{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00015062","kind":"vulnerability","title":"ip-address: a CIDR suffix on the parsed address suppresses special-use classification and can bypass SSRF and trust-boundary checks","revision":2,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-4xrf-jv44-h6hh","CVE-2026-69198"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for ip-address. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-115cef6e32a87a5ddd1525dc352a2bc5"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"EPSS","as_of":"2026-11-04T12:03:12.000Z","value":"0.480%","meaning":"FIRST EPSS model v2026.06.15; exploitation probability over 30 days, percentile 0.41547. Missing scores are unknown.","source_id":"sr-115cef6e32a87a5ddd1525dc352a2bc5"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-14aae43c8ca7a3a19587c62b249aa85c","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-4xrf-jv44-h6hh","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-4xrf-jv44-h6hh","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-03T09:58:33.950Z"},{"id":"sr-115cef6e32a87a5ddd1525dc352a2bc5","url":"https://www.first.org/epss/data.html","basis":"official_catalog","notes":"FIRST EPSS; probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, not local compromise. Dataset date/model retained; FIRST services terms apply.","title":"CVE-2026-69198","publisher":"FIRST EPSS","observed_at":"2026-11-04T23:33:33.061Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-14aae43c8ca7a3a19587c62b249aa85c"],"technology":"ip-address","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\nEvery special-use classification method is built on `isInSubnet`, which short-circuits to `false` whenever the address's own subnet mask is *shorter* than the reference range's mask. That mask comes verbatim from the CIDR suffix on the parsed input, so appending a suffix such as `/0` suppresses classification entirely: `isLoopback()`, `isPrivate()`, `isLinkLocal()`, `isCGNAT()`, `isMulticast()`, `isUnspecified()`, `isBroadcast()`, `isULA()`, and `getType()` all report an internal address as unremarkable, while `correctForm()` and `address` still return the real internal target.\n\nAn application that builds a network trust-boundary decision on these checks (for example a filter intended to block Server-Side Request Forgery, or SSRF) may therefore treat an internal target as external and allow the request. SSRF is an attack in which a user-supplied address coaxes the server into making a request to an internal destination the user could not otherwise reach, such as a loopback service or a cloud metadata endpoint.\n\n### Details\n\n`isInSubnet` in `src/common.ts` opens with a guard that compares the two prefix lengths:\n\n```js\nexport function isInSubnet(this, address) {\n  if (t","public_affected_ranges":[">= 10.1.1, <= 10.2.1"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-07T14:02:01.403Z","source_updated_at":"2026-08-03T19:59:34.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-08-03T19:59:33.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"Dated EPSS estimate updated; this is not a new disclosure or proof of exploitation.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-03T09:58:33.950Z"},{"id":"NVI-00015062","kind":"vulnerability","title":"ip-address: a CIDR suffix on the parsed address suppresses special-use classification and can bypass SSRF and trust-boundary checks","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-4xrf-jv44-h6hh","CVE-2026-69198"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for ip-address. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-14aae43c8ca7a3a19587c62b249aa85c"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-14aae43c8ca7a3a19587c62b249aa85c","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-4xrf-jv44-h6hh","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-4xrf-jv44-h6hh","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-03T09:58:33.950Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-14aae43c8ca7a3a19587c62b249aa85c"],"technology":"ip-address","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n\nEvery special-use classification method is built on `isInSubnet`, which short-circuits to `false` whenever the address's own subnet mask is *shorter* than the reference range's mask. That mask comes verbatim from the CIDR suffix on the parsed input, so appending a suffix such as `/0` suppresses classification entirely: `isLoopback()`, `isPrivate()`, `isLinkLocal()`, `isCGNAT()`, `isMulticast()`, `isUnspecified()`, `isBroadcast()`, `isULA()`, and `getType()` all report an internal address as unremarkable, while `correctForm()` and `address` still return the real internal target.\n\nAn application that builds a network trust-boundary decision on these checks (for example a filter intended to block Server-Side Request Forgery, or SSRF) may therefore treat an internal target as external and allow the request. SSRF is an attack in which a user-supplied address coaxes the server into making a request to an internal destination the user could not otherwise reach, such as a loopback service or a cloud metadata endpoint.\n\n### Details\n\n`isInSubnet` in `src/common.ts` opens with a guard that compares the two prefix lengths:\n\n```js\nexport function isInSubnet(this, address) {\n  if (t","public_affected_ranges":[">= 10.1.1, <= 10.2.1"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-03T10:03:26.541Z","source_updated_at":"2026-08-03T19:59:34.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-08-03T19:59:33.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-03T09:58:33.950Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}