{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00014111","kind":"vulnerability","title":"mppx: Gas Draining with access list","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-vc9j-9wph-qghj","CVE-2026-63628"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for mppx. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-491fd7190d6e2d1f58e5d1cd2b1f3755"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-491fd7190d6e2d1f58e5d1cd2b1f3755","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-vc9j-9wph-qghj","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-vc9j-9wph-qghj","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T14:29:31.527Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-491fd7190d6e2d1f58e5d1cd2b1f3755"],"technology":"mppx","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Details\nWhen the server acts as the fee_payer, `mppx` 0.6.27 copies the client-supplied EIP-2930 access list verbatim into the cosigned fee-payer transaction. The TypeScript SDK's fee-payer cosigning path accepts any `access_list` the client includes in the 0x78 `FeePayerEnvelope` without inspecting its length or contents.\n\nAccess list gas is charged **intrinsically** — before any opcode executes — regardless of whether the listed addresses are ever touched.\n\nAn attacker submits a valid `transferWithMemo` alongside fabricated address-only access list entries. The server validates calldata and gas parameters but never inspects `access_list` length. It cosigns and broadcasts a transaction that costs the fee-payer wallet `N × 2,400` extra gas per request with no corresponding work performed on-chain.\n\nAt the default of 180 entries and 100 Gwei `max_fee_per_gas`, this inflates the fee-payer cost from the normal ~51,287 gas to ~483,287 gas — a **9.4× multiplier** — while staying within the `FeePayerPolicy` cap of 500K gas, the Node.js 16 KB header limit, and the Moderato RPC's `eth_call` simulation budget (verified empirically at 180 entries).\n\n### PoC\nThe PoC is provided below. It ","public_affected_ranges":["< 0.8.2"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-02T10:00:37.208Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-22T20:34:21.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-09-22T20:34:19.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-01T14:29:31.527Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}