{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00014119","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Angular: Sanitization bypass via directive host bindings on concrete host elements in @angular/core and @angular/compiler","revision":2,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-hh8m-fm6v-7cvg","CVE-2026-88057"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for @angular/core, @angular/compiler, @angular/core, @angular/compiler, @angular/core. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-11d1f41a1dff2dfcd9dc003a536cfbf5"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-11-03T12:00:27.000Z","value":"0.372%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.31229. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-11d1f41a1dff2dfcd9dc003a536cfbf5"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-4bde00c2e21ad1d0bd6afda599db9a70","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-hh8m-fm6v-7cvg","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-hh8m-fm6v-7cvg","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T22:54:05.264Z"},{"id":"sr-11d1f41a1dff2dfcd9dc003a536cfbf5","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-88057","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-11-03T17:45:16.085Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-4bde00c2e21ad1d0bd6afda599db9a70"],"technology":"@angular/core","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"Angular automatically sanitizes untrusted values bound to security-sensitive DOM sinks (such as `href`, `src`, `action`, `xlink:href`, and `data`) to protect against Cross-Site Scripting (XSS).\n\nPrior to the fix, the Angular compiler determined the `SecurityContext` for directive host bindings (`host: {'[attr.href]': 'value'}` or `@HostBinding('attr.href')`) based solely on the declaring directive or component selector at compile time, rather than the concrete host element that the directive was applied to.\n\nWhen a directive with a security-sensitive host binding was applied to a different concrete host element—such as through:\n- `hostDirectives` composition,\n- Class inheritance of host bindings,\n- Dynamic component instantiation (`createComponent` with custom `hostElement` or dynamic directives),\n- Elements with SVG/MathML namespaces (e.g. ``, ``), or\n- Elements using tag-neutral selectors (e.g. `:not(...)`),\n\nthe compiler either failed to associate a sanitizer with the host binding or attached an incorrect security context. As a result, untrusted inputs (e.g. `javascript:...` URLs) bound via the host binding would be written to the DOM attribute without passing throu","public_affected_ranges":[">= 22.0.0, < 22.1.0"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-4bde00c2e21ad1d0bd6afda599db9a70"],"technology":"@angular/compiler","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"Angular automatically sanitizes untrusted values bound to security-sensitive DOM sinks (such as `href`, `src`, `action`, `xlink:href`, and `data`) to protect against Cross-Site Scripting (XSS).\n\nPrior to the fix, the Angular compiler determined the `SecurityContext` for directive host bindings (`host: {'[attr.href]': 'value'}` or `@HostBinding('attr.href')`) based solely on the declaring directive or component selector at compile time, rather than the concrete host element that the directive was applied to.\n\nWhen a directive with a security-sensitive host binding was applied to a different concrete host element—such as through:\n- `hostDirectives` composition,\n- Class inheritance of host bindings,\n- Dynamic component instantiation (`createComponent` with custom `hostElement` or dynamic directives),\n- Elements with SVG/MathML namespaces (e.g. ``, ``), or\n- Elements using tag-neutral selectors (e.g. `:not(...)`),\n\nthe compiler either failed to associate a sanitizer with the host binding or attached an incorrect security context. As a result, untrusted inputs (e.g. `javascript:...` URLs) bound via the host binding would be written to the DOM attribute without passing throu","public_affected_ranges":[">= 22.0.0, < 22.1.0"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-4bde00c2e21ad1d0bd6afda599db9a70"],"technology":"@angular/core","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"Angular automatically sanitizes untrusted values bound to security-sensitive DOM sinks (such as `href`, `src`, `action`, `xlink:href`, and `data`) to protect against Cross-Site Scripting (XSS).\n\nPrior to the fix, the Angular compiler determined the `SecurityContext` for directive host bindings (`host: {'[attr.href]': 'value'}` or `@HostBinding('attr.href')`) based solely on the declaring directive or component selector at compile time, rather than the concrete host element that the directive was applied to.\n\nWhen a directive with a security-sensitive host binding was applied to a different concrete host element—such as through:\n- `hostDirectives` composition,\n- Class inheritance of host bindings,\n- Dynamic component instantiation (`createComponent` with custom `hostElement` or dynamic directives),\n- Elements with SVG/MathML namespaces (e.g. ``, ``), or\n- Elements using tag-neutral selectors (e.g. `:not(...)