{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00015047","kind":"vulnerability","title":"atomic-agents-stack: HTTP MCP catalog accepts cleartext http and spawns catalog-supplied commands (MITM to RCE)","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-xhcr-cqfr-m3hv"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for atomic-agents-stack. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-10d13b1502d524f9ae8388cdf96ffee2"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-10d13b1502d524f9ae8388cdf96ffee2","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-xhcr-cqfr-m3hv","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-xhcr-cqfr-m3hv","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-02T20:15:44.568Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-10d13b1502d524f9ae8388cdf96ffee2"],"technology":"atomic-agents-stack","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"The HTTP MCP server-registry backend factory (`atomic_agents/mcp_registry/http.py`, `make_http_mcp_server_registry_backend_from_url`) accepts both `http` and `https` schemes. Catalog entries carry `command`/`args` that are type-validated but content-unrestricted, and are later spawned as local stdio subprocesses by `MCPClientPool`. Over a cleartext `http://` catalog URL, a network man-in-the-middle can rewrite the catalog response to inject an arbitrary `command`/`args` and obtain code execution on the agent host, with no LLM involvement. The Policy MCP allowlist is not a default mitigation (`mcp_allow_fn` defaults to None), so absent an operator-authored allowlist every resolved spec connects.\n\n**Affected:** `mcp_registry/http.py`, all versions through 1.0.0. (The `https` path is sound: `httpx` defaults to `verify=True`, `follow_redirects=False`.)\n\n**Fix:** require `https` by default and gate `http://` behind a loud explicit opt-in. Defense-in-depth: allowlist the resolved command basename (or require confirmation) before any registry-sourced subprocess spawn. Document the consequence in spec/36.","public_affected_ranges":["<= 1.0.0"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-03T10:03:26.539Z","source_updated_at":"2026-08-17T21:49:55.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-08-17T21:49:55.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-02T20:15:44.568Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}