{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00015043","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Velero vulnerable to file path traversal when extracting from backup's tarball","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-j2g6-362q-6qc6","CVE-2026-32637"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for github.com/vmware-tanzu/velero. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-0fbb60162b7ab395c58c4d03bb736206"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-0fbb60162b7ab395c58c4d03bb736206","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-j2g6-362q-6qc6","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-j2g6-362q-6qc6","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-02T20:14:33.912Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-0fbb60162b7ab395c58c4d03bb736206"],"technology":"github.com/vmware-tanzu/velero","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Impact\n_What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?_\nIf the attacker compromises the backup's object storage backend and uploads a malicious backup tarball including file names like the following:\n* ../../../tmp/escape_1              -> file created at /tmp/escape_1\n* ../../../../../../../../tmp/escape_2 -> file created at /tmp/escape_2\n* ../../../tmp/cron_poc              -> would be /etc/cron.d/backdoor in real attack\n* ../../../tmp/ssh_poc               -> would be ~/.ssh/authorized_keys\n* ../../../tmp/kubeconfig_poc        -> would be ~/.kube/config\n\nIt's possible that extracting files from the tarball during restore can overwrite sensitive files in the Velero pod filesystem. \n\n### Patches\n_Has the problem been patched? What versions should users upgrade to?_\n\nBy far, there is no patch yet.\nWe are working on the main branch, then cherry-pick to the release-1.18 for v1.18.1 patch.\n\n### Workarounds\n_Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?_\n\nThere is no workaround, but the good news is that keeping your OSS safe will prevent the vulnerability.","public_affected_ranges":["< 1.18.1"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-03T10:03:26.539Z","source_updated_at":"2026-08-20T17:26:48.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-08-20T17:26:07.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-02T20:14:33.912Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}