`),\n\nthe compiler either failed to associate a sanitizer with the host binding or attached an incorrect security context. As a result, untrusted inputs (e.g. `javascript:...` URLs) bound via the host binding would be written to the DOM attribute without passing throu","public_affected_ranges":[">= 21.0.0, < 21.2.20"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-4bde00c2e21ad1d0bd6afda599db9a70"],"technology":"@angular/compiler","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"Angular automatically sanitizes untrusted values bound to security-sensitive DOM sinks (such as `href`, `src`, `action`, `xlink:href`, and `data`) to protect against Cross-Site Scripting (XSS).\n\nPrior to the fix, the Angular compiler determined the `SecurityContext` for directive host bindings (`host: {'[attr.href]': 'value'}` or `@HostBinding('attr.href')`) based solely on the declaring directive or component selector at compile time, rather than the concrete host element that the directive was applied to.\n\nWhen a directive with a security-sensitive host binding was applied to a different concrete host element—such as through:\n- `hostDirectives` composition,\n- Class inheritance of host bindings,\n- Dynamic component instantiation (`createComponent` with custom `hostElement` or dynamic directives),\n- Elements with SVG/MathML namespaces (e.g. ``, ``), or\n- Elements using tag-neutral selectors (e.g. `:not(...)`),\n\nthe compiler either failed to associate a sanitizer with the host binding or attached an incorrect security context. As a result, untrusted inputs (e.g. `javascript:...` URLs) bound via the host binding would be written to the DOM attribute without passing throu","public_affected_ranges":[">= 21.0.0, < 21.2.20"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-4bde00c2e21ad1d0bd6afda599db9a70"],"technology":"@angular/core","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"Angular automatically sanitizes untrusted values bound to security-sensitive DOM sinks (such as `href`, `src`, `action`, `xlink:href`, and `data`) to protect against Cross-Site Scripting (XSS).\n\nPrior to the fix, the Angular compiler determined the `SecurityContext` for directive host bindings (`host: {'[attr.href]': 'value'}` or `@HostBinding('attr.href')`) based solely on the declaring directive or component selector at compile time, rather than the concrete host element that the directive was applied to.\n\nWhen a directive with a security-sensitive host binding was applied to a different concrete host element—such as through:\n- `hostDirectives` composition,\n- Class inheritance of host bindings,\n- Dynamic component instantiation (`createComponent` with custom `hostElement` or dynamic directives),\n- Elements with SVG/MathML namespaces (e.g. ``, ``), or\n- Elements using tag-neutral selectors (e.g. `:not(...)`),\n\nthe compiler either failed to associate a sanitizer with the host binding or attached an incorrect security context. As a result, untrusted inputs (e.g. `javascript:...` URLs) bound via the host binding would be written to the DOM attribute without passing throu","public_affected_ranges":[">= 20.0.0, < 20.3.28"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-4bde00c2e21ad1d0bd6afda599db9a70"],"technology":"@angular/compiler","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"Angular automatically sanitizes untrusted values bound to security-sensitive DOM sinks (such as `href`, `src`, `action`, `xlink:href`, and `data`) to protect against Cross-Site Scripting (XSS).\n\nPrior to the fix, the Angular compiler determined the `SecurityContext` for directive host bindings (`host: {'[attr.href]': 'value'}` or `@HostBinding('attr.href')`) based solely on the declaring directive or component selector at compile time, rather than the concrete host element that the directive was applied to.\n\nWhen a directive with a security-sensitive host binding was applied to a different concrete host element—such as through:\n- `hostDirectives` composition,\n- Class inheritance of host bindings,\n- Dynamic component instantiation (`createComponent` with custom `hostElement` or dynamic directives),\n- Elements with SVG/MathML namespaces (e.g. ``, ``), or\n- Elements using tag-neutral selectors (e.g. `:not(...)`),\n\nthe compiler either failed to associate a sanitizer with the host binding or attached an incorrect security context. As a result, untrusted inputs (e.g. `javascript:...` URLs) bound via the host binding would be written to the DOM attribute without passing throu","public_affected_ranges":[">= 20.0.0, < 20.3.28"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-4bde00c2e21ad1d0bd6afda599db9a70"],"technology":"@angular/core","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"Angular automatically sanitizes untrusted values bound to security-sensitive DOM sinks (such as `href`, `src`, `action`, `xlink:href`, and `data`) to protect against Cross-Site Scripting (XSS).