kind":"vulnerability","title":"@hono/oauth-providers: OAuth state check fails open on omitted state, enabling login CSRF and forced account linking","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-fm3f-ch8h-qw8q","CVE-2026-81888"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for @hono/oauth-providers. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-44e2b89f4e3b4457a99bbe954dccdf18"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-08-31T20:30:51.000Z","value":"5.4 medium","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-44e2b89f4e3b4457a99bbe954dccdf18"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-44e2b89f4e3b4457a99bbe954dccdf18","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-fm3f-ch8h-qw8q","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-fm3f-ch8h-qw8q","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-02T02:21:58.521Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-44e2b89f4e3b4457a99bbe954dccdf18"],"technology":"@hono/oauth-providers","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\nThe built-in social login providers accept an OAuth callback even when the `state` value is absent on both sides, so the anti-CSRF check passes for a callback that never came from a genuine login attempt. This defeats the `state`-based CSRF protection under default usage.\n\n### Details\n\nThe `state` check treated two absent values as a match, so a callback that omits `state` — and for which no `state` was ever stored — was allowed to redeem the authorization code. Hono's `csrf()` middleware does not help: it only inspects form-style requests, while the OAuth callback is a top-level `GET` navigation it treats as safe.\n\nThis affects the `google`, `github`, `facebook`, `discord`, `twitch`, `linkedin`, and `msentra` providers. The `x` (Twitter) provider is not exploitable due to its PKCE binding.\n\n### Impact\n\nAn attacker can make a victim's browser complete an OAuth callback that binds the attacker's identity instead of the victim's, leading to login CSRF (the victim silently acts inside the attacker's account) or forced account linking (the attacker's identity is linked to the victim's account, enabling later sign-in as the victim). Affects applications using an affected pr","public_affected_ranges":["< 0.8.6"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-02T10:00:37.206Z","source_updated_at":"2026-08-31T20:30:51.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-08-31T20:30:50.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-02T02:21:58.521Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}