{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00014183","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Kargo has Open Redirect in UI OIDC Login Flow via redirectTo Query Parameter","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-g7gw-m874-7rmf","CVE-2026-42350"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for github.com/akuity/kargo, github.com/akuity/kargo, github.com/akuity/kargo, github.com/akuity/kargo. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-5678e6fb83efe886fb920d3e1530b2c1"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-5678e6fb83efe886fb920d3e1530b2c1","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-g7gw-m874-7rmf","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-g7gw-m874-7rmf","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-02T09:56:23.004Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-5678e6fb83efe886fb920d3e1530b2c1"],"technology":"github.com/akuity/kargo","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nThe Kargo UI reads a `redirectTo` query parameter on the `/login` and `/token-renew` routes and, following a successful OIDC authentication, uses its value as the destination for client-side navigation. The parameter is treated as a path string but is not constrained to targets within the UI's own origin. Protocol-relative values (e.g. `//attacker.example.com`) and values using a backslash prefix (e.g. `/\\attacker.example.com`) are accepted and result in navigation to an external origin.\n\nAn attacker can exploit this by crafting a URL of the form `https://kargo.example.com/login?redirectTo=/token-renew?redirectTo=/\\attacker.example.com` and delivering it to a victim through any channel that permits link sharing. When the victim follows the link and signs in to Kargo, the browser is redirected to the attacker-controlled origin. Because the initial URL resolves to the legitimate Kargo host and the user is genuinely authenticated in the process, the redirect inherits the perceived trust of the user's own Kargo instance.\n\nThe principal risk is that such a redirect can serve as a stepping stone for credentials phishing. The attacker-controlled page can present a UI resemblin","public_affected_ranges":["< 1.7.10"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-5678e6fb83efe886fb920d3e1530b2c1"],"technology":"github.com/akuity/kargo","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nThe Kargo UI reads a `redirectTo` query parameter on the `/login` and `/token-renew` routes and, following a successful OIDC authentication, uses its value as the destination for client-side navigation. The parameter is treated as a path string but is not constrained to targets within the UI's own origin. Protocol-relative values (e.g. `//attacker.example.com`) and values using a backslash prefix (e.g. `/\\attacker.example.com`) are accepted and result in navigation to an external origin.\n\nAn attacker can exploit this by crafting a URL of the form `https://kargo.example.com/login?redirectTo=/token-renew?redirectTo=/\\attacker.example.com` and delivering it to a victim through any channel that permits link sharing. When the victim follows the link and signs in to Kargo, the browser is redirected to the attacker-controlled origin. Because the initial URL resolves to the legitimate Kargo host and the user is genuinely authenticated in the process, the redirect inherits the perceived trust of the user's own Kargo instance.\n\nThe principal risk is that such a redirect can serve as a stepping stone for credentials phishing. The attacker-controlled page can present a UI resemblin","public_affected_ranges":[">= 1.8.0, < 1.8.13"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-5678e6fb83efe886fb920d3e1530b2c1"],"technology":"github.com/akuity/kargo","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nThe Kargo UI reads a `redirectTo` query parameter on the `/login` and `/token-renew` routes and, following a successful OIDC authentication, uses its value as the destination for client-side navigation. The parameter is treated as a path string but is not constrained to targets within the UI's own origin. Protocol-relative values (e.g. `//attacker.example.com`) and values using a backslash prefix (e.g. `/\\attacker.example.com`) are accepted and result in navigation to an external origin.\n\nAn attacker can exploit this by crafting a URL of the form `https://kargo.example.com/login?redirectTo=/token-renew?redirectTo=/\\attacker.example.com` and delivering it to a victim through any channel that permits link sharing. When the victim follows the link and signs in to Kargo, the browser is redirected to the attacker-controlled origin. Because the initial URL resolves to the legitimate Kargo host and the user is genuinely authenticated in the process, the redirect inherits the perceived trust of the user's own Kargo instance.\n\nThe principal risk is that such a redirect can serve as a stepping stone for credentials phishing. The attacker-controlled page can present a UI resemblin","public_affected_ranges":[">= 1.9.0, < 1.9.8"]},{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-5678e6fb83efe886fb920d3e1530b2c1"],"technology":"github.com/akuity/kargo","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## Summary\n\nThe Kargo UI reads a `redirectTo` query parameter on the `/login` and `/token-renew` routes and, following a successful OIDC authentication, uses its value as the destination for client-side navigation. The parameter is treated as a path string but is not constrained to targets within the UI's own origin. Protocol-relative values (e.g. `//attacker.example.com`) and values using a backslash prefix (e.g. `/\\attacker.example.com`) are accepted and result in navigation to an external origin.\n\nAn attacker can exploit this by crafting a URL of the form `https://kargo.example.com/login?redirectTo=/token-renew?redirectTo=/\\attacker.example.com` and delivering it to a victim through any channel that permits link sharing. When the victim follows the link and signs in to Kargo, the browser is redirected to the attacker-controlled origin. Because the initial URL resolves to the legitimate Kargo host and the user is genuinely authenticated in the process, the redirect inherits the perceived trust of the user's own Kargo instance.\n\nThe principal risk is that such a redirect can serve as a stepping stone for credentials phishing. The attacker-controlled page can present a UI resemblin","public_affected_ranges":[">= 1.10.0, < 1.10.2"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-02T10:00:37.221Z","source_updated_at":"2026-08-27T17:17:37.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-08-27T17:17:36.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-02T09:56:23.004Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}