\n\nPrior to the fix, the Angular compiler determined the `SecurityContext` for directive host bindings (`host: {'[attr.href]': 'value'}` or `@HostBinding('attr.href')`) based solely on the declaring directive or component selector at compile time, rather than the concrete host element that the directive was applied to.\n\nWhen a directive with a security-sensitive host binding was applied to a different concrete host element—such as through:\n- `hostDirectives` composition,\n- Class inheritance of host bindings,\n- Dynamic component instantiation (`createComponent` with custom `hostElement` or dynamic directives),\n- Elements with SVG/MathML namespaces (e.g. ``, ``), or\n- Elements using tag-neutral selectors (e.g. `:not(...)`),\n\nthe compiler either failed to associate a sanitizer with the host binding or attached an incorrect security context. As a result, untrusted inputs (e.g. `javascript:...` URLs) bound via the host binding would be written to the DOM attribute without passing throu","public_affected_ranges":["<= 19.2.25"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-4bde00c2e21ad1d0bd6afda599db9a70"],"technology":"@angular/compiler","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"Angular automatically sanitizes untrusted values bound to security-sensitive DOM sinks (such as `href`, `src`, `action`, `xlink:href`, and `data`) to protect against Cross-Site Scripting (XSS).\n\nPrior to the fix, the Angular compiler determined the `SecurityContext` for directive host bindings (`host: {'[attr.href]': 'value'}` or `@HostBinding('attr.href')`) based solely on the declaring directive or component selector at compile time, rather than the concrete host element that the directive was applied to.\n\nWhen a directive with a security-sensitive host binding was applied to a different concrete host element—such as through:\n- `hostDirectives` composition,\n- Class inheritance of host bindings,\n- Dynamic component instantiation (`createComponent` with custom `hostElement` or dynamic directives),\n- Elements with SVG/MathML namespaces (e.g. ``, ``), or\n- Elements using tag-neutral selectors (e.g. `:not(...)`),\n\nthe compiler either failed to associate a sanitizer with the host binding or attached an incorrect security context. As a result, untrusted inputs (e.g. `javascript:...` URLs) bound via the host binding would be written to the DOM attribute without passing throu","public_affected_ranges":["<= 19.2.25"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-06T00:29:57.304Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-10T20:18:03.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-09-10T20:18:02.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-01T22:54:05.264Z"},{"id":"NVI-00014119","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Angular: Sanitization bypass via directive host bindings on concrete host elements in @angular/core and @angular/compiler","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-hh8m-fm6v-7cvg","CVE-2026-88057"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for @angular/core, @angular/compiler, @angular/core, @angular/compiler, @angular/core. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-4bde00c2e21ad1d0bd6afda599db9a70"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-4bde00c2e21ad1d0bd6afda599db9a70","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-hh8m-fm6v-7cvg","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-hh8m-fm6v-7cvg","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T22:54:05.264Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-4bde00c2e21ad1d0bd6afda599db9a70"],"technology":"@angular/core","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"Angular automatically sanitizes untrusted values bound to security-sensitive DOM sinks (such as `href`, `src`, `action`, `xlink:href`, and `data`) to protect against Cross-Site Scripting (XSS).\n\nPrior to the fix, the Angular compiler determined the `SecurityContext` for directive host bindings (`host: {'[attr.href]': 'value'}` or `@HostBinding('attr.href')`) based solely on the declaring directive or component selector at compile time, rather than the concrete host element that the directive was applied to.\n\nWhen a directive with a security-sensitive host binding was applied to a different concrete host element—such as through:\n- `hostDirectives` composition,\n- Class inheritance of host bindings,\n- Dynamic component instantiation (`createComponent` with custom `hostElement` or dynamic directives),\n- Elements with SVG/MathML namespaces (e.g. ``, ``), or\n- Elements using tag-neutral selectors (e.g. `:not(...)`),\n\nthe compiler either failed to associate a sanitizer with the host binding or attached an incorrect security context. As a result, untrusted inputs (e.g. `javascript:...