{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00014997","kind":"vulnerability","title":"@budibase/backend-core has potential SSRF DNS rebinding bypass in outbound fetch validation","revision":2,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-gfq7-5x4g-3xhf","CVE-2026-54353"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for @budibase/backend-core. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-19258c49d1b2ea7a6cc30d82173b0adc"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-08-12T18:57:28.000Z","value":"8.5 high","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-03fc8c8160aa396bdf6d953d475b5d6f"},{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-11-04T12:03:12.000Z","value":"0.213%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.11667. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-19258c49d1b2ea7a6cc30d82173b0adc"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-03fc8c8160aa396bdf6d953d475b5d6f","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-gfq7-5x4g-3xhf","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-gfq7-5x4g-3xhf","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-02T20:17:12.848Z"},{"id":"sr-19258c49d1b2ea7a6cc30d82173b0adc","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-54353","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-11-04T17:58:50.331Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-03fc8c8160aa396bdf6d953d475b5d6f"],"technology":"@budibase/backend-core","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"Summary\n\nAuthenticated users with automation permissions can bypass Budibase's SSRF blacklist through DNS rebinding.\n\nThe outbound fetch flow validates a hostname against the blacklist before the request is sent, but the actual socket connection later performs a separate DNS lookup through node-fetch. Since the validated IPs are never pinned to the connection, an attacker-controlled hostname can return a public IP during validation and a private/internal IP during the real connection.\n\nThis results in a non-blind SSRF primitive against internal services reachable from the Budibase host, including loopback, RFC1918 ranges, and cloud metadata endpoints.\n\nDetails\n\nThe issue comes from the outbound fetch validation flow resolving DNS twice:\n\nDuring blacklist validation\nAgain during the real socket connection\n\nThe first lookup result is discarded after validation, so the second lookup is free to resolve to a different IP.\n\nThis creates a classic TOCTOU DNS rebinding issue.\n\nAffected flow in:\n\npackages/backend-core/src/utils/outboundFetch.ts\n```\nasync function throwIfUnsafe(url: string): Promise {\n  const parsed = parseUrl(url)\n\n  if (await isBlacklisted(parsed.hostname)) {\n    thr","public_affected_ranges":["< 3.39.9"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-08T19:53:38.946Z","source_updated_at":"2026-08-12T18:57:28.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-06-22T23:39:24.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-02T20:17:12.848Z"},{"id":"NVI-00014997","kind":"vulnerability","title":"@budibase/backend-core has potential SSRF DNS rebinding bypass in outbound fetch validation","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-gfq7-5x4g-3xhf","CVE-2026-54353"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for @budibase/backend-core. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-03fc8c8160aa396bdf6d953d475b5d6f"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-08-12T18:57:28.000Z","value":"8.5 high","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-03fc8c8160aa396bdf6d953d475b5d6f"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-03fc8c8160aa396bdf6d953d475b5d6f","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-gfq7-5x4g-3xhf","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-gfq7-5x4g-3xhf","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-02T20:17:12.848Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-03fc8c8160aa396bdf6d953d475b5d6f"],"technology":"@budibase/backend-core","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"Summary\n\nAuthenticated users with automation permissions can bypass Budibase's SSRF blacklist through DNS rebinding.\n\nThe outbound fetch flow validates a hostname against the blacklist before the request is sent, but the actual socket connection later performs a separate DNS lookup through node-fetch. Since the validated IPs are never pinned to the connection, an attacker-controlled hostname can return a public IP during validation and a private/internal IP during the real connection.\n\nThis results in a non-blind SSRF primitive against internal services reachable from the Budibase host, including loopback, RFC1918 ranges, and cloud metadata endpoints.\n\nDetails\n\nThe issue comes from the outbound fetch validation flow resolving DNS twice:\n\nDuring blacklist validation\nAgain during the real socket connection\n\nThe first lookup result is discarded after validation, so the second lookup is free to resolve to a different IP.\n\nThis creates a classic TOCTOU DNS rebinding issue.\n\nAffected flow in:\n\npackages/backend-core/src/utils/outboundFetch.ts\n```\nasync function throwIfUnsafe(url: string): Promise {\n  const parsed = parseUrl(url)\n\n  if (await isBlacklisted(parsed.hostname)) {\n    thr","public_affected_ranges":["< 3.39.9"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-03T10:03:26.533Z","source_updated_at":"2026-08-12T18:57:28.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-06-22T23:39:24.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-02T20:17:12.848Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}