{"items":[{"id":"NVI-00015173","kind":"vulnerability","title":"Natural Language Toolkit (NLTK) has path traversal in FramenetCorpusReader.frame() that allows arbitrary XML file read, bypassing the nltk.pathsec sandbox (ENFORCE=True)","revision":1,"unknowns":["Customer inventory, deployment, reachability and exploitation have not been inspected."],"lifecycle":"active","identifiers":["GHSA-xh95-f55m-82fw","CVE-2026-12074"],"plain_summary":"GitHub lists this reviewed advisory for nltk. Published version ranges and source prerequisites are shown below; this is not an inspection of a visitor’s application.","review_status":"source_listed","control_topics":[],"public_actions":[{"summary":"Identify the exact component and deployed version, examine the linked publisher’s conditions, and retain evidence of any mitigation.","source_ids":["sr-3592dff8357264a79a38fc74c786aeb2"],"action_type":"investigate","limitations":"Confirm current vendor support, compatibility and deployment evidence. This report has not tested a fix in your system.","current_supported_target":null}],"schema_version":"1.1.0","source_metrics":[{"kind":"CVSS","as_of":"2026-07-31T16:50:41.000Z","value":"7.5 high","meaning":"GitHub source severity; exploitability and local consequence require separate evidence.","source_id":"sr-3592dff8357264a79a38fc74c786aeb2"}],"why_it_matters":"Published affected context helps an owner decide what evidence to gather. This report has not examined your application.","related_sources":[{"id":"sr-3592dff8357264a79a38fc74c786aeb2","url":"https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-xh95-f55m-82fw","basis":"vendor_advisory","notes":"GitHub Advisory Database; CC-BY-4.0. Each advisory links its original attribution. Null normalizes fields.","title":"GHSA-xh95-f55m-82fw","publisher":"GitHub Advisory Database","observed_at":"2026-11-03T09:58:49.818Z"}],"affected_context":[{"certainty":"source_listed","source_ids":["sr-3592dff8357264a79a38fc74c786aeb2"],"technology":"nltk","known_exclusions":[],"conditions_summary":"### Summary\n`FramenetCorpusReader.frame(name)` interpolates a caller-supplied frame name into an XML file path that is read with the builtin `open()`, bypassing `CorpusReader.open()` and the `nltk.pathsec` sandbox — including strict `ENFORCE=True` mode. A `../` sequence in the name escapes the corpus root, yielding an arbitrary XML file read whose parsed content is returned to the caller.\n\n\n### Details\n`frame_by_name` builds the path by joining the corpus root, the frame directory, and the caller-supplied name with a fixed `.xml` extension, with no containment check, then constructs an `XMLCorpusView` from that **string** path. Because the view is built from a string rather than a `PathPointer`, it reads with the builtin `open()`, so `nltk.pathsec.validate_path()` is never invoked and `ENFORCE=True` does not block the access. This is the same path-traversal class previously hardened for the generic corpus readers; `frame_by_name` never goes through `CorpusReader.open()`, so that protection does not apply.\n\nThe same string-path-into-`XMLCorpusView` pattern exists in two sibling methods that take a name from corpus data rather than the immediate caller:\n- `doc()` — uses the index ent","public_affected_ranges":["<= 3.9.4"]}],"null_published_at":"2026-11-03T10:03:26.556Z","source_updated_at":"2026-07-31T16:50:41.000Z","source_disclosed_at":"2026-07-31T16:50:41.000Z","is_synthetic_fixture":false,"null_last_reviewed_at":null,"public_change_summary":"First indexed by Null; source disclosure date is shown separately.","null_first_observed_at":"2026-11-03T09:58:49.818Z"}],"next_cursor":null,"snapshot_revision":"42594"}