` URLs) bound via the host binding would be written to the DOM attribute without passing throu","public_affected_ranges":[">= 22.0.0, < 22.1.0"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-4bde00c2e21ad1d0bd6afda599db9a70"],"technology":"@angular/compiler","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"Angular automatically sanitizes untrusted values bound to security-sensitive DOM sinks (such as `href`, `src`, `action`, `xlink:href`, and `data`) to protect against Cross-Site Scripting (XSS).\n\nPrior to the fix, the Angular compiler determined the `SecurityContext` for directive host bindings (`host: {'[attr.href]': 'value'}` or `@HostBinding('attr.href')`) based solely on the declaring directive or component selector at compile time, rather than the concrete host element that the directive was applied to.\n\nWhen a directive with a security-sensitive host binding was applied to a different concrete host element—such as through:\n- `hostDirectives` composition,\n- Class inheritance of host bindings,\n- Dynamic component instantiation (`createComponent` with custom `hostElement` or dynamic directives),\n- Elements with SVG/MathML namespaces (e.g. ``, ``), or\n- Elements using tag-neutral selectors (e.g. `:not(...)`),\n\nthe compiler either failed to associate a sanitizer with the host binding or attached an incorrect security context. As a result, untrusted inputs (e.g. `javascript:...` URLs) bound via the host binding would be written to the DOM attribute without passing throu","public_affected_ranges":[">= 22.0.0, < 22.1.0"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-4bde00c2e21ad1d0bd6afda599db9a70"],"technology":"@angular/core","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"Angular automatically sanitizes untrusted values bound to security-sensitive DOM sinks (such as `href`, `src`, `action`, `xlink:href`, and `data`) to protect against Cross-Site Scripting (XSS).\n\nPrior to the fix, the Angular compiler determined the `SecurityContext` for directive host bindings (`host: {'[attr.href]': 'value'}` or `@HostBinding('attr.href')`) based solely on the declaring directive or component selector at compile time, rather than the concrete host element that the directive was applied to.\n\nWhen a directive with a security-sensitive host binding was applied to a different concrete host element—such as through:\n- `hostDirectives` composition,\n- Class inheritance of host bindings,\n- Dynamic component instantiation (`createComponent` with custom `hostElement` or dynamic directives),\n- Elements with SVG/MathML namespaces (e.g. ``, ``), or\n- Elements using tag-neutral selectors (e.g. `:not(...)`),\n\nthe compiler either failed to associate a sanitizer with the host binding or attached an incorrect security context. As a result, untrusted inputs (e.g. `javascript:...` URLs) bound via the host binding would be written to the DOM attribute without passing throu","public_affected_ranges":[">= 21.0.0, < 21.2.20"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-4bde00c2e21ad1d0bd6afda599db9a70"],"technology":"@angular/compiler","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"Angular automatically sanitizes untrusted values bound to security-sensitive DOM sinks (such as `href`, `src`, `action`, `xlink:href`, and `data`) to protect against Cross-Site Scripting (XSS).\n\nPrior to the fix, the Angular compiler determined the `SecurityContext` for directive host bindings (`host: {'[attr.href]': 'value'}` or `@HostBinding('attr.href')`) based solely on the declaring directive or component selector at compile time, rather than the concrete host element that the directive was applied to.\n\nWhen a directive with a security-sensitive host binding was applied to a different concrete host element—such as through:\n- `hostDirectives` composition,\n- Class inheritance of host bindings,\n- Dynamic component instantiation (`createComponent` with custom `hostElement` or dynamic directives),\n- Elements with SVG/MathML namespaces (e.g. ``, ``), or\n- Elements using tag-neutral selectors (e.g. `:not(...)`),\n\nthe compiler either failed to associate a sanitizer with the host binding or attached an incorrect security context. As a result, untrusted inputs (e.g. `javascript:...` URLs) bound via the host binding would be written to the DOM attribute without passing throu","public_affected_ranges":[">= 21.0.0, < 21.2.20"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-4bde00c2e21ad1d0bd6afda599db9a70"],"technology":"@angular/core","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"Angular automatically sanitizes untrusted values bound to security-sensitive DOM sinks (such as `href`, `src`, `action`, `xlink:href`, and `data`) to protect against Cross-Site Scripting (XSS).\n\nPrior to the fix, the Angular compiler determined the `SecurityContext` for directive host bindings (`host: {'[attr.href]': 'value'}` or `@HostBinding('attr.href')`) based solely on the declaring directive or component selector at compile time, rather than the concrete host element that the directive was applied to.\n\nWhen a directive with a security-sensitive host binding was applied to a different concrete host element—such as through:\n- `hostDirectives` composition,\n- Class inheritance of host bindings,\n- Dynamic component instantiation (`createComponent` with custom `hostElement` or dynamic directives),\n- Elements with SVG/MathML namespaces (e.g. ``, ``), or\n- Elements using tag-neutral selectors (e.g. `:not(...)