{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00014198","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Prowler: SAML Domain Claiming Enables Cross-Tenant Account Takeover","revision":2,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-h8m9-jgf8-vwvp","CVE-2026-59151"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for prowler-cloud. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-05d5c8e5a72f74861fa2c0645c582194"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-09-11T21:38:25.000Z","value":"9.6 critical","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-593801fcad56955c303ef5e1fee8701d"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-11-04T12:03:12.000Z","value":"0.534%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.45194. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-05d5c8e5a72f74861fa2c0645c582194"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-593801fcad56955c303ef5e1fee8701d","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-h8m9-jgf8-vwvp","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-h8m9-jgf8-vwvp","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T22:54:05.264Z"},{"id":"sr-05d5c8e5a72f74861fa2c0645c582194","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-59151","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-11-04T23:33:33.054Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-593801fcad56955c303ef5e1fee8701d"],"technology":"prowler-cloud","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## SAML Tenant Binding Enables Cross-Tenant Account Takeover\n\n### Summary\n\nProwler's SAML authentication flow trusted the email domain asserted in a SAMLResponse when deciding which tenant should receive the final token. A malicious tenant with its own SAML configuration and a self-controlled IdP could complete a valid SAML flow for its own configured domain, while asserting an email address from another configured domain.\n\nIn the vulnerable flow, the ACS finish logic later derived the tenant from the asserted email domain instead of binding token issuance to the tenant associated with the validated SAML configuration. This could cause a token to be issued for the wrong tenant.\n\nThe attacker does not generally need to claim the victim's email domain. If the victim tenant already has SAML configured for that domain, another tenant cannot claim it because `SAMLConfiguration.email_domain` and `SAMLDomainIndex.email_domain` are globally unique.\n\n### Details\nThe confirmed root cause is in the SAML ACS finish and token issuance flow. The flow selected a SAML configuration through the ACS route, but later recalculated the tenant from the asserted user email domain:\n\n```python\nemail_domain","public_affected_ranges":["< 5.30.3"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-06T07:24:11.260Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-11T21:38:25.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-09-11T21:38:24.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-01T22:54:05.264Z"},{"id":"NVI-00014198","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Prowler: SAML Domain Claiming Enables Cross-Tenant Account Takeover","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-h8m9-jgf8-vwvp","CVE-2026-59151"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for prowler-cloud. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-593801fcad56955c303ef5e1fee8701d"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-09-11T21:38:25.000Z","value":"9.6 critical","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-593801fcad56955c303ef5e1fee8701d"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-593801fcad56955c303ef5e1fee8701d","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-h8m9-jgf8-vwvp","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-h8m9-jgf8-vwvp","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-01T22:54:05.264Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-593801fcad56955c303ef5e1fee8701d"],"technology":"prowler-cloud","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"## SAML Tenant Binding Enables Cross-Tenant Account Takeover\n\n### Summary\n\nProwler's SAML authentication flow trusted the email domain asserted in a SAMLResponse when deciding which tenant should receive the final token. A malicious tenant with its own SAML configuration and a self-controlled IdP could complete a valid SAML flow for its own configured domain, while asserting an email address from another configured domain.\n\nIn the vulnerable flow, the ACS finish logic later derived the tenant from the asserted email domain instead of binding token issuance to the tenant associated with the validated SAML configuration. This could cause a token to be issued for the wrong tenant.\n\nThe attacker does not generally need to claim the victim's email domain. If the victim tenant already has SAML configured for that domain, another tenant cannot claim it because `SAMLConfiguration.email_domain` and `SAMLDomainIndex.email_domain` are globally unique.\n\n### Details\nThe confirmed root cause is in the SAML ACS finish and token issuance flow. The flow selected a SAML configuration through the ACS route, but later recalculated the tenant from the asserted user email domain:\n\n```python\nemail_domain","public_affected_ranges":["< 5.30.3"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-02T10:00:37.224Z","source_updated_at":"2026-09-11T21:38:25.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-09-11T21:38:24.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-01T22:54:05.264Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}