{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00014152","kind":"vulnerability","title":"PraisonAI: [Path Traversal] agent tools escape the configured workspace via symlinks","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-ch89-h4r2-c8f8","CVE-2026-55540"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for PraisonAI. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-50a3ad9506ed4027fc94e749177c9db7"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-08-25T14:54:57.000Z","value":"7.1 high","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-50a3ad9506ed4027fc94e749177c9db7"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-50a3ad9506ed4027fc94e749177c9db7","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-ch89-h4r2-c8f8","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-ch89-h4r2-c8f8","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-02T09:56:37.775Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-50a3ad9506ed4027fc94e749177c9db7"],"technology":"PraisonAI","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\nPraisonAI's `praisonai.code` tool wrappers (exported as `CODE_TOOLS` for agents) expose a `workspace` setting that the module itself treats as a path-traversal **security boundary** — `read_file`, `write_file`, `apply_diff`, and `search_replace` explicitly call `is_path_within_directory()` and return `\"… is outside the workspace\"` on violations. That boundary is enforced **unsoundly and inconsistently**:\n \n1. The containment helper uses `os.path.abspath()`, not `realpath()`/`Path.resolve()`. A symlink located **inside** the workspace whose target is **outside** has an `abspath()` that is still inside the workspace, so it passes the check while `open()` follows the link. This bypasses read, write, apply_diff, and search_replace (CWE-59).\n2. `list_files()` resolves `path` against the workspace but **never** calls the containment helper at all — `../` and absolute paths escape directly (CWE-22).\n3. `execute_command()` takes a `workspace` argument documented \"for security validation\" but performs **no** `cwd` containment check; `code_execute_command()` resolves a relative `cwd` against the workspace and also never validates it (and never even passes `workspace` to the low-l","public_affected_ranges":["< 4.6.58"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-02T10:00:37.214Z","source_updated_at":"2026-08-25T14:54:57.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-08-25T14:54:56.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-02T09:56:37.775Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}