`),\n\nthe compiler either failed to associate a sanitizer with the host binding or attached an incorrect security context. As a result, untrusted inputs (e.g. `javascript:...` URLs) bound via the host binding would be written to the DOM attribute without passing throu","public_affected_ranges":[">= 20.0.0, < 20.3.28"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-4bde00c2e21ad1d0bd6afda599db9a70"],"technology":"@angular/compiler","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"Angular automatically sanitizes untrusted values bound to security-sensitive DOM sinks (such as `href`, `src`, `action`, `xlink:href`, and `data`) to protect against Cross-Site Scripting (XSS).\n\nPrior to the fix, the Angular compiler determined the `SecurityContext` for directive host bindings (`host: {'[attr.href]': 'value'}` or `@HostBinding('attr.href')`) based solely on the declaring directive or component selector at compile time, rather than the concrete host element that the directive was applied to.\n\nWhen a directive with a security-sensitive host binding was applied to a different concrete host element—such as through:\n- `hostDirectives` composition,\n- Class inheritance of host bindings,\n- Dynamic component instantiation (`createComponent` with custom `hostElement` or dynamic directives),\n- Elements with SVG/MathML namespaces (e.g. ``, ``), or\n- Elements using tag-neutral selectors (e.g. `:not(...)`),\n\nthe compiler either failed to associate a sanitizer with the host binding or attached an incorrect security context. As a result, untrusted inputs (e.g. `javascript:...` URLs) bound via the host binding would be written to the DOM attribute without passing throu","public_affected_ranges":[">= 20.0.0, < 20.3.28"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-4bde00c2e21ad1d0bd6afda599db9a70"],"technology":"@angular/core","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"Angular automatically sanitizes untrusted values bound to security-sensitive DOM sinks (such as `href`, `src`, `action`, `xlink:href`, and `data`) to protect against Cross-Site Scripting (XSS).\n\nPrior to the fix, the Angular compiler determined the `SecurityContext` for directive host bindings (`host: {'[attr.href]': 'value'}` or `@HostBinding('attr.href')`) based solely on the declaring directive or component selector at compile time, rather than the concrete host element that the directive was applied to.\n\nWhen a directive with a security-sensitive host binding was applied to a different concrete host element—such as through:\n- `hostDirectives` composition,\n- Class inheritance of host bindings,\n- Dynamic component instantiation (`createComponent` with custom `hostElement` or dynamic directives),\n- Elements with SVG/MathML namespaces (e.g. ``, ``), or\n- Elements using tag-neutral selectors (e.g. `:not(...)`),\n\nthe compiler either failed to associate a sanitizer with the host binding or attached an incorrect security context. As a result, untrusted inputs (e.g. `javascript:...` URLs) bound via the host binding would be written to the DOM attribute without passing throu","public_affected_ranges":["<= 19.2.25"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-4bde00c2e21ad1d0bd6afda599db9a70"],"technology":"@angular/compiler","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"Angular automatically sanitizes untrusted values bound to security-sensitive DOM sinks (such as `href`, `src`, `action`, `xlink:href`, and `data`) to protect against Cross-Site Scripting (XSS).\n\nPrior to the fix, the Angular compiler determined the `SecurityContext` for directive host bindings (`host: {'[attr.href]': 'value'}` or `@HostBinding('attr.href')`) based solely on the declaring directive or component selector at compile time, rather than the concrete host element that the directive was applied to.\n\nWhen a directive with a security-sensitive host binding was applied to a different concrete host element—such as through:\n- `hostDirectives` composition,\n- Class inheritance of host bindings,\n- Dynamic component instantiation (`createComponent` with custom `hostElement` or dynamic directives),\n- Elements with SVG/MathML namespaces (e.g. ``, ``), or\n- Elements using tag-neutral selectors (e.g. `:not(...)`),\n\nthe compiler either failed to associate a sanitizer with the host binding or attached an incorrect security context. As a result, untrusted inputs (e.g. `javascript:...` URLs) bound via the host binding would be written to the DOM attribute without passing throu","public_affected_ranges":["<= 19.2.25"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-02T10:00:37.209Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-10T20:18:03.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-09-10T20:18:02.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-01T22:54:05.264Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}