{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00014998","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Glances has a command injection bypass of action-template sanitizer via cross-field shell-operator reconstruction","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-qcpp-8x79-hhp3","CVE-2026-68518"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for glances. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-04cb7d260ce5b4cbe4d1a00aabcb2755"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-04cb7d260ce5b4cbe4d1a00aabcb2755","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-qcpp-8x79-hhp3","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-qcpp-8x79-hhp3","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-02T20:15:44.568Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-04cb7d260ce5b4cbe4d1a00aabcb2755"],"technology":"glances","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\nThe Glances action system lets an administrator configure shell commands that run\nwhen a monitoring threshold is crossed. The command is a Mustache template whose\nvariables are filled with runtime stat fields such as a process name, a container\nname or a filesystem mount point. Those fields are attacker-influenceable: a\nlocal, unprivileged user who starts a process (or a container) controls its name\nand command line. The rendered command is executed by `secure_popen()`, which\ninterprets `&&`, `|` and `>` as chaining / pipe / redirection operators.\n\n`glances/actions.py` defends against this with `_sanitize_mustache_dict()`, which\nstrips those operators from **each individual** template value before rendering.\nThe sanitization is applied per field, but the operators are reconstructed\n**across the boundary of two adjacent template variables** after Mustache\nrendering. When an action template concatenates two unescaped variables\n(`{{{a}}}{{{b}}}` or `{{&a}}{{&b}}`) and the attacker makes the first value end\nwith `&` and the second begin with `&`, the rendered command contains a real\n`&&`, and `secure_popen()` executes the injected command. The single-`&` in each\nvalue pass","public_affected_ranges":["<= 4.5.5"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-03T10:03:26.533Z","source_updated_at":"2026-08-17T16:36:37.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-08-17T16:36:37.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-02T20:15:44.568Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}