{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00014125","kind":"vulnerability","title":"xmldom: Attribute name injection via setAttribute() bypasses requireWellFormed","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-4w3w-2rp5-g8jm","CVE-2026-83605"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for @xmldom/xmldom, @xmldom/xmldom, xmldom. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-4caa80de74df346b664295a0f2dc5a69"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-4caa80de74df346b664295a0f2dc5a69","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-4w3w-2rp5-g8jm","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-4w3w-2rp5-g8jm","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-02T02:20:31.767Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-4caa80de74df346b664295a0f2dc5a69"],"technology":"@xmldom/xmldom","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`Element.setAttribute()` in `@xmldom/xmldom` bypasses attribute name validation by calling the private `_createAttribute(name)` method, which performs no validation. The public `createAttribute()` method correctly validates names against an anchored `QName` pattern, but `setAttribute()` never uses it. The serializer escapes attribute *values* but trusts attribute *names*, allowing an attacker to inject additional attributes (including event handlers) into serialized output. The `requireWellFormed: true` option did not catch this.\n\n## Details\n\n`Element.setAttribute(name, value)` creates attribute nodes by calling the private `_createAttribute(name)` method, which performs no validation on the `name` parameter. In contrast, the public `Document.createAttribute(name)` method validates the name against the `QName` production before creating the attribute node.\n\nThe result is a two-tier validation system where the most commonly used API (`setAttribute`) takes the unvalidated path:\n\n- `doc.createAttribute(\"bad name\")` — throws `INVALID_CHARACTER_ERR` (correct).\n- `el.setAttribute(\"bad name\", \"value\")` — succeeds silently (vulnerable).\n\nThe serializer emits attribute names ver","public_affected_ranges":[">= 0.9.0, <= 0.9.10"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-4caa80de74df346b664295a0f2dc5a69"],"technology":"@xmldom/xmldom","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`Element.setAttribute()` in `@xmldom/xmldom` bypasses attribute name validation by calling the private `_createAttribute(name)` method, which performs no validation. The public `createAttribute()` method correctly validates names against an anchored `QName` pattern, but `setAttribute()` never uses it. The serializer escapes attribute *values* but trusts attribute *names*, allowing an attacker to inject additional attributes (including event handlers) into serialized output. The `requireWellFormed: true` option did not catch this.\n\n## Details\n\n`Element.setAttribute(name, value)` creates attribute nodes by calling the private `_createAttribute(name)` method, which performs no validation on the `name` parameter. In contrast, the public `Document.createAttribute(name)` method validates the name against the `QName` production before creating the attribute node.\n\nThe result is a two-tier validation system where the most commonly used API (`setAttribute`) takes the unvalidated path:\n\n- `doc.createAttribute(\"bad name\")` — throws `INVALID_CHARACTER_ERR` (correct).\n- `el.setAttribute(\"bad name\", \"value\")` — succeeds silently (vulnerable).\n\nThe serializer emits attribute names ver","public_affected_ranges":[">= 0.7.0, <= 0.8.13"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-4caa80de74df346b664295a0f2dc5a69"],"technology":"xmldom","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\n`Element.setAttribute()` in `@xmldom/xmldom` bypasses attribute name validation by calling the private `_createAttribute(name)` method, which performs no validation. The public `createAttribute()` method correctly validates names against an anchored `QName` pattern, but `setAttribute()` never uses it. The serializer escapes attribute *values* but trusts attribute *names*, allowing an attacker to inject additional attributes (including event handlers) into serialized output. The `requireWellFormed: true` option did not catch this.\n\n## Details\n\n`Element.setAttribute(name, value)` creates attribute nodes by calling the private `_createAttribute(name)` method, which performs no validation on the `name` parameter. In contrast, the public `Document.createAttribute(name)` method validates the name against the `QName` production before creating the attribute node.\n\nThe result is a two-tier validation system where the most commonly used API (`setAttribute`) takes the unvalidated path:\n\n- `doc.createAttribute(\"bad name\")` — throws `INVALID_CHARACTER_ERR` (correct).\n- `el.setAttribute(\"bad name\", \"value\")` — succeeds silently (vulnerable).\n\nThe serializer emits attribute names ver","public_affected_ranges":["<= 0.6.0"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-02T10:00:37.210Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-08T20:30:52.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-09-08T20:30:51.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-02T02:20:31.